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Hinging on economic theory predictions, this dissertation empirically examines the 
extent to which public policies influence youths and young adults smoking behaviors 
in Mexico. In the following, the decision to conduct the analysis separate for men and 
for women, in acknowledgement of separate gender paradigms, has yielded 
illuminating insights. This study contains three separate but related essays. 
The first essay develops a new index of clean indoor air policies, analyzing the 
role of these policies --and other variables-- as determinants of cigarette consumption. 
The new index and previously developed indices are positively correlated, but 
imperfectly so. More stringent laws are negatively associated with the number of 
cigarettes smoked by men, but have no influence on smoking participation for either 
men or women. The statistical and economically meaningful predictors of smoking 
vary with the dependent variable (i.e. smoking participation and conditional intensity), 
and by gender.  
 The second essay investigates the causal effect of Oportunidades, a federal 
social program, on the smoking behaviors of its participants. I find that the unbundled 
components of the program, inclusive of sizable cash transfers, health information 
sessions and schooling, have no effect on adult smoking; they have  a small positive 
effect on adolescent’s cigarette consumption. Differential program treatments by sex 
position the research to isolate the effect of income, which shall be demonstrated to be 
not-statistically different from zero. Null effects for women and adolescents are 
 
 
  
 
consistent with either: a) effects of each benefit in different directions that offset each 
other, or b) a zero effect of all components.  
The third essay measures, and disentangles, the correlation between schooling 
and smoking. The positive association among women is shown to be due to 
unobserved heterogeneity. Smoking is more prevalent among more sophisticated 
women coming from better-off backgrounds. Conversely, ‘Third Factors’ are not 
found to be behind the negative association between schooling and smoking among 
men. Using variation in junior high school classroom openings during the nineties to 
deal with the endogeneity of schooling, I find that higher educational achievement 
may cause less smoking among men.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1. Questions 
Since the study of smoking behaviors in developing economies is still a fresh 
area of research, much remains to be learned.  Analysts are typically drawn to the 
study of the causes of smoking in Mexico based on the strong consensus that smoking 
harms health. It is also true, however, that smokers receive benefits from smoking; 
otherwise they would not pay to do it. The economic models of addiction used as the 
basis of the empirical research in this dissertation contribute a better understanding to 
the individual’s complex decisions, where this particular harmful, health act is 
concerned, elucidating the compelling tradeoff between immediate gratification, on 
the one hand, and long-term health and well-being, on the other.  
Data from different sources allow, for the first time, the analysis of smoking 
behaviors in Mexico at the individual level. Emphasis is put on the effect of three sets 
of public policies that, based on theoretical and empirical economic research, are 
predicted to have influenced smoking behaviors substantially, through various 
channels.  
Separately assessing the impact upon men and upon women, the rest of the 
dissertation poses the following original questions:  
o Are clean indoor air policies associated with smoking participation and/or 
conditional intensity? What are the determinants of the demand for cigarettes 
among young adults?  
o What is the causal treatment effect of participation in the Oportunidades 
program on adolescent and adult smoking? Is the effect of this program 
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 heterogeneous across population subgroups defined in terms of their poverty 
intensity? What is the isolated income effect of the program on adult smoking? 
o Is the positive correlation between schooling and smoking among women, as 
contrasted with the negative association among men, driven by usually hard-to-
observe factors: such as utility function parameters, cognitive ability, and 
family background? If not, is the casual explanation, which correlates 
schooling with a diminishment in smoking useful?  
Knowledge about the determinants of smoking and the effect of various 
policies on the smoking behaviors of different population subgroups and across gender 
can help in targeting strategies that aim to minimize the harm associated with cigarette 
smoking. 
The rest of this chapter reviews up-to-date economic models of smoking, and 
describes the model that is used as the framework of analysis throughout this research. 
It also provides background on the demand and supply of cigarettes, against the 
backdrop of anti-smoking policies in Mexico. 
 
2. Overview of Economic Models of Addiction 
Unlike other goods, the nicotine contained in cigarettes makes their 
consumption addictive: smoking initiation leads to a compulsive need for, and use of, 
cigarettes. Standard economic theory predicts that the demand for a given good 
depends on its contemporaneous price, the current price of other products, individual’s 
income, tastes and other factors. Standard theory, however, does not reflect the 
dependence of current consumption decisions on past behavior, figuring highly in the 
case of addictive substances. This explains why addictive goods were once considered 
resistant to standard economic analysis (Chaloupka et al., 2000).  
2 
 Over the past few decades, a number of economic models, explicitly designed 
to incorporate the habit-forming nature of cigarette consumption, have emerged. 
Economic models of addiction can be divided into two major groups: myopic and 
rational. The main difference between these two groups of models hinges on the 
assumptions they make about individuals’ rationality, where rationality reflects the 
degree to which the addict considers the future implications of current consumption 
decisions. 
In myopic models of addiction, the individual recognizes the dependence of 
current addictive consumption decisions on past consumption. Nonetheless, when 
making current choices, individuals ignore the impact of current and past choices on 
future consumption. Tastes in myopic models have been treated both as endogenous 
(Gorman, 1967; Pollak, 1970) and exogenous (Mullahy’s, 1985).  
In rational addiction models individuals are assumed to be both backward and 
forward-looking. In the seminal rational-addictive work developed by Becker and 
Murphy (1988) individuals have stable preferences and seek to maximize life-time 
utility, taking into account the full price of addictive goods. Full price includes the 
current and future monetary price of cigarettes and the money value of the 
consequences of current consumption, such as the negative effects on earnings and the 
health problems associated with addiction.  
One of the most important criticisms to Becker and Murphy’s rational 
addiction model is its failure to capture the fact that just a few of the individuals who 
express a desire to quit the habit of smoking actually do it. To overcome this “self-
control” problem, the decision to smoke was modeled on the basis of a behavioral 
economics approach that allows individuals to be time-inconsistent (Gruber and 
Köszegi, 2001). Individuals who are time inconsistent behave as if harboring two 
personalities --one is a myopic doer who adores tobacco, and the other is a farsighted 
3 
 planner who wants clean lungs (Thaler and Shefrin, 1981). In time-inconsistent 
models today’s self is impatient. Faced with the tradeoff between the short- term 
pleasures of smoking and the long term health damages of doing so, the individual will 
prefer immediate gratification, so he will decide to smoke today. However, because 
tomorrow's self is much more patient, today’s choice of tomorrow’s consumption path 
will be consistent with the desire to quit smoking tomorrow. The problem is that when 
tomorrow comes, the future self who was patient is now the current impatient self. So 
the smoking continues to the long-term regret of the smoker; a smoker who does not 
always behave in his own interest.  
Testing sophisticated economic models of rational addiction (Becker and 
Murphy, 1988) or time inconsistent preferences (Gruber and Köszegi, 2001) requires 
longitudinal data and exogenous changes in full prices, which are not available in 
Mexico. Therefore, the demand for cigarettes in this dissertation relies on the 
predictions of the myopic model of cigarette demand developed by Mullahy (1985), 
which I discuss in turn.  
Mullahy’s (1985) myopic model is a one period model that captures the three 
defining characteristics of cigarette addiction, namely reinforcement, tolerance, and 
withdrawal. Reinforcement, as the key determinant in the myopic model, implies that 
the more one partakes of an activity, the more one wishes to partake. Due to the 
body’s adaptation to the drug, short-run tolerance implies that the benefit of smoking 
one more cigarette decreases with the amount of cigarettes already consumed. Because 
of a congestion phenomenon, long-run tolerance suggests that, holding constant the 
consumption of cigarettes, the production of nicotine is reduced when habit stocks are 
larger. Withdrawal reflects the negative physical reactions to the cessation, 
interruption, or reduction of consumption. Withdrawal effects are larger, the larger the 
stocks of habits are. 
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 In Mullahy’s model, the individual looks backward, but not forward, when 
facing the following instantaneous utility maximization problem: 
 
ܯܽݔ஺,௒          (1) ܷ
s.t  
ൌ ߶ሺܰ,ܪ, ܻሻ 
,ܰ ൌ ߤሺܣ, ܵ ߠሻ 
ሺܣܪ ൌ ߖ , ܵ, ߠሻ 
௒ܲ
ߠ ൌ
ܣ ஺ܲ ൅ ܻ ൌ ܫ 
ܵ ൌ ܵ଴ ,     ߠ଴ 
ܣ ൒ 0, ܻ ൒ 0 
 
ܰ is nicotine service flows, ܪ represents the perceptions of the individual in terms of 
health promotion and ܻ is a composite of non-addictive goods. The utility function is 
increasing in ܪ and Y. ߶ே ൐ 0 if the individual likes smoking. Both ܰ and ܪ are non-
market commodities produced by transforming inputs. The individual’s technological 
possibilities for the production of ܰ and ܪ are represented by the function N=ߤሺ. ሻ and 
ܪ ൌ ߖሺ. ሻ, respectively. ܣ, which stands for “addictive good,” is cigarette 
consumption; and ܵ is a quasi-fixed factor of production which is held at the level 
ܵ଴ ൌ ܵሺܶሻ in the instantaneous optimization problem. ߠ is a vector of variables that 
reflects tastes such as age, gender and education. In the budget constraint restriction, ܫ 
is income, ஺ܲ is the price of the addictive good and ௒ܲ is the price of the composite 
non-addictive good.  
Due to short-run tolerance, the returns of the consumption of the addictive 
good are positive but decreasing. Therefore ߤ஺ ൐ 0 and  ߤ஺஺ ൏ 0.  Long-term 
tolerance states that, holding the consumption of the addictive good constant, larger 
habit stocks reduce the production of nicotine services due to congestion; implying 
that ߤௌ ൏ 0 . Long-term tolerance also suggests that ߤ஺ௌ ൏ 0 because the marginal 
product of the consumption of the addictive good is diminished by increases in the 
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 stock of habits.1 On the other hand, reinforcement suggests that ߤ஺ௌ ൐ 0. Therefore, 
the sign of ߤ஺ௌ depends on whether long-term tolerance or reinforcement are 
dominant.  
ߖ஺ ൑ 0 for, when consumption increases, the perceptions of the individual in 
terms of health promotion do not increase. ߖ஺஺ can either be positive or negative. 
Since the stock is seen as a commitment to smoking, the greater the stock, the higher 
the health promotion perceptions implying that ߖௌ ൐ 0.  ߖ஺ௌ ൐ 0 (i.e. the perception 
of incremental health promotion due to additional cigarettes smoked increases with 
increasing levels of the stock).  
The habit stock serves formally as a constraint on the instantaneous 
optimization problem ሺ1ሻ, and affects demands through its role in the production of 
nicotine services. The stock equals the depreciated sum of an individual’s past 
consumption of the addictive good as expressed in equation ሺ2ሻ: 
 
ܵ ൌ ܵሺܶሻ ൌ ׬ ݁ି௥ሺ்ି௧ሻܣሺݐሻ݀ݐఝ      ሺ2ሻ 
 
where the process {A(t)}tא ߮  is the lifetime profile of an individuals' use of A, r>0 is 
a decay rate, ߮ ൌ ൣ ෰ܶ , T൧, ܶ is the instant of decision and  ෰ܶ  is the initial time of 
positive purchase or utilization.  
ܵሺݐሻ is the solution to the differential equation relating changes in the state 
variable ܵ to instantaneous consumption-investment, ܣሺݐሻ, and depreciation of 
existing stocks at the rate ߜ: 
 
                                                 
1  Under these circumstances, an individual would rather prefer to reduce the stocks, but the quasi-fixed 
nature of the stock precludes any instantaneous diminution of the habit stock. In addition, the myopic 
behavior implies that individuals do not recognize at the instant of choice that the present use of the 
habituating good is serving as an investment in the stock.   
6 
 ሶܵ ൌ ܣሺݐሻ െ ߜܵሺݐሻ       ሺ3ሻ 
 
Therefore, the only means for augmenting (decreasing) S is through 
investments in cigarette consumption (depreciation).  
The demand function of the addictive good resulting as solution to problem (1) 
above is: 
 
ܣሺݐሻ ൌ ሾࣂሺݐሻ, ܵሺݐሻ, ஺ܲሺݐሻ, ௒ܲሺݐሻ, ܫሺݐሻ, ሿ               ሺ4ሻ 
 
The demand function of addictive goods is thus a function of a vector of 
measured exogenous covariates; these in turn hold sway over numerous associated 
factors:  the production of nicotine services and the perceptions of health promotion; 
the stock of the addictive good, own and cross prices, and individual income. Under 
certain parameter assumptions, not smoking is in the best interest of an individual, but 
smoking might also be.  
 
3. Overview of the tobacco market in Mexico   
Table 1.1, Panel A reports smoking indicators for individuals aged 20 to 65 by 
sex, calculated from the National Health and Nutrition Survey, 2006. As can readily 
be seen from this table, a gap exists between men’s and women’s current and former 
smoking rates. 30.1 percent of men and 9.5 of women report to be current smokers. 
Former smokers represent 16.50 percent of men and 5.80 percent of women.  
Compared to more developed countries, the intensity of smoking, measured as the 
number of cigarettes smoked a day, is relatively low in Mexico for both men and 
women. Even so, cigarette smoking is responsible for 9 percent of the annual deaths 
7 
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Table 1.1 Profile of Smoking in Mexico. 
  Men  Women 
  Mean  SD  Mean  SD 
Panel A. Smoking Status      
Current   0.301  0.459  0.095  0.294 
Former   0.165  0.371  0.058  0.234 
No. Cigarettes&  5.886  7.725  4.125  5.473 
Panel B. Individual Characteristics       
Cohort:        
20-29  0.344  0.344  0.107  0.107 
30-39  0.327  0.327  0.098  0.098 
40-49  0.304  0.304  0.111  0.111 
50-65  0.286  0.286  0.088  0.088 
Indigenous Condition:        
No  0.310  0.462  0.102  0.303 
Yes  0.181  0.385  0.009  0.094 
Marital Status:        
Married  0.298  0.458  0.079  0.270 
Divorced  0.279  0.449  0.119  0.324 
Single  0.317  0.465  0.130  0.336 
Income (pesos):        
No income  0.274  0.446  0.084  0.277 
0-1 thousand  0.222  0.416  0.050  0.218 
1-2 thousand  0.244  0.430  0.076  0.265 
2-5 thousand  0.326  0.469  0.139  0.346 
5 thousand or more  0.335  0.472  0.191  0.393 
Employment status:        
Employed  0.315  0.464  0.130  0.336 
Unemployed  0.414  0.494  0.198  0.402 
Inactive  0.229  0.421  0.075  0.263 
Schooling:        
Elementary or less  0.282  0.450  0.060  0.237 
Junior high school  0.351  0.477  0.099  0.298 
High school  0.337  0.473  0.175  0.380 
College  0.261  0.439  0.158  0.365 
Observations 16991  22121 
 
  
Notes: Sample aged 20 to 65 years. &Smokers=5098 men and 6503 women. 
Source: National Health and Nutrition Survey, 2006 
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 Table 1.1 (Continued) 
 
  Men  Women 
  Mean  SD  Mean  SD 
Panel C. Location      
Area:      
Urban  0.318  0.466  0.114  0.318 
Rural  0.239  0.427  0.022  0.147 
Region:        
Northwest  0.295  0.456  0.095  0.293 
Northeast  0.336  0.473  0.118  0.323 
Southeast  0.223  0.417  0.037  0.188 
Center  0.353  0.478  0.143  0.351 
West  0.303  0.460  0.086  0.280 
Observations 16991  22121 
 
 
 
Notes: Sample aged 20 to 65 years. 
Source: National Health and Nutrition Survey, 2006 
among Mexican men aged 35 and over, and 6 percent among women in the same age 
range (Valdés Salgado, 2005).  
Smoking rates by socio-demographic characteristics are presented in Table 1.1, 
panel B. Men and women who are not indigenous, single, wealthy, and unemployed 
are more likely to smoke. There is no clear pattern between smoking rates and age in 
women; but men are less likely to smoke as they age. For both men and women, there 
is a U-shaped relationship between income and smoking rates. Finally, the percentage 
of smokers decreases substantially after junior high school among men. Surprisingly, 
the schooling-smoking gradient among women is positive and steep up to high school, 
and it decreases only slightly for those with college diplomas.   
The prevalence of smoking varies significantly across geographic units (Table 
1.1, panel C). Cigarette consumption is more prominent in urban than in rural areas. 
The highest prevalence of tobacco consumption is in Central Mexico and the lowest in 
the Southeast region. This evidence suggests that smoking is more prevalent in 
developed areas.  
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 Recent epidemiological trends can be summarized as follows. First, the 
percentage of male smokers has remained relatively stable since 1988. Second, a 
higher percentage of women and adolescents smoke. And third, compared with older 
cohorts, the average age of addictive onset is lower among younger cohorts. It is 20.6 
years for the cohort born in 1930 and 16.6 years for the cohort born between 1975 and 
1978 (Campuzano-Rincón et al., 2005).   
The tobacco market in Mexico is oligopolistic. Two companies hold about half 
of the national market share: British American Tobacco (BAT) and Cigatam-Philip 
Morris. These companies offer a wide spectrum of cigarette brands, with and without 
filter. Cigatam's brands include Marlboro--Mexico's bestselling cigarette since 1990--
and Benson & Hedges. BAT owns three of the top five brands in Mexico: Boots, 
Raleigh and Montana.  
Cigarettes are sold at accessible prices. Data from barcode scanning in large 
food stores, reported monthly by The Central Bank of Mexico, suggests that the 
average price of a pack of twenty cigarettes in 2006 was almost 15 pesos (about 1 US 
dollar). The minimum price was 12.9 pesos and the maximum 17.5 pesos.  
 
4. Rationale for Government Intervention and Anti-smoking policies in Mexico 
Despite the health and other consequences associated with smoking, standard 
economic theory provides no justification for government intervention in the market 
when rational consumers know all the risks and bear all the costs of their choices. Two 
market failures justify government intervention: 1) inadequate information about the 
addictive nature of tobacco consumption and the health risks of engaging in this 
behavior, and 2) physical externalities derived from second hand smoking, alongside 
the financial externalities arising in countries with an element of publicly financed 
healthcare, where non-smokers pay a share of the medical costs associated with the 
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 treatment of tobacco-related illnesses (Jha et al., 2000). In addition, economic models 
that depart from rational choice suggest that “optimal government policy should 
depend not only on the externalities that smokers impose on others but also on the 
"internalities" imposed by smokers on themselves” (Gruber and Köszegi, 2001, p. 
1261). 
A wide array of anti-smoking policies have been implemented in Mexico and 
elsewhere. Some of these are ‘first-best’ policies aiming to address a specific, 
identified market inefficiency. Other interventions are not justified by economic 
theory, but follow public health goals (e.g. reducing tobacco use in response to the 
world’s tobacco epidemic). Nearly all tobacco control policies in Mexico emanate 
from the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC). This is an international 
treaty that Mexico ratified in May of 2004, by which it agreed to adopt or maintain 
certain tobacco control measures.     
 The first national anti-smoking program in Mexico was launched in 1990, 
when the hazards of smoking where recognized in the Federal Health Act for the first 
time. Anti-smoking policies remained lax until 2000. After that year, taxes were 
raised, health-warning labels and anti-smoking mass media campaigns launched, and 
youth access restrictions to cigarettes and clean indoor air laws strengthened. Except 
for clean indoor air laws, all tobacco control policies are set at the national level. A 
brief description of these policies follows.  
There are two types of taxes levied on manufactured cigarettes in Mexico: a 15 
percent value-added tax, applied to the retail price; and a special tax on production and 
services (IEPS, in Spanish). By 2007, the average IEPS levied on cigarettes 
represented 140 percent of their total price.  In the same year, the tax incidence on 
tobacco (i.e. the sum of all taxes on tobacco as a percentage of the retail price) 
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 represented 63.8 percent of the retail price of cigarettes (Sáenz de Miera et al., 2007). 
Unlike in other countries, taxes in Mexico do not vary across geographic units. 
Two policy options have been used to address the information market-failure: 
antismoking campaigns and health-warning labels on cigarette packs. Anti-smoking 
campaigns consist of print and electronic mass media, disseminating information on 
the health risks of smoking, and the benefits of quitting smoking. Health warnings on 
cigarette packages were displayed for the first time in July of 2000, when the 
Regulation on the Control of Tobacco Consumption was enacted. Since the advent of 
stronger regulations, both the size and content of the health-warning labels have 
changed. Since 2004, health-warning labels take up 50 percent of the main display 
surface of the package and they clearly state the hazards of smoking.  
In terms of advertising, the Federal Regulation on Cigarette Advertising 
enacted in 2000 was mainly focused on regulating sponsorships. Tobacco advertising 
was not banned in radio and television until 2004 (Sáenz de Miera et al, 2007). In that 
same year, cigarette publicity was prohibited within 200 meters of schools, hospitals 
and other public entrances. In addition, the distribution of free tobacco samples to 
minors was outlawed. To date, low-tar “light” cigarette advertisement is still 
permitted.  
Youth access laws in Mexico include minimum age-at-sale (18 years), banning 
of self-service displays, limits to vending machines, and bans on loose cigarette sale. 
Despite the cited bans regarding the sale, or distribution of tobacco to under-age 
adolescents, Kuri et al. (2006) have found that 73 percent of retailers in Mexico City 
sell cigarettes to minors; only 7 percent of vendors ask customers to show a valid 
identification.  
Clean indoor air laws are regulations that aim to protect the 41 percent of 
Mexicans who are affected by second-hand smoking (INEGI, 2004). Clean indoor air 
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 laws were implemented for the first time in 1990, when the Ministry of Health banned 
smoking in all health care centers. This regulation was extended to all federal 
buildings in 2000.  
Clean indoor air policies are the only anti-smoking policies that vary across 
states. By April of 2008, 21 states had enacted clean-air statues, of which only Baja 
California, Tlaxcala, and Aguascalientes, passed laws before the Tobacco Control Act 
was enacted in 2000.  
 
5. Economic Analysis of Smoking in Mexico 
The last decade has seen a growing number of economists devote substantial 
effort to more fully understanding the tobacco market. Empirical application of recent 
theoretical perspectives on addictive goods has aided the understanding of the role of 
prices, policies and other determinants of smoking. Most economic research has 
focused on developed countries. The lack of research in developing countries is 
particularly striking, given that more than half of smokers live in these parts of the 
globe (Warner, 2008).  
All the studies of cigarette consumption in Mexico have attempted to identify 
the effect of prices on smoking participation and conditional intensity (Sesma-
Vázquez et al. 2002; Sesma-Vázquez et al., 2005; and Jiménez-Ruíz et al. 2008). The 
unit of analysis in these studies is households, which might mask features of the 
smoking decisions that take place individually. Also, their measure of price, computed 
as a household’s expenditures on cigarettes divided by the number of packs purchased 
by a household or by a group of households sharing a number of socioeconomic 
characteristics, has as its denominator an endogenously determined quantity.   
To the best of my knowledge, this dissertation constitutes the first thorough 
analysis of cigarette consumption in Mexico from an economic perspective. This study 
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 is novel in various ways. First, I concentrate attention on a series of policies that, 
based on previous theoretical and empirical health economics research, are predicted 
to have possible non-intended effects on smoking. I am aware of no previous study 
that has investigated the effectiveness of clean indoor air laws or any other of the 
recent tobacco regulations in Mexico. I therefore ask whether differences in the 
enactment and stringency of clean indoor laws are associated with smoking 
consumption. I also measure the effect on smoking decisions of the Oportunidades 
program and of an exogenous change in classroom availability that affected schooling. 
Second, an in contrast with previous studies, I use individual rather than household-
level data. Third, the analysis is conducted separately for men and women, which 
gives new insights in terms of the motivations for health investments by gender.  
In the course of this research, I use a number of different data sets. Household-
based surveys include the National Health Survey 2000, the National Health and 
Nutrition Survey 2006, the ENCASEH 1997, the ENCEL 2003, the Mexican Family 
Life Survey 2002 and 2005 and the National Survey of Addictions 2002. I also use 
numerous state-level characteristics. The sources of these data and the definition of the 
variables are discussed in each chapter. I use so many data sets because no single 
source of data has information on all the hypotheses I seek to test. Most of the analysis 
in this dissertation uses quasi-experimental research designs to achieve casual 
inference. 
 
6. Layout of the Dissertation 
The remainder of this dissertation is comprised of four chapters. Chapter Two 
is the first substantive essay. It develops a new index of clean indoor air policies and 
analyzes the role of these policies and other variables as determinants of cigarette 
consumption. Chapter Three investigates the causal effect of a federal anti-poverty 
15 
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program in Mexico, Oportunidades, on the smoking behaviors of its participants. 
Chapter Four measures and disentangles the correlation between schooling and 
smoking. Chapter Five elucidates my research conclusions.  
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 CHAPTER 2 
 
CLEAN INDOOR AIR POLICIES AND SMOKING 
 
1. Introduction 
As of 2008, 21 of the 32 states in Mexico had enacted regulations aiming to 
restrict smoking indoors. Despite the growing number of public health advocates for 
ordinances restricting smoking in public places (the Economist, 2008), the 
effectiveness of these laws as tobacco control strategies in Mexico has not been 
assessed yet. Nor has individual-level data been used to explore the determinants of 
smoking in Mexico. This paper attempts to fill these gaps by examining whether state-
level clean indoor air laws and other socio-economic characteristics affect individual 
smoking behaviors. 
The aim of clean indoor air policies is to protect non-smokers from the 
physical discomfort associated with passive smoking, such as irritation, annoying 
effects and health effects. These policies also aim to resolve the financial externalities 
that come about when, in countries where health care is publicly financed, non-
smokers pay a share of the medical costs associated with the treatment of smoking 
related diseases medical costs associated with tobacco related illness treatments. These 
costs accounted for about 5 percent of the total expenditure of the Mexican Social 
Security Institute,--the principal health care provider in Mexico--(Reynales et al., 
2006). Government interventions like this are justified by economic theory on 
efficiency grounds (Jha et al., 2000).   
Despite that clean indoor air policies do not intend to address the choice of 
whether to smoke, economic models of addiction suggest that they might decrease 
cigarette consumption. These models predict that the optimal level of tobacco 
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 consumption occurs when the marginal costs of smoking equal the benefits. 
Restrictions to smoke in enclosed areas increase the costs associated with smoking. By 
imposing fines or other penalties to people smoking indoors, stringent and enforced 
laws increase the monetary costs of cigarette consumption. To adhere with the laws 
smokers are forced to smoke outdoors. This raises the time, and possibly the 
discomfort, associated with smoking. Bans on public and workplace smoking augment 
the individuals’ direct and indirect costs of smoking relative to the benefits, which 
might prompt some smokers to cut back their consumption or quit.  
Clean indoor air laws are not necessarily binding for all individuals. As in 
many other countries, smoking restrictions in Mexico are limited to certain locations 
(e.g. workplaces and hospitals). Where imposed, the constringency of the provisions is 
not homogenous. In some places regulations are very restrictive, but in others they are 
merely symbolic legislative statements. Tobacco control laws impose greater costs on 
individuals who spend most of their time in locations where the provisions are either 
more restrictive or better enforced. Put it differently, people who spend no time in 
places where smoking is limited or prohibited face no extra costs of smoking, so law 
enactment is unlikely to influence these individual’s smoking decisions. Additionally, 
laws that are not enforced, or perceived not to be, have much the same effect as having 
no law.  
Previous empirical research has examined the relationship between clean 
indoor air regulation and cigarette consumption. In the U.S., solid support has been 
found for the hypothesis that restrictions on smoking in enclosed places have a 
significant effect on both adult and teenage smoking participation or conditional 
demand (see, for example, Wasserman et al., 1991; Ross and Chaloupka, 2004; 
DeCicca et al., 2008a). The effect of these policies has been generally measured with a 
dummy indicating whether a law has been enacted in a given state/county. Only a few 
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 papers have made steps to incorporate specific features of the law in the analysis of the 
effectiveness of clean indoor air policies on smoking.  For example, Tauras (2006) and 
Chirqui et al. (2002) rated each location on the extensiveness of legislative provisions. 
Both studies then created an index of clean-air laws as a weighted average of specific-
location ratings. A caveat of these studies is that, assuming that the effect of bans on 
smoking is independent of the time people spend in each location, all locations are 
weighted equally.  
Some studies have considered that more comprehensive laws are those that 
cover places where a large fraction of the population is intended to be affected or 
where individuals spend a large amount of time. Chaloupka and Pacula (1999) used as 
weights the fraction of the population who are subject to smoking restrictions in the 
person’s county of residence. An index developed in a Surgeon General’s report 
assigned full weight to private worksites because “individuals spend more time at 
work than in any other place outside the home” (U.S. DHS, 1986; p. 327), but it 
neglected that people spend time in other locations besides workplaces. None of these 
indices measure the degree of stringency or take into account the enforcement aspect 
of the law.  
Building on economic theory predictions, one contribution of this study is to 
develop a new method to create an index of clean indoor air tobacco control policies. 
Employing this index, which is more comprehensive than previous indices, helps to 
deal with the problem of multicollinearity among numerous policies regulating 
smoking behaviors.  As in previous indices, this index takes into account whether 
smoking is partially or fully banned. It improves upon previous indices in two main 
ways. First, the contribution of each location to the overall index is a function of the 
costs imposed on potential smokers. Holding the restriction level constant, the larger 
the fraction of the population spending most of their time in a given location, the 
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 higher the contribution of that location to the overall index is. Second, the 
effectiveness of the clean indoor air restrictions in this index varies with the 
enforcement level of the law. The index developed in this chapter serves to generate a 
“summary score” of the legislation for population subgroups in each state, thus 
facilitating comparison of clean indoor air restrictions across populations, geographic 
areas and over time. The index is applied here to Mexican data.  
Another contribution of this chapter is the analysis of the determinants of 
cigarette consumption, paying particular attention to the role of clean indoor air 
policies. Sesma-Vázquez et al. (2002), Sesma-Vázquez et al. (2005), and Jiménez-
Ruíz et al. (2008) have provided some initial steps towards an evidence-based 
diagnostic of the determinants of cigarette use in Mexico. Instead of using household-
level data as in previous studies, I use individual-level data. Indeed, the empirical 
analysis is conducted separately for men and women. This distinction is important as 
previous research has suggested that there are sex differences in nicotine metabolism 
(Ben-Zaken Cohen, et al., 2007). Also, the fact that the male population in Mexico 
smokes three times as much as the female population and that the gender gap has 
narrowed over time suggests that men, women, youth and old adults might have 
different motivations for smoking, and may also respond to the same incentives 
distinctly.  
The empirical analysis is based on individual information from the National 
Health and Nutrition Survey, 2006, matched to clean indoor air and other policies at 
the state and at the state and economic activity levels. The sample is restricted to 
individuals aged 20 to 50 years. The estimation equation is derived from Mullahy’s 
(1985) model of addiction presented in the Introduction of this dissertation. I use a 
linear probability model for the estimation of smoking participation and ordinary least 
squares to estimate the conditional intensity of smoking. In alternative models I use a 
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 probit model to estimate smoking participation. The preferred measure of clean indoor 
air policies is the index developed in this chapter, but I also explore other measures of 
state regulations restricting smoking in public places. 
The findings in this chapter suggest that more stringent laws have no influence 
on smoking participation for either men or women, but are negatively associated with 
the number of cigarettes smoked by males. More specifically, a one unit increase in 
the index is associated with 6.2 less cigarettes smoked a day. The statistical and 
economically meaningful predictors of smoking vary with the dependent variable (i.e. 
smoking participation and conditional intensity), and by gender.  
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. In section 2 I develop an index of 
clean indoor air policies. Section 3 applies this index to Mexican data and compares it 
to previously developed indices. Section 4 discusses the data and methods to be used 
in the analysis of the determinants of cigarette consumption among young Mexican 
adults. Section 5 presents the empirical results on the determinants of smoking, paying 
particular attention to the role of policies that limit smoking indoors. Section 6 
explores the causes of the effects found in Section 5 and discusses the results in the 
context of the current economic literature. Section 7 concludes and provides 
guidelines for future research. 
 
2. Clean Indoor Air Policy Index  
This section develops a Clean Indoor Air Policy Index (CIAPI), which 
provides a composite snapshot of clean indoor air policies. The CIAPI has two 
dimensions. The first dimension measures the strictness of tobacco control restrictions 
in public places. The second dimension assesses the overall level of enforcement of 
the policies in those locations.  
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 The calculation of the strictness dimension involves four steps. First, following 
Chriqui et al. (2002), the severity of state clean indoor air laws in each location is 
rated based on general guidelines reflecting health policy goals. For example, states 
with full bans on smoking in workplaces might receive the maximum rating value 
when that is the target to aspire to. Compared to those states, states where smoking is 
permitted in designated areas will get lower scores.   
 Second, a performance indicator ܮ௜௦ is calculated for each location i in state s. 
This can be done applying the following formula: 
ܮ௜௦ ൌ
௔௖௧௨௔௟ ௩௔௟௨௘ି௠௜௡௜௠௨௠ ௩௔௟௨௘
௧௔௥௚௘௧ ௩௔௟௨௘ି௠௜௡௜௠௨௠ ௩௔௟௨௘
  ሺ1ሻ 
 
 
ܮ௜௦ in (1) ranges between 0 and 1. Values of performances lower than one indicate that 
the restrictions in a specific location fall far short of what is considered to be optimum 
legislation. 
Third, the total population is divided into groups based on broad categories of 
main economic activity (e.g. public workers and students) and the average time each 
of the groups spends at each location is estimated. The total number of groups might 
be larger than the groups affected by the law. This is possible when the legislation 
does not consider bans in places where relevant groups spend most of the time, and the 
principles for banning smoking in those places are similar to those in other place (e.g. 
regulations in homes as workplaces). The fourth step involves the calculation of the 
strictness of the law dimension. For each group ݃ considered, the strictness index  ܵ௦௚ 
is calculated as a weighted average of location-specific performance levels:  
 
௚ܵ௦ ൌ  ∑ ߙ௜௚௦ܮ௜௦ 
௡
௜ୀଵ        ሺ2ሻ 
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 The weights ߙ௜௚௦ are the average proportion of time that people in group ݃  
spend at location ݅ and state s. The fifth step is optional. State-level strictness indices 
might be constructed based on group-specific indices if the proportion of the 
population in each group ሺ ௚ܲሻ  is known. This can be done as follows:  
ܵ௦ ൌ  ∑ ௚ܲ ௚ܵ௦ ସ௚ୀଵ        ሺ3ሻ 
 
 
The calculation of the enforcement dimension involves three similar steps. In 
the first step two other features of the legislation are tallied based on targets. One 
aspect measures the degree to which the law defines sanctions to smokers and 
proprietors (i.e. sanctions Sୱ). The other evaluates whether an appropriate authority is 
designated to enforce the law (i.e. enforcement agency Aୱሻ. The second step involves 
calculating a performance indicator for each enforcement aspect using a formula 
similar to (1) above. Finally, the enforcement dimension Eୱ in state s is calculated as a 
weighted average of its two components. The weights are equal because higher 
penalties are not effective if no proper authority is designated to enforce the law and 
vice versa:  
 
ܧ௦ ൌ  
ଵ
ଶ
ܣ௦ ൅
ଵ
ଶ
ܵ௦  ሺ4ሻ 
 
In any given year, the Clean Indoor Air Policy Index ܥܫܣܲܫ for a given state and 
population subgroup can be expressed as:  
ܥܫܣܲܫ௚௦ ൌ ܤ௚௦ כ  ܧ௦ ሺ5ሻ 
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 The two components enter equation ሺ5ሻ multiplicatively to reflect that the efficacy of 
smoking restrictions should depend on both the stringency of the law and its 
enforcement level. The overall index thus decreases as differences in the actual and 
desired level of enforcement increase. The CIAPI is a standardized index ranging from 
0 to 1. As previously mentioned, the CIAPI index might also be expressed at the state 
level. To do that ܤ௚௦ in equation ሺ5ሻ may be replaced by ܤ௦. 
The clean indoor air policy index developed in this section improves upon 
previous indices in two main ways. First, it assesses the extent to which different 
people should be affected by clean indoor air policies varying the location-specific 
weights according to the proportion of people attending the place in question and the 
average duration of their visits. Second, the effectiveness of the restrictions in this 
index depends on the enforcement of the law. Additionally, defining the index at the 
economic activity and state level allows comparisons across states, population 
subgroups and over time. The first application of this index to Mexican data is 
discussed in turn. 
 
3. Clean Indoor Air Policy Index in Mexico 
As of May of 2006, 13 of the 32 states in Mexico had laws restricting smoking 
in Mexico. The state-level legislation for the calculation of the Clean Indoor Air 
Policy Index developed in the previous section comes from Orden Jurídico Nacional, 
a repository of laws available online and personal communications with state Congress 
officers. The index scores the strictness of regulations in eleven locations: public 
workplaces, private workplaces, schools, houses (as workplaces), public 
transportation, restaurants, retail stores, recreational facilities, cultural facilities, health 
care facilities and private homes.  The Appendix of this chapter provides details on 
how the laws were coded and how the weights were calculated. 
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In principle, location-specific weights of the CIAPI should be constructed 
calculating the time individuals spend in each place they report to be. I am not aware 
of any dataset asking detailed information on where people were, either in Mexico or 
elsewhere. The Mexican Time Use Survey, 2002 used in this chapter is not ideal, but it 
is the most suitable available data to compute weights. In many circumstances this 
survey asked what people did in the reference week and where they did what they did. 
For example, people reported the time spent studying at school and at home. In other 
circumstances, however, individuals only reported what they did. Hence, based on 
people’s responses on what they had done I inferred where people were. For example, 
I assumed that all the people who reported to have cleaned their houses did it indoors, 
but they could have done it outdoors.  
The CIAPI index was calculated separately for men and women. To be 
consistent with the sample restrictions used in the analysis of cigarette consumption, 
the index weights were based on the time spent by people aged 20 to 50 years. The 
index discussed in this section is composed of four groups: public workers, private 
workers, students and house workers.  
Table 2.1 presents evidence suggesting that there is multicollinearity between 
smoking restrictions in different locations. The pairwise correlations of smoking 
restriction scores reach up to level 0.95 (top of the table). Except for two cases, the 
variance inflation factors exceed 10; the cutoff that has been suggested to denote 
collinearity (see Belsley, 1991). R-squares from auxiliary regressions that use each 
location as the dependent variable and other locations as independent variable range 
from 0.84 to 0.99, indicating that restrictions in other locations explain most of the 
variation of the restrictions in a given location. The CIAPI index developed in the 
previous section addresses the correlation problem among policy variables. 
 Table 2.1 Multicollinearity tests of Clean Indoor Air Policies in Locations Considered in the Mexican Legislation. 
 
 Pairwise Correlation 
VIF R-squared  Work Schools Transp. Restaur. Retail Stores 
Recreat. 
Place 
Cultural 
Places 
Health 
Care 
Centers
Sanctions 
Work 1          6.07  0.84 
Schools 0.781 1        37.43 0.97 
Transport. 0.649 0.797 1       25.29 0.96 
Restaur. 0.651 0.699 0.588 1      20.87 0.95 
Retail 
Stores 0.673 0.795 0.810 0.592 1     98.02 
28 0.99 
Recreat. 
Places 0.258 0.642 0.337 0.287 0.496 1    9.23 0.89 
Cultural 
Places 0.814 0.858 0.808 0.843 0.906 0.369 1   187.33 0.99 
Health Care 
Centers 0.795 0.772 0.863 0.740 0.691 0.119 0.848 1    19.35 0.95 
Sanctions 0.696 0.769 0.951 0.616 0.753 0.306 0.786 0.884 1   17.22 0.94 
Enforcement 
Agency 0.777 0.920 0.800 0.814 0.653 0.441 0.841 0.841 0.800 44.43 0.98 
Notes: Tranport=Transportation, Restaur.=Restaurants, Recreat.=Recreational,VIF=Variance Inflation Factors and R-squared comes from regressions 
where regulations in a given location are regressed on restrictions in all other locations. 
Source: Own calculations based on Mexican statutory state legislation 
 
 
 
 Table 2.2 illustrates the calculation of the ܥܫܣܲܫ at the state-level in the states 
with the lowest CIAPI for women and the highest for men (henceforth, state 1 and 2). 
The strictness dimension in state 1 is very low because the population share with the 
highest index (students) is small, and that of the lowest index (home workers) is large. 
In contrast, state 2 has a relatively high index because the restrictions in private and 
public workplaces in this state rank the highest, and the percentage of people affected 
by these provisions represents 86 percent of the population. Both state indices drop 
when the enforcement component is taken into account. This is because, based on 
health targets, the enforcement level is 50 percent of what it should be in state 1 and 
75 percent of what is ought to be in state 2.  
 
Table 2.2 Example of the Calculation of the Clean Indoor Air Policy Index 
(CIAPI) at the State-Level. 
 
  Group-specific 
strictness index,  Sgs 
(1) 
Population 
Share, Ps 
(2) 
(1)*(2) 
State 1 - Lowest  CIAPI:     
Public Workers 0.106  0.08  0.008 
Private Workers 0.067  0.41  0.027 
Students 0.248  0.01  0.002 
Home Workers 0.021  0.51  0.010 
State-level strictness index,  Ss (3) 0.048 
Sate 2 - Highest CIAPI:       
Public Workers 0.544  0.22  0.122 
Private Workers 0.446  0.64  0.286 
Student Workers 0.150  0.06  0.009 
Home Workers 0.225  0.08  0.017 
State-level strictness index, Ss (3) 0.433 
 
State-level strictness 
index Ss 
(3) 
Enforcement 
Es 
(4) 
 CIAPIs (3)*(4) 
State 1 - Lowest  CIAPI  0.048  0.50  0.024 
Sate 2 - Highest CIAPI  0.433  0.75  0.325 
Source: Own calculations based on ENUT (2002) and Mexican statutory state legislation.  
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 Table 2.3 presents basic descriptive statistics of the state-level CIAPI index 
and its components by gender. Only the 13 states that had clean indoor air laws in 
effect as of May of 2006 were included in these calculations. Considering that the 
overall index and both of its dimensions range from 0 to 1, the strictness dimension for 
both males and females is considerably low. In fact, it is much lower for women than 
for men because a larger proportion of females spend most of their time in places 
where smoking is not regulated at all. Moreover, since the enforcement component in 
all the states is less than what is desirable, the CIAPI index is even lower. There 
variability of the the index is higher for men than for women.  
 
Table 2.3 Descriptive Statistics of the State-Level CIAPI Index 
and its Components. 
 
 Mean  Std. Dev.  Min   Max 
Men:        
Strictness index 0.271  0.106  0.098  0.433 
Enforcement index 0.596  0.146  0.375  0.750 
CIAPI 0.164  0.089  0.061  0.325 
        
Women:        
Strictness index 0.119  0.042  0.048  0.169 
Enforcement index 0.596  0.146  0.375  0.750 
CIAPI 0.070  0.029  0.024  0.115 
Source: Own calculations based on ENUT (2002) and Mexican statutory state legislation. 
 
Table 2.4 reports correlation coefficients of the CIAPI and the other indices 
that have been previously used in this literature for the states that had enacted laws by 
May of 2006. Following Tauras (2006), the unrated index is the sum of indicator 
variables measuring whether tobacco restrictions and enforcement provisions existed 
in a given location. The rated index corresponds to the sum of the rated scores in each 
location. The rating was based on the codebook presented in table A2.1 of the 
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 Appendix. This index is the Mexican version of the one used by Chriqui et al (2002).  
As expected, the correlation among indices is positive, but imperfectly so. 2  
 
Table 2.4 Pairwise correlation of Clean Indoor Air Policy Indices. 
 
 Men  Women 
 Unrated Rated CIAPI  Unrated Rated CIAPI 
Unrated 1    1   
Rated 0.436 1   0.436 1  
Notes: Unrated refers to an index constructed as the sum of dichotomous variables for each location. 
A given location is coded as 1 if smoking is restricted in that specific location. 
Rated refers to an index constructed as the sum of the rated scores for each location. The rating is 
based on the codebook presented in table A 2.1. 
CIAPI is a weighted index of rated tobacco restrictions in specific locations. The weights are based on 
the proportion of people affected in each of the locations and the average time of their visits. 
Source: Own calculations based on ENUT (2002) and Mexican statutory state legislation. 
CIAPI 0.101 0.567 1  0.038 0.752 1 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Data and Methods for the Estimation of the Determinants of Smoking 
4.1 Data  
 This chapter uses the Mexican Health and Nutrition Survey (ENSANUT, in 
Spanish), 2006. This is a cross-sectional data set that contains a wide array of 
individual-level data and self-reported cigarette consumption. The ENSANUT is 
representative of Mexican states, rural-urban areas and metropolitan cities. A detailed 
description of this survey can be found in Olaiz et al. (2006). 
The ENSANUT provides information of one individual aged 20 or older per 
household. Throughout the analysis I restrict attention to people aged 20 to 50 years. 
The potential sample in this age range consisted of 32,669 individuals. Elimination of 
observations with missing information in state of residence and other relevant 
variables yields a final sample of 13,816 men and 18,314 women.  
                                                 
2 The correlations are considerably higher when all states are included because the 18 states with no 
laws are coded as zero in all the indices.   
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 Smoking participants are those who report to be current smokers given that 
they have smoked at least 5 packs of cigarettes in their life. The intensity of smoking 
corresponds to the number of cigarettes smoked per day. This measure is constructed 
with information on the number of cigarettes smoked and the frequency of smoking 
(occasionally, daily, weekly and monthly). Occasional smokers are treated as non-
smokers. Given the difficulties to econometrically overcome the tendency of 
individuals to report amounts consumed as packs or half packs, I proceed on the 
assumption of error- free data. The stock of cigarettes is proxied by the number of 
years the person has smoked regularly. This measure takes into consideration both the 
time the person has smoked and the intensity of smoking. Its only caveat is that 
“smoking regularly” is somewhat subjective.  
Table 2.5 reports descriptive statistics of the estimation sample. The top panel 
presents individual-level variables and the lower panel state-level variables that were 
matched to the survey data based on each respondent’s state of residence. There were 
two exceptions to this rule. The CIAPI was merged based on both the individual’s 
main activity and state of residence. Since the ENSANUT does not distinguish between 
private and public workers, indices in each state were constructed for three groups of 
individuals: workers (public and private combined), students and individuals working 
at home. Cigarette prices were merged to individual-level data based on the state of 
residence and month of interview.   
State-level data comes from different sources. The sources of legislative 
records were discussed in the previous section. The percentage of people who think 
that smoking is either “dangerous” or “very dangerous” comes from the National 
Addiction Survey (INEGI, 2004). Information on the percentage of urban people, 
unemployment rates and tobacco producer states comes from the National Institute of 
Statistics. Cigarette prices, which include taxes, are derived from barcode scanning in  
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 Table 2.5 Descriptive Statistics of the Estimation Sample. 
 
  Men  Women 
  Mean  S.D  Mean  S.D 
Notes: There are 4,310 men and 1,510 women smokers in the sample.  
Source: Own calculations based on the National Survey of Health and Nutrition, 2006, and state-level 
characteristics from various sources. Please see text for details.
Individual-Level:         
Smoker 0.325  0.468  0.106  0.307 
Former 0.126  0.332  0.050  0.217 
Avg. no. cigarettes 5.243  7.051  3.545  4.769 
Stock 4.145  7.020  1.232  4.275 
Age 33.711  8.867  33.945  8.702 
Some middle school 0.649  0.477  0.577  0.494 
Income (thousands) 0.357  0.451  0.142  0.280 
Indigenous 0.059  0.236  0.069  0.253 
Single 0.290  0.454  0.232  0.422 
Married 0.686  0.464  0.686  0.464 
Divorced 0.023  0.151  0.082  0.274 
Worker, public or private 0.872  0.334  0.360  0.480 
Student 0.042  0.201  0.033  0.178 
Worker at home 0.086  0.280  0.607  0.489 
Pregnant -  -  0.023  0.149 
Oportunidades 0.169  0.374  0.185  0.388 
Rural 0.200  0.400  0.205  0.404 
Northwest 0.087  0.283  0.081  0.273 
Northeast 0.151  0.358  0.138  0.345 
Southwest 0.265  0.441  0.270  0.444 
Central 0.297  0.457  0.304  0.460 
West 0.201  0.400  0.206  0.405 
State-Level:         
CIAPI 0.045  0.064  0.019  0.034 
Law (=1) 0.411  0.492  0.409  0.492 
Rated law 8.072  9.854  7.963  9.765 
CIAPI-state only 0.047  0.063  0.023  0.029 
% Think smoking dangerous 0.765  0.070  0.856  0.059 
Tobacco producer state 0.113  0.317  0.115  0.319 
% Urban 0.701  0.204  0.694  0.205 
Unemployment rate 2.601  0.751  2.582  0.756 
Cigarette price (pesos), 2000 10.332  1.059  10.325  1.063 
Cigarette price (pesos), 2006 14.909  0.958  14.928  0.950 
Observations 13816  18314 
 
 
large food stores reported monthly by the Central Bank of Mexico for 46 urban cities. 
State cigarette prices are averages of city prices. Real prices result by dividing 
nominal prices in each city by the city-price index.  
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 4.2 Empirical Strategy  
Based on the predictions of the cigarette demand function discussed in Chapter 
I, the econometric model for the estimation of cigarette consumption C୧ୱof individual i 
residing in state s, working in activity a can be written as: 
 
ܥ௜௦௔ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ௜ܵߙଵ ൅ ࣂ௜ࢻଶ ൅ ܥܫܣܲܫ௦௔ߙଷ ൅ ௦ܲߙସ ൅ ࡰ࢙ࢻହ ൅ ߤ௜௦  ሺ6ሻ 
 
where the smoking variable is expressed as a function of the individual stock of 
cigarettes and a vector of individual attributes ࣂ࢏, which includes tastes and income, 
the Clean Indoor Policy Index ܥܫܣܲܫ௦௔ defined at the state and economic activity 
levels, the price of cigarettes in the state of residence ௦ܲ, and a vector of state-level 
characteristics ࡰ࢙. Denoting  with * the omitted variables, the vector of personal 
characteristics includes:  age,  dummies for marital status (single*, married, divorced), 
a dummy for junior high school, a dummy indicating whether the individual is 
indigenous, a dummy variable for rural area, a set of dummy variables for economic 
activity (workers*, students, home-workers), a set of dummy variables for region of 
residence (southeast, northwest*, northeast, central and west) and individual’s income 
ܫ௜ (expressed in thousands). 
  Equation (6) relates current policies and prices to contemporaneous smoking 
consumption holding constant the lifetime stock of cigarettes and other important 
individual characteristics. While the coefficient on the stock cannot be interpreted as a 
causal effect on smoking, including this variable does minimize the specification 
problem that is present in models of smoking participation and conditional demand 
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 that ignore the addictive nature of cigarette smoking. 3 Mis-specification issues in the 
context of smoking have been discussed by DeCicca et al. (2005, 2008b). 
Identification of clean indoor air policies derives from variation across states, 
and within states, across activities. Individual’s smoking decisions are small to affect 
tobacco control laws defined at the state-occupation levels, thus reducing potential 
endogeneity biases. Yet, if states that passed tobacco control laws are different from 
states that did not passed them in observable or unobservable ways, the 
ܥܫܣܲܫ௦௔coefficient in equation (6) would suffer from omitted variable biases.  To 
address this issue, equation (6) includes a set of controls that should capture 
differences in state-level tastes for smoking. They are: a dummy indicating whether 
the state is a tobacco producer, a variable reflecting state-awareness of the dangers of 
smoking, measured as the percentage of people in the state who reported to know that 
smoking is either ‘very dangerous’ or ‘dangerous’, the unemployment rate, the 
percentage of the population in urban areas, and a set of dummies to indicate the 
political party with majority vote in the local. Still, the coefficient on the clean indoor 
air policy index should not be interpreted as a causal effect because unobserved state-
level heterogeneity might cause the correlation between smoking and tobacco control 
policies.  
Cigarette prices are averages of city-prices in each state.  In a developing 
country like Mexico, state price variation might be the result of transportation costs 
and a less than fully market integration where the presence of potential arbitrage is not 
                                                 
3  Alternatively, one could estimate a reduced form equation where smoking is modeled as a function of 
previous determinants of smoking status. This implies that current participation would be modeled as 
a function of the relevant history of prices, tobacco control policies and other time varying 
determinants of smoking.  This strategy requires knowledge on the year in which the person started 
smoking and her migration history coming from either retrospective information or panel data. This 
information is not available in the survey used in this study. Indeed, it is not even possible to follow 
DeCicca, Kenkel and Mathios (2005) and estimate a smoking participation model that includes both 
current and past prices and policies because no information is readily available on the place where the 
person lived when he/she started smoking. 
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 enough to equalize prices between geographical locations. As Deaton (1997) 
recognizes, this type of “variation in developing countries is not usually available in 
developed economies” (p. 283). Tax variation across states has been used to identify 
price effects in other countries (see, for example DeCicca et al, 2000; Gruber and 
Zinman, 2000; Cawley et al., 2006), but this strategy cannot be used in Mexico as 
taxes are set nationally (see Chapter I), Nonetheless, the use of state-level prices 
improves upon previous studies in Mexico where prices, calculated dividing 
household cigarette expenditure by consumption (the RHS variable), suffer from 
endogeneity biases.  
I estimate different versions of equation (6) corresponding to two cigarette 
consumption measures. One is smoking participation, where C୧ୱ is a dummy variable 
taking the value of one if the individual smokes. The other measures the number of 
cigarettes a person smokes conditional upon participation. Smoking participation is the 
usual limited-dependent variable set-up, where one observes someone smoking only 
when the underlying net utility gain from doing so is positive.  
I use a linear probability model (LPM) for the estimation of smoking 
participation and ordinary least squares (OLS) for the estimation of conditional 
intensity. I use LPM for ease of computation and interpretation. However, to account 
for the limited nature of the smoking participation variable, I also conduct the analysis 
of the propensity to smoke using a probit model, which completes Cragg’s (1971) 
two-part model. This model is more flexible than its closest alternative, a Tobit model. 
This is because the parameters that govern the probability of observing an above-
threshold realization of the dependent variable (i.e. smoking participation) are allowed 
to differ from the coefficients determining the quantity of cigarettes smoked, 
conditional on smoking.  
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Individuals residing in the same state are assigned identical values of the state-
level variables, which generates within-group dependence of the errors. In fact, in the 
benchmark models that uses a dummy variable for law-enactment the number of 
clusters is 2. The maximum number of clusters that variation in my data generates is 
38, corresponding to clean indoor air policies merged at the state and individual 
activity levels. To account for this issue, the standard errors reported in all 
specifications are cluster-robust. As Wooldridge (2003), Bertrand, Mullainathan and 
Duflo (2004) and Cameron et al. (2008) have noted, standard asymptotic tests in 
applications with few clusters tend to over-reject the null hypothesis considerably. To 
correct for this problem, the preferred specifications use the bootstrap procedure for 
determining the corrected standard errors proposed by Cameron et al. (2008).  This 
procedure is referred to as wild cluster bootstrap-t standard error correction. 
 
5. Results 
Each table of results contains estimations for men and women. Unless 
otherwise indicated, all regressions include individual and state-level controls. Table 
2.6 presents benchmark estimates of models of cigarette participation and conditional 
intensity that explore the alternative measures of smoking restrictions indoors that 
have been used in this literature. Each cell of this table contains, from top to bottom, 
the coefficient, the standard error in parentheses, and the wild cluster bootstrap p-
value italicized in brackets.  The stars denote significance levels based on adjusted p-
values à la Cameron et al. (2008). 
Since smoking restrictions in different locations are highly collinear, it is not possible 
to include all these policies in a single model. Doing so would make the coefficient 
estimates sensitive to model specification and increase their standard errors. 
Therefore, the regressions in Table 2.6 include one policy variable at a time. As 
 Table 2.6 Relationship between Clean Indoor Air Policy Measures Previously 
Used in the Literature and Smoking. 
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 Men  Women 
 Participation  Intensity Participation  Intensity 
Work 0.006 -0.625 * 0.004   -0.036
 (0.002) (0.060) (0.001)   (0.127)
 [0.19] [0.07] [0.21]   [0.84]
Schools 0.002 -0.310 0.004 *  0.213
 (0.001) (0.036) (0.001)   (0.117)
 [0.56] [0.18] [0.07]   [0.46]
Transportation 0.001 -0.211 0.003 *  0.251
 (0.000) (0.126) (0.001)   (0.083)
 [0.12] [0.67] [0.07]   [0.59]
Restaurants 0.001 -0.399 * 0.002   0.058
 (0.001) (0.050) (0.002)   (0.112)
 [0.22] [0.08] [0.33]   [0.79]
Retail stores 0.006 -0.516 0.005   0.330
 (0.003) (0.113) (0.000)   (0.088)
 [0.40] [0.14] [0.14]   [0.14]
Recreational  0.002 -0.329 0.007   0.706
 (0.004) (0.169) (0.002)   (0.250)
 [0.84] [0.62] [0.20]   [0.57]
Cultural  0.002 ** -0.292 0.002 *  0.116
 (0.001) (0.072) (0.000)   (0.068)
 [0.04] [0.19] [0.10]   [0.49]
Health care  0.000 -0.193 0.002 *  0.082
 (0.001) (0.095) (0.001)   (0.080)
 [0.70] [0.10] [0.07]   [0.38]
Sanctions 0.000 -0.231 0.003   0.214
 (0.001) (0.104) (0.001)   (0.090)
 [0.69] [0.38] [0.20]   [0.19]
Enforcement  0.000 -0.353 0.003   0.149
 (0.001) (0.066) (0.001)   (0.164)
 [0.62] [0.39] [0.38]   [0.87]
Notes: Each entry comes from a regression where the dependent variable was regressed on the 
policy variable denoted in the first column a set of individual level characteristics (as in Table 2.8) 
and a set of state-level characteristics including: a dummy for tobacco producer state, a variable 
reflecting state-level awareness of the dangers of smoking, the unemployment rate, the percentage of 
the population in urban areas, state-level cigarette prices and a set of dummies to indicate the 
political party with majority vote in the local Congress.  The coefficient is presented in the first row 
of each followed by the standard error in parentheses, and the adjusted wild p-value italicized in 
brackets.  The stars reflect significance levels based on clustered wild adjusted p-values (see, 
Cameron et al., 2008). * 10% Significance level. ** 5% Significance level. *** 1% Significance 
level. 
Source: Own calculations from the National Health and Nutrition Survey, 2006. 
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 Table 2.6 (Continued) 
 
 Men  Women 
 Participation  Intensity  Participation  Intensity 
Notes: Each entry comes from a regression where the dependent variable was regressed on the 
policy variable denoted in the first column a set of individual level characteristics (as in Table 2.8) 
and a set of state-level characteristics including: a dummy for tobacco producer state, a variable 
reflecting state-level awareness of the dangers of smoking, the unemployment rate, the percentage of 
the population in urban areas, state-level cigarette prices and a set of dummies to indicate the 
political party with majority vote in the local Congress.  The coefficient is presented in the first row 
of each followed by the standard error in parentheses, and the adjusted wild p-value italicized in 
brackets.  The stars reflect significance levels based on clustered wild adjusted p-values (see, 
Cameron et al., 2008). * 10% Significance level. ** 5% Significance level. *** 1% Significance 
level. 
Source: Own calculations from the National Health and Nutrition Survey, 2006. 
Law (=1) 0.002 -0.770 0.007   0.437
 (0.000) (0.163) (0.002)   (0.297)
 [0.25] [0.25] [0.25]   [0.74]
Rated law 0.000 -0.039 0.000 *  0.021
 (0.000) (0.009) (0.000)   (0.011)
 [0.89] [0.14] [0.07]   [0.22]
Observations 13816 4301 18314   1510
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ross and Chaloupka (2004) point out, these models demonstrate how 
individual policies affect cigarette consumption when multicollinearity is eliminated at 
the expense of introducing omitted variable biases. The prediction that compulsory 
restrictions in enclosed areas would increase the costs of smoking, and hereby 
decrease smoking is confirmed for workplaces and cultural restaurants among men. 
Surprisingly, cultural places are positively associated with smoking participation 
among women and men. Restrictions on smoking in schools, transportation services 
and health care facilities are also positively correlated with female smoking 
participation. Reverse causality might be behind these unexpected signs (i.e. high 
smoking participation among women might have driven more stringent policies).   
Aggregate measures of clean indoor air policies are presented at the bottom of 
Table 2.6. Law is a dummy variable that reflects whether or not a state has enacted a 
clean indoor air law. Rated is the sum of the rated restrictions in all locations, where 
the maximum score in each location is 4. The evidence in this table indicates that the 
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 stringency of the law, rather than the enactment of the law, is positively associated 
with female smoking participation.  
Based on the evidence from the regressions where policies in different 
locations where added one at a time, the significance of the rated law in models of 
female smoking participation and the lack of significance on this coefficient in models 
of male conditional intensity is not surprising, but is seems inappropriate. This is 
because, despite the fact that women spend a little time in locations that are 
statistically significant in the models of smoking participation, these restrictions 
contribute significantly to the overall rated index where all smoking limits are equally 
weighted. In contrast, even though the costs of smoking when smoking restrictions are 
imposed in workplaces—where men spend most of their time--, the significance of 
workplaces and restaurants in the model of male conditional intensity is offset by the 
lack of significance of the rest of the coefficients. The CIAPI index should correct for 
this problem. 
Table 2.7 presents the results using the most preferred measure of compulsory 
restrictions; the Clean Indoor-Policy Index developed in this chapter. This index is 
defined at the economic activity (public/private worker, student, home worker) and 
state levels. Including state fixed-effects in these specifications would wipe out 
interesting variation across states. This is a drawback if one thinks that state and the 
laws are correlated. In order to alleviate this problem, I control instead for region of 
residence.  
Panel 1 reports the coefficients on the Clean Indoor Air Policy Index from 
benchmark specifications that do not include state-level controls. The other panels 
report estimations from specifications that do include state controls. In the benchmark 
models, stringent smoking restrictions are negatively and statistically significantly 
associated with conditional cigarette demand among men, but not among women.   
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 Table 2.7 Relationship between the CIAPI and Smoking. 
 
 
Men Women 
Participation Intensity Participation Intensity 
Panel 1: LPM without state controls 
CIAPI  0.032    -3.685 ***  0.028   4.152   
  (0.046)    (0.658)    (0.069)   (2.532)   
Panel 2: LPM  
CIAPI  0.072 ** -6.227 *** 0.016   5.780 * 
  (0.035)    (1.413)    (0.051)   (3.013)   
Panel 3: Probit model  
CIAPI  0.310 *      0.328      
  (0.162)        (0.342)      
  {0.105}        { .031}      
Panel 4: LPM with SE-adjusted 
CIAPI  0.072   -6.227 ** 0.016   5.780  
  [0.17]   [0.05]   [0.82]   [0.22]  
Observations 13816   4301    18314   1510  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Each entry comes from a regression where the dependent variable was regressed on the 
Clean Indoor Air Policy Index (CIAPI), individual level characteristics (as in Table 2.8) and a set of 
state-level characteristics, which includes: a dummy for tobacco producer state, a variable 
reflecting state-level awareness of the dangers of smoking, the unemployment rate, the percentage of 
the population in urban areas, state-level cigarette prices and a set of dummies to indicate the 
political party with majority vote in the local Congress. Results in Panel 1 are estimated via a 
Linear Probability Model (LPM) that does not include state-level controls. The rest of the estimates 
control for state-level characteristics. Panels 2 and 4presents results estimated through a LPM and 
Panel 3 via a Probit Model. Panel 4 reports estimates where the standard errors are adjusted for the 
‘small number of clusters’. Standard errors are in parentheses, marginal effects in curly brackets, 
and the adjusted wild p-value italicized in brackets.  * 10% Significance level. ** 5% Significance 
level. *** 1% Significance level. 
Source: Own calculations from the National Health and Nutrition Survey, 2006. 
 
In Panel 2, when state controls are included in linear probability models of 
smoking participation and OLS models of conditional intensity, the magnitude of all, 
but the coefficient on smoking participation among women, increases. Moreover, the 
estimated coefficient of the CIAPI index in the model of smoking participation among 
men, and conditional intensity among women become statistically significant.  This 
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 suggests that the omission of important state controls induces a downward bias on the 
CIAPI coefficient. 
Panel 3 presents comparable results for models of smoking participation that 
are estimated using a probit model. Each cell contains, from top to bottom, the 
coefficient, the standard errors in parentheses, and the marginal effects evaluated at 
the mean of the independent variable in curly brackets. As can be readily seen from 
this table, using a probit model for the estimation of smoking participation leads to 
similar qualitative conclusions: the positive marginal effect of the stringency of the 
laws among men and the non-statistical effect among women indicate that smoking 
participation increases with the stringency of the laws among men, but not among 
women. 
In Panel 4 of Table 2.7 I present the results of models of smoking participation 
and conditional intensity estimated using the wild cluster bootstrap-t standard error 
procedure. This is the most preferred estimation because it corrects for the small 
number of clusters. Since this method is not yet available for non-linear models, 
smoking participation is estimated using a LPM. When standard errors are corrected, 
only the negative and significant association between stringent laws and the intensity 
of smoking among men remains. In particular, a one unit increase in the CIAPI is 
associated with 6.2 fewer cigarettes smoked per day. Therefore, living in a state with 
no clean indoor air law compared to living in Zacatecas, currently the state with the 
most stringent law (0.3032), is associated with 1.9 more cigarettes smoked per day.  
The estimates for the demographic and socioeconomic determinants of 
cigarette demand of the preferred model (Panel 4, Table 2.7) are presented in Table 
2.8. As in Table 2.6, each cell of this table contains, from top to bottom, the 
coefficient, the standard error in parentheses, and the wild cluster bootstrap p-values 
italicized in brackets.  The stars denoting significance levels are based on wild p
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Table 2.8 Determinants of Cigarette Demand. 
  
 
 
Men  Women 
Participation  Intensity  Participation   Intensity 
Cig. stock 0.043 *** 0.217 *** 0.046 *** 0.092   
  (0.001)   (0.015)    (0.001)   (0.025)   
  [0.01]   [0.00]    [0.01]   [0.11]   
Age -0.011 *** 0.004    -0.003 *** 0.017   
  (0.001)   (0.020)    (0.000)    (0.016)   
  [0.00]     [0.87]    [0.00]    [0.35]   
Indigenous -0.012     2.611    -0.002    -1.126   
  (0.014)     (1.219)    (0.005)    (0.496)   
  [0.48]     [0.52]    [0.78]    [0.11]   
Married -0.005     -0.006    -0.012    -0.089   
  (0.010)     (0.370)    (0.006)    (0.307)   
  [0.67]     [0.96]    [0.13]    [0.85]   
Divorced 0.041     1.127    0.035    0.342   
  (0.015)     (0.776)    (0.008)    (0.291)   
  [0.13]     [0.17]    [0.13]    [0.51]   
Middle school -0.043 *** -0.391    0.022 **   -0.206   
  (0.007)     (0.404)    (0.007)    (0.189)   
  [0.01]     [0.92]    [0.03]    [0.37]   
Income -0.002     0.537    0.014    -0.251   
  (0.009)     (0.219)    (0.014)    (0.287)   
  [0.96]     [0.29]    [0.74]    [0.52]   
Student -0.006     -0.157    0.042    0.481   
  (0.021)     (0.279)    (0.031)    (0.303)   
  [0.77]     [0.70]    [0.91]    [0.51]   
Home worker -0.015     0.519    -0.012    0.896   
  (0.013)     (0.369)    (0.004)    (0.239)   
  [0.32]     [0.52]    [0.24]    [0.25]   
Oportunidades -0.020 *   -1.214    -0.004    0.075   
  (0.008)     (0.290)    (0.002)    (0.514)   
  [0.09]     [0.12]    [0.38]   [0.98]   
Pregnant           -0.055 *** -0.049   
            (0.010)     (1.378)   
            [0.00]     [0.98]   
 
 
 
Notes: Details on omitted and other independent variables included are on the next page at the 
end of this table.  
Each cell contains, from top to bottom, the coefficient, the standard error in parentheses, and wild 
p-value italicized in brackets. The stars reflect significance levels based on clustered wild 
adjusted p-values (see, Cameron et al., 2008).  * 10% Significance level. ** 5% Significance 
level. *** 1% Significance level. 
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 Table 2.8 (Continued)  
 
 
Men  Women 
Participation  Intensity  Participation   Intensity 
Rural -0.026 
 
 -1.072   -0.021
**
  -0.275   
  (0.010) 
 
  (0.224)   (0.003)     (0.371)   
  [0.58] 
 
 [0.19]   [0.02]     [0.53]   
Northeast 0.073 
**
 -1.917   0.017     0.366   
  (0.010) 
 
  (0.349)   (0.011)     (1.375)   
  [0.02] 
 
 [0.14]  [0.27]     [0.77]   
Southeast 0.051 
 
 -4.919
*
 0.007     -0.620   
  (0.018) 
 
  (0.286)  (0.010)     (0.956)   
  [0.14] 
 
 [0.06]  [0.59]     [0.74]   
Center 0.040 
**
 -3.709
**
 0.008     -1.371   
  (0.008) 
 
  (0.288)   (0.010)     (0.516)   
  [0.03] 
 
 [0.02]   [0.82]     [0.16]   
West 0.015 
 
 -2.357   -0.002     0.026   
  (0.014) 
 
  (0.269)   (0.010)     (0.731)   
  [0.21] 
 
 [0.12]   [0.76]     [0.96]   
R-squared 0.40    0.12    0.45     0.06   
Observations 13816   4301     18314     1510   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The omitted variables are single, public/private workers and northwest.  
Independent variables in these regressions include the CIAPI, and state-level characteristics: a 
dummy for tobacco producer state, a variable reflecting state-level awareness of the dangers of 
smoking, the unemployment rate, the percentage of the population in urban areas, cigarette prices 
and a set of dummies to indicate the political party with majority vote in the local Congress. Smoking 
participation models are estimated through a LPM and conditional intensity models via OLS.  
Each cell contains, from top to bottom, the coefficient, the standard error in parentheses, and wild p-
value italicized in brackets. The stars reflect significance levels based on clustered wild adjusted p-
values (see, Cameron et al., 2008).  * 10% Significance level. ** 5% Significance level. *** 1% 
Significance level. 
values. The first part of the table reports the estimates on individual-characteristics. 
The stock of cigarettes is associated with a higher probability of being a smoker for 
both men and women. This result is consistent with the addictive nature of cigarettes, 
but may not be interpreted as a causal effect. This is because the stock of habits might 
be correlated with previously determined market-level characteristics as well as 
unobservable individual characteristics. 
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 Controlling for the stock of habits, people are less likely to smoke as they age. 
One of the most striking results is that, conditioning on other relevant factors, having a 
middle school diploma decreases the probability of male smoking, but decreases the 
probability of female smoking. These findings, however, conform to the profile of 
smoking presented in the introduction of this dissertation. Participation in 
Oportunidades, a federal social program providing income and health information 
sessions to adults, decreases the probability of smoking for men, but the coefficient is 
barely significant. Finally, pregnant women are less likely to smoke, but being 
pregnant does not alter the number of cigarettes smoked for women who smoke. 
Compared to men who live in the Northwest, men residing in the Northeast 
and Central regions are more likely to smoke, whereas men living in the Southeast and 
Central regions smoke with lower intensity once they decide to pursue the habit. The 
probability of smoking is higher for women living in urban versus rural areas.  
Individual and socio-demographic variables do not predict the number of 
cigarettes people smoke. With the exception of the CIAPI and the stock of cigarettes 
none of the coefficients in the regressions of conditional intensity of smoking among 
male are significant. Furthermore, the R-squares of these models are particularly low. 
The findings in this chapter can be summarized as follows. First, the exclusion 
of observable characteristics bias downwards the coefficient on the stringency of the 
laws. Second, ignoring that the regressions include only a small number of clusters 
leads to an over-rejection of the null hypothesis that clean indoor air policies affect 
smoking decisions. Third, once state-level variables are controlled for and the standard 
errors are adjusted I find a negative and significant association between more stringent 
laws and the number of cigarettes smoked by men. Fourth, the predictors of smoking 
participation by men and women differ significantly. And fifth, other than the clean 
indoor air laws and the stock of cigarettes, none of the other individual or state-level 
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 variables predict the number of cigarettes smoked by men and women who smoke. 
The next section explores the possible causes of these findings and contrasts the 
results with those found in the previous literature.  
 
6. Discussion  
Using variation of clean indoor air policy indices across activities and states, 
the conclusion that emerged in the previous section is that clean indoor air policies and 
the number of cigarettes smoked by men are negatively correlated. This finding is 
consistent with the prediction that compulsory restrictions in enclosed areas increase 
the costs of smoking and thereby decrease cigarette consumption. This is not, 
however, the only possible explanation for this correlation.  
An important question that arises in interpreting the results of the previous 
section is, what is the political economy behind the enactment of clean indoor air 
policy laws? There are many potential explanations. States that enacted stringent or 
lax laws compared to states that did not pass a law at all might vary in various ways. 
Variation might occur in terms of the public awareness of the health and economic 
consequences of smoking, public sentiment towards smoking, state-level cigarette 
price determination, economic progress and political forces. The later issue could have 
been particularly important in Mexico were the last decade brought extraordinary 
changes to the Mexican political system. Once an authoritarian regime controlled by 
the hegemonic Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), party-switching at the state-
level started in 1989, which ultimately paved the way for Fox's election in 2000 
running on the ticket of the center-right PAN.  
Stringent laws may have resulted from low levels and/or intensities of cigarette 
smoking rather than caused them. Lower levels of smoking would facilitate the 
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 passage of the laws, since they would encounter less opposition. Conversely, more 
stringent laws could have attempted to decrease high levels of smoking. 
I predict the enactment of clean indoor air laws and the stringency of these 
laws, measured by the CIAPI, as a function of various state-level characteristics and 
gender-specific prevalence and intensity of smoking, all of them measured prior to the 
passage of the laws. State controls include economic variables, such as the 
unemployment rate and a set of dummies for region reflecting differences in 
purchasing power; a set of dummies indicating the political party holding the majority 
vote in the local Congress (PRI, PAN, PRD); and multiple tobacco related variables: a 
measure of state-level awareness regarding the health-related consequences of 
smoking, a dummy for state tobacco producer, and cigarette prices.  
The factors that predict the enactment (Law) and stringency (CIAPI) of the 
laws are reported in table 2.9. The unemployment rate is the only state-level variable 
that is negatively associated with both the enactment and the stringency of the laws. 
Additionally, the urban population share and the PRD in Congress are negatively 
correlated with law enactment in the regression for women. The signs of the tobacco-
related variables are unexpected, but none of these variables are significant.4  
The last two rows of table 2.9 show evidence that the prevalence of smoking 
affected positively and significantly the enactment of the laws, but not the stringency 
of the laws. In contrast, the average number of cigarettes is not found to significantly 
affect the passage of the laws. This suggests that, while policy endogeneity is a 
potential problem in the estimation of smoking participation, it is less of a problem in 
the estimation of the number of cigarettes smoked.  
 
 
                                                 
4  The results are similar if the states that passed laws before 2000 (Aguascalientes, Baja California and 
Tlaxcala) are excluded from the regressions. Results are available from the author upon request. 
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 Table 2.9 Preset Factors that Predict the Enactment and Stringency of  
Clean Indoor Air Laws. 
 
 
Men   Women 
Law (=1)   CIAPI   Law (=1)   CIAPI 
Economic Variables:                       
% Urban -0.655     -0.022    -1.458 **   -0.061   
  (0.745)     (0.039)    (0.612)    (0.036)   
Unemployment rate -0.292 *   -0.015 *   -0.283 **   -0.014 ** 
  (0.150)    (0.008)    (0.125)    (0.007)   
Northeast -0.347    -0.020    -0.262    -0.017   
  (0.462)    (0.021)    (0.360)    (0.019)   
Southeast -0.579    -0.032    -0.502    -0.031   
  (0.628)    (0.031)    (0.736)     (0.036)   
Central -0.168    -0.019    0.050     -0.011   
  (0.613)    (0.030)    (0.714)     (0.039)   
West -0.655    -0.030    -0.463     -0.022   
  (0.419)    (0.021)    (0.509)     (0.024)   
Political variables:                 
PAN in Congress -0.025    0.008    -0.005     0.009   
  (0.338)    (0.018)    (0.355)     (0.019)   
PRD in Congress -0.617    -0.025    -0.699 *   -0.030   
  (0.394)    (0.020)    (0.372)     (0.019)   
Tobacco-related variables: 
% Smoking danger.  -0.890    -0.038    -1.219     -0.057   
  (2.039)    (0.097)    (2.403)     (0.112)   
Tobacco producer  0.408    0.015    0.200     0.006   
  (0.411)    (0.018)    (0.305)     (0.012)   
Cigarette price 0.016    0.003    0.031     0.004
  (0.111)    (0.005)    (0.114)     (0.006)
% Smokers&  4.817 *   0.225    10.397 **   0.509   
  (2.483)    (0.130)    (4.226)     (0.295)   
Avg. no. cigarettes&  -0.084    -0.004    -0.542     -0.028   
  (0.143)    (0.006)    (0.770)     (0.041)   
R-squared 0.41  0.39  0.50   0.49   
Notes: The omitted variables Northwest and the PRI party. 
All independent variables are measured prior to the passage of the law. 
Standard errors are in parentheses.
Observations 32  32  32   32   
 
 
 
All in all the evidence in this section indicates that neither observable 
characteristics nor initial intensity of smoking were behind the enactment of more 
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 stringent laws. This suggests that the laws might in fact have cause a decrease in the 
number of cigarettes smoked by men. It is important to note, however, that the 
inclusion of state controls increased the estimated coefficients of the CIAPI and 
changed its significance. If states self-selected to law passage based on characteristics 
that I cannot observe, such as the anti-smoking sentiment discussed by DeCicca et al. 
(various years), the conclusion that the estimates in the previous section are bias-free 
would be inaccurate. For that reason, I neglect to interpret the results above as casual.  
The evidence of cross-sectional studies relating tobacco measures with 
smoking participation and conditional intensity in the U.S. is mixed. For example, 
Ross and Chaloupka (2004), who use an index that adds up dummy variables, each 
representing full restrictions in a given location, found that clean indoor air restrictions 
reduce smoking participation but have not effect on smoking intensity. In contrast, 
Wasserman et al. (1991) found that more stringent regulation has a consistently strong 
negative influence on the number of packs smoked. This conclusion was based on an 
index that considered, albeit roughly, that more comprehensive laws should discount 
restrictions in relatively unimportant places and give more credit to regulations that 
affect a large share of the population. The choice of index might explain why the 
conclusions reached by Wasserman and his colleagues in the U.S. are similar to the 
ones in this chapter.  
 
7. Conclusions and Further Research 
The indices of smoking restrictions indoors that have been used in previous 
research are admittedly imperfect measures of tobacco control policies for at least two 
reasons. First, creating the index variables has required somewhat arbitrary 
assumptions. Second, the indices do not reflect the level of enforcement of the laws 
(DeCicca et al., 2002).  
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 The first main focus of this study was to develop a new index of smoking 
restrictions, the Clean Indoor Air Policy Index (CIAPI), which advances previous 
indices in two main aspects. First, regulations in locations where most of the people 
spend little time have less of an impact to the overall index. And second, the CIAPI 
index is penalized as differences in the actual and desired level of enforcement 
increase. Additionally, the strictness of the law is calculated for four population 
subgroups, allowing comparisons across types of individuals and geographic units. In 
the case of Mexico, the data enable distinguishing between private workers, public 
workers, students and individuals who work at home. This index is not without 
limitations, but it solves the problem of multicollinearity of the policies and 
summarizes the overall impact of clean indoor air policies relying on more credible 
assumptions than previous indices.  
Clean Indoor Policy Indices in Mexico may be improved in various ways. 
Future efforts might conjoin statutory and regulatory rankings to quantify the 
restrictive nature of statewide clear indoor air policies. Ordinances at the municipal 
level should be codified and ranked in order to evaluate local restrictions. When doing 
that, it would be important to account for state preemption, which occurs when local 
areas are not allowed to enact smoke-free ordinances that are more rigorous than those 
of the state. Finally, de Jure enforcement might be replaced by a measure of de facto 
enforcement. This has been done in the U.S. by Chaloupka and Ross (2004). 
A second goal of this study was to analyze the role of clean indoor air policies 
--and other variables-- as determinants of cigarette consumption. Compared to 
previous studies, the estimates in this chapter were refined by using individual level 
data, rather than household-level data. Using cross-sectional data for 2006, I found 
that more stringent policies are associated with less smoking intensity among men. 
The fact that more stringent laws were not found to be determined by observable 
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 characteristics or initial levels of smoking intensity provided suggestive, but not 
definite, evidence in favor of the hypothesis that the laws changed the individuals’ 
smoking decisions. 
The cross-sectional data used in this study did not allow me to explore whether 
unobserved state-level characteristics might be causing both the passage of stringent 
laws and the decrease in the quantity of cigarettes consumed. The ideal data to address 
unobserved heterogeneity issues would be to have panel data of individuals residing in 
different states for whom smoking decisions are observed before and after the law 
enactment in their state of residence. The only Mexican dataset that has followed 
individuals over time is the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS). This survey was 
not used because the second round became available when this study was already 
finished. Even though this survey is representative at a national level, not all states 
where interviewed in this survey. None of the states that had enacted laws before 2002 
were included in the MxFLS sample. 12 of the states included in the sample did not 
have changes between 2002 and 2005, and four states did. Only 8 Mexican states 
enacted laws between the baseline survey in 2002 and the follow-up in 2006. 
Exploiting the longitudinal nature of this data in a regression framework that includes 
individual and state fixed-effects would shed some light on the role of unobserved 
heterogeneity and pave the way for the estimation of causal effects of tobacco control 
laws on smoking in Mexico. 
Besides the stock of cigarettes and the clean indoor air policies, none of the 
individual characteristics explain differences in the number of cigarettes smoked by 
men or women. However, I found significant gender differences in the models of 
smoking participation. Two findings are noteworthy. First, participation in 
Oportunidades, the largest anti-poverty program in Mexico, decreases the probability 
of cigarette participation among men. Even though this program did not intend to 
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affect smoking, the benefits of this program, inclusive of cash transfers and health 
information sessions, might have altered individual’s decisions to smoke. The next 
chapter explores this possibility. Second, even though schooling is negatively 
associated with smoking among men, women with middle school diplomas are more 
likely to smoke. Differences in the schooling-smoking gradient by gender are 
intriguing and worth exploring. This will be done in the third essay of this dissertation.  
 
  
 APPENDIX 
 
APPLICATION OF THE CIAPI TO MEXICAN DATA 
 
1. Rating of legislation 
The first step in the calculation of the CIAPI involved coding and rating state 
smoke-free laws. The coding was done using Atlas Ti V. 5.2.; a commonly used 
software for qualitative data analysis. Only statutory laws were considered in the 
present analysis (i.e. the norms with the highest rank in the Mexican legal system). 
Nonetheless, clean indoor air policies are also in the form of regulations (Ibañez, 
2005). 
I coded state-level statutory laws in effect by May of 2006, which was the last 
interview month of the ENSANUT, 2006.  By that date, 13 states had laws restricting 
smoking. Three of these states had already promulgated laws when the National 
Health Survey 2000 was carried out and the rest passed them between 2001 and 
2006.5 In 12 of the 13 states the legislation analyzed were ‘Laws for the Protection of 
Non-Smokers. In Chihuahua, tobacco control restrictions are considered in the 
Environmental Protection Law. In most cases, the stated goal of the law is to protect 
people from second hand smoking. Only Mexico’s City law states explicitly the 
objective of reducing cigarette consumption.  
                                                 
5  As of April 2008 eight other states had promulgated laws for a total of 21 states with laws restricting 
or prohibiting smoking in certain places. Tamaulipas enacted the law in December of 2005 (one 
month after the ENSANUT of 2006 was carried out in that state), Durango, and San Luis Potosi 
promulgated laws in late 2006.  Coahuila, Veracruz, Quintana Roo, Yucatán and Sinaloa enacted 
laws in 2007. Additionally, Aguascalientes and Mexico City reformed their laws in October of 2006 
and the beginning of 2008, respectively. 
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 Tobacco partial and full bans were only coded when the laws were 
unambiguous in their application. The following standard coding scheme was 
employed for most of the locations:  
0 No provision/no meet a restriction 
1 Restrict smoking to designated areas or require separate ventilation with 
exemptions 
2 Restricts smoking to separately ventilated areas  
3 No smoking permitted unless restricted to enclosed, separately ventilated 
designated smoking areas  
4 Ban at all times (i.e. health policy goal) 
The codebook is presented in table A2.1. A summary of the specific decision 
rules in each location follows.  
Government workplaces refers to buildings of the three branches of the 
Government (legislative, executive and judicial), or all the buildings of the Public 
Administration.  No points were deducted if the law did not explicitly mention that the 
law applied to autonomous agencies like the Central Bank of Mexico. Private 
workplaces include banks, financial, commercial and industrial offices and offices of 
firms producing goods and services  
In the case of schools, laws that did not explicitly indicate whether private 
schools were or were not included, were coded as having restrictions in both public 
and private schools. Laws that did not explicitly mentioned prohibitions in college and 
universities were severely penalized. The same was true when restrictions only applied 
to classrooms. Some legislation considered classrooms, laboratories, faculty and 
administrative offices etc.   
Public transportation includes public transit and inter-city buses. Public transit 
includes bus, light rail and subway.  
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 Table A2.1 Codebook of Law Rating.  
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 Variable Description Value Coding Explanation 
govXX Gov’t 
worksites 
by year 
(XX) 
4 Government worksites are 100% smoke-free, no 
exemptions 
3 No smoking permitted in government worksites 
unless restricted to enclosed, separately ventilated 
designated smoking areas  
2 i) Smoking in government worksites restricted to 
designated smoking areas which are separate and 
enclosed or ii) Smoking in separately ventilated 
designated smoking areas at government worksites, 
with a minimal exemption  
1 i) Smoking in government worksites restricted only to 
designated smoking areas or ii) Any stricter 
requirement that applies to some but not all types of 
worksites (e.g., worksites with access to the public)  
0 No restrictions, or requirement(s) that smoking be 
permitted 
pvtXX Private 
worksites 
by year 
(XX) 
4 All rooms in all private worksites are 100% smoke-
free, no exemptions 
3 Offices in all private worksites are 100% smoke-free, 
with a minimal exemption (e.g., other rooms in the 
building are not considered)  
2 i) Smoking in private worksites restricted to 
designated smoking areas which separately ventilated 
in at least two types of offices  or ii) any stricter 
requirement applying with a minimal exemption (e.g. 
worksites with access to the public) to  at least one 
type of worksites  
1 i) Smoking in private worksites restricted  to 
designated smoking areas in at least two types of 
offices or ii) Any stricter requirement that excludes 
completely at least one type of office (e.g., no 
provisions for warehouses) 
0 No restrictions 
schXX Schools by 
year (XX) 
4 Private and public schools including colleges and 
universities are 100% smoke-free. 
3 No smoking in schools is permitted with minimal 
exemption(s)  (e.g., colleges and universities have 
separately ventilated designated smoking areas) 
2 i) No smoking in classrooms is permitted (college and 
university classrooms included) or ii) No smoking in 
school is permitted, but this requirement excludes 
colleges and universities 
1 i) Smoking in classrooms restricted only to 
designated smoking areas, or ii) Any stricter 
requirement with more than minimal exception(s) 
(e.g., all private schools explicitly exempted )  
0 No restrictions  
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 Table A2.1 (Continued) 
 
Variable Description Value Coding Explanation 
hosXX Health 
Care 
Facilities 
by year 
(XX) 
4 Health care facilities are 100% smoke-free  
3 Smoking in health care facilities restricted to enclosed 
separately ventilated smoking areas 
2 Smoking in health care facilities restricted to 
separately ventilated smoking areas 
1 i) Smoking in health care facilities restricted to 
designated smoking areas or 
ii) Any stricter requirement that applies to only one 
type of health care facility (e.g. excludes clinics or 
private hospitals) 
0 No restrictions  
Note: Health care facilities include nursing homes, hospitals and health centers, public 
and private. 
tranXX Transport
by year 
(XX) 
4 Public transportation is 100% smoke-free including 
rail, bus services, cabs, ferries and inter-city buses, 
and requires sign posting. 
3 Public transit is 100% smoke-free including  rail, bus 
services, taxi cabs and ferries,  and requires sign 
posting 
2 Smoking is restricted to enclosed, separately 
ventilated public transit units including rail, bus 
services, taxi cabs and ferries,  and requires sign 
posting 
1 i) Smoking is restricted to separately ventilated public 
transit units including rail, bus services, taxi cabs and 
ferries,  and requires sign posting or 
ii) any stricter requirement that only applies to some 
public transit (e.g. taxi drives decide whether they 
allow smoking in the car) 
Note: Public transportation includes public transit. That is, public transit excludes inter-
city buses 
restXX Restaurant 
by year 
(XX) 
4 Restaurants (explicitly including bar areas of 
restaurants) are 100% smoke-free 
3 No smoking permitted in restaurants (including bar 
areas of restaurants) unless restricted to enclosed 
separately ventilated designated smoking areas 
2 Smoking in restaurants restricted to separately 
ventilated designated smoking areas 
1 i) Smoking in restaurants restricted only to designated 
smoking areas or  
ii) Restrictions on smoking that apply to some but not 
all restaurants (e.g., size exemptions) 
0 No restrictions 
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Table A2.1 (Continued) 
 
Variable Description Value Coding Explanation 
retXX Retail 
stores by 
year (XX) 
4 Retail stores or businesses open to the public are 
100% smoke-free 
3 No smoking permitted in retail stores or businesses 
open to the public unless restricted to enclosed, 
separately ventilated designated smoking areas 
2 i) Smoking in retail stores or businesses open to the 
public restricted to designated smoking areas which 
are separately ventilated or, ii) Bans smoking in either 
all retail stores or all businesses open to the public 
and restricts smoking to enclosed, separately 
ventilated areas in some of the others (e.g. smoking is 
permitted in separately ventilated areas of 
commercial businesses open to the public and banned 
in all other businesses).   
1 i) Smoking in retail stores or businesses open to the 
public restricted to designated smoking areas,  or ii) 
Any stricter law that applies to either retail stores or 
businesses open to the public  
0 No restrictions. 
recXX Recreation
al/sport 
facilities by 
year (XX) 
4 Recreational and sport facilities are 100% smoke-free 
3 i) Restricts smoking to enclosed, separately ventilated 
areas in all recreational and sports facilities or ii) 
Bans smoking in either all sports or recreational 
facilities and restricts smoking to separately 
ventilated designated smoking areas in all other 
facilities, or iii) Bans smoking in either all sports or 
recreational facilities and restricts smoking to 
enclosed separately ventilated designated smoking 
areas in some of the other facilities.  
2 i) Smoking in all recreational and cultural facilities 
restricted to separately ventilated smoking areas or ii) 
Bans smoking in either all recreational or sport 
facilities and restricts smoking to designated smoking 
areas in all the other facilities or iii) Bans smoking in 
either all recreational or sport facilities  and restricts 
smoking to separately ventilated designated smoking 
areas in some of the other facilities 
1 i) Smoking in either of all recreational or cultural 
facilities restricted only to designated smoking areas 
or ii) Bans smoking in either all sports or recreational 
facilities or iii) Any stricter requirement that applies 
to only some of the recreational and/or cultural 
facilities  
0 No restrictions 
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Table A2.1 (Continued) 
 
Variable Description Value Coding Explanation 
culXX Cultural 
facilities by 
year (XX) 
4 i) Restricts smoking to enclosed, separately ventilated 
designed smoking areas in all cultural facilities or ii) 
Bans smoking in at least four cultural facilities and 
restricts smoking to separately ventilated designated 
smoking areas in the others 
3 i) Restricts smoking to separately ventilated designed 
smoking areas in at least four cultural facilities and 
restricts smoking to separately ventilated smoking 
areas in the other or ii) bans smoking in at least three 
cultural facilities and do has some type of less strict 
requirements on the others 
2 i) Restricts smoking to separately ventilated 
designated areas in three cultural facilities and 
restricts smoking to designated areas in at least other 
cultural facility or ii) Bans smoking in at least three 
cultural facilities imposing no restrictions on the 
others  
1 i) Restricts smoking to designated areas in at least 
four cultural facilities or ii) Bans smoking in at least 
two cultural facilities imposing no restrictions on the 
others or iii) Restricts smoking to separately 
ventilated designated areas in at least three cultural 
facilities imposing no restrictions on the others  
0 i) Restricts smoking to designated areas in three or 
less cultural facilities or ii) No restrictions, or 
requirement(s) that smoking be permitted  
Note: All cultural facilities include museums, auditoriums, indoor movie theaters, theaters 
and libraries. 
sanXX Sanctions 
by year 
(XX) 
4 Graduated penalties or fines, applicable to smokers, 
proprietors and employers, for repeated violation of 
clean indoor air legislation. In addition, the law has 
some provisions for infractions not considered in the 
law. 
3 i) Graduated penalties or fines, applicable to all types 
of infractors (smokers, proprietors and vehicle 
owners) on some clean indoor air provisions with 
penalties or fines applicable to the other clean indoor 
air provisions or ii) Graduated penalties or fines, 
applicable to some of the infractors (either smokers, 
proprietors and vehicle owners)  on all  clean indoor 
air provisions with penalties or fines applicable to the 
other type of infractors. In addition, the law explicitly 
considers provisions for infractions that are "not 
considered in the law" in either i) or ii) 
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 Table A2.1 (Continued) 
 
Variable Description Value Coding Explanation 
  
2 i) Penalties or fines, applicable to all types of 
infractors (smokers/proprietors/vehicle owners) and 
all specified clean indoor provisions orii) Penalties or 
fines applicable to  some of the infractors or some of 
the clean indoor provisions if and only if the law 
considers provisions for infractions that are "not 
considered in the law".  
  
1 Penalties or fines, applicable to either smokers, 
proprietors or vehicle owners to only a limited 
number of specified clean indoor air provisions 
  
0 None of the above 
ageXX Agency by 
year (XX) 
4 Designate an enforcement authority for clean indoor 
air legislation, and require the agency or other 
officials to conduct ordinary and random compliance 
inspections in businesses and vehicles and require 
sign posting.  
3 i) Designate an enforcement authority for clean 
indoor air legislation, and require the agency or other 
officials to conduct ordinary compliance inspections 
in businesses and vehicles and require sign posting or 
ii) Designate an enforcement authority for clean 
indoor air legislation, and require the agency or other 
officials to conduct ordinary and random compliance 
inspections in businesses and vehicles but no 
requirement for sign posting.  
2 i) Designate an enforcement authority for clean 
indoor air legislation and require sign posting or 
ii) Designate an enforcement authority for clean 
indoor air legislation and require the agency or other 
officials to conduct ordinary  compliance inspections 
in either businesses or vehicles but no requirement for 
sign posting 
1 Designate an enforcement authority for clean indoor 
air legislation, but no requirement for sign posting or 
inspections.  
0 No provision 
totXX Total score 
by year 
(XX) 
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Some states have smoking restrictions in restaurants or bars. States were given 
no credit for restrictions in bars-- ‘places where people dance’--, if they did not specify 
whether smoking was banned in the whole building or only in specific areas where 
people actually dance. Retail stores include self-service stores, malls and other 
businesses that are open to the public.  
Most of the legislation explicitly referred to prohibitions or restrictions on all 
recreational facilities and/or all sport facilities. When they did not, an exhaustive list 
of examples was needed in order to consider prohibitions in all recreational or all 
sports facilities. More specifically, laws that mentioned prohibitions in gyms and/or 
parks were given the lowest possible score.  
Cultural facilities include museums, auditoriums, indoor movie theaters, 
theaters and libraries. Health care facilities include both private and public hospitals 
and health centers, nursing homes and clinics. 
Legislation that did not consider how to sanction “infractions not considered in 
the law” received at most two points. If penalties or fines where applicable to either of 
smokers/proprietors/public vehicle owner and/or only applicable to certain clean 
indoor air provisions, two points were given at most. Graduated fines or penalties were 
given credit only when the law defined: i) the terms of repeated violations (e.g. 
repeated offense within 6 months of the first offense), and ii) the term “serious 
infraction”. 
Table A2.2 reports the scores by item and state. The number of public places 
with restrictions varies from 7 to 9.  Most of the states with laws in effect have some 
sort of regulations on all public places with the exception of recreational activities and 
smoking at home.  
  
 Table A2.2 Scores of Statutory Laws in Mexico by State and Item. 
 
code state gov06 pvt06 sch06 hwk06 hos06 tran06 res06 ret06 rec06 cul06 hom06 san06 age06 tot06 
01 Aguascalientes 1 3 2 0 4 3 1 1 0 2 0 1 2 20 
02 B. C. N  4 1 2 0 4 1 4 0 0 2 0 2 3 23 
03 B. C.S  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
04 Campeche 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
05 Coahuila  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
06 Colima 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
07 Chiapas 1 3 2 0 4 3 1 1 0 2 0 1 2 20 
08 Chihuahua 1 0 3 0 1 3 1 1 3 1 0 3 2 19 
09 Distrito Federal 3 1 2 0 3 3 3 2 0 4 0 2 2 25 
10 Durango 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
11 Guanajuato 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12 Guerrero 1 1 2 0 4 3 1 1 0 2 0 1 2 18 
13 Hidalgo 1 3 2 0 4 3 1 1 0 2 0 2 2 21 
14 Jalisco 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
15 México 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 64 16 Michoacán  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
17 Morelos 3 2 2 0 3 1 3 1 1 3 0 2 2 23 
18 Nayarit 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
19 Nuevo León 4 1 2 0 2 3 2 2 1 3 0 4 2 26 
20 Oaxaca 1 1 2 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 3 13 
21 Puebla 2 2 4 0 2 1 1 2 2 3 0 1 2 22 
22 Querétaro  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
23 Quintana Roo 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
24 San Luis Potosí 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
25 Sinaloa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
26 Sonora 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
27 Tabasco 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
28 Tamaulipas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
29 Tlaxcala 1 2 2 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 2 12 
30 Veracruz - Llave 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
31 Yucatán 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
32 Zacatecas 4 3 2 0 4 3 1 1 0 2 0 1 2 23 
 
 Table A2.3 presents the frequency of individual ratings (0-4 points) for 11 
strictness items and 2 enforcement items. Smoking is more restrictive in hospitals, 
schools and transportation services. The item-specific means are low because many of 
the states allow smoking in separately ventilated areas. The regulations in government 
are stricter than in private workplaces. In fact, 3 states ban smoking fully in 
government workplaces. Sanctions vary significantly across states; only in five states 
the legislation considered very strict sanctions. In general, enforcement is delegated to 
a state agency, normally the state Ministry of Health. Most of the states have mild 
provisions regarding monitoring and law enforcement. Enforcement is handled 
passively rather than actively; the responsible agency responds to complains, but does 
not actively monitor policy compliance by surveying worksites, restaurants or public 
places.   
 
Table A2.3 Frequency of Individual Clean Indoor Air Regulations. 
 
Item 
 Rating     
1 2 3 4 Mean 
Restrictions in locations 
Gov’t workplaces 7 1 2 3 0.84 
Private workplaces 5 3 4 0 0.72 
Schools 0 11 1 1 0.91 
House - Work 0 0 0 0 0.00 
Transportation  5 0 8 0 0.91 
Restaurants 9 1 2 1 0.66 
Retail Stores 7 3 0 0 0.41 
Recreational Facilities 3 1 1 0 0.25 
Cultural Facilities 3 6 3 1 0.88 
Health Care Facilities 3 2 2 6 1.16 
Home - Relax 0 0 0 0 0.00 
Enforcement items 
Sanctions 3 4 1 5 1.06 
Agency  0 11 2 0 0.88 
Notes: The horizontal summation of ratings is13 at the most, which equals the number of states that 
passed laws by May 2006. None of the states consider restrictions at home.  
Source: Own calculations based on Mexican statutory state legislation
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 1.2 Construction of weights 
The weights were estimated using the Time Use Survey, 2002 (ENUT, in 
Spanish).  This is a supplement to the National Survey of Income and Expenditure 
providing estimates of how Mexicans spend their time (e.g. eating, relaxing, and 
working). It also provides information on the full range of nonmarket activities, from 
childcare to volunteering. To be consistent with the sample used in the study of 
cigarette consumption, the weights were calculated using the sample of people aged 20 
to 50 years.  
The proportion of people in the four occupational groups (public or private 
worker, student or house-worker) and the average time they spend at different 
locations by gender is presented in Table A2.4. At a national level, the percentage of 
females working at home (50%) is considerably higher than that of males (5.3%).6 
Consequently, the share of time that people spend at different locations varies by 
gender (see Table A2.4, column All). Women spend most of their weekly time at 
home (76%), either working or relaxing. Only 16% of their time is spent at work or at 
school. In contrast, men spend about the same proportion of their weekly time at work 
and at home (45% and 41%, respectively).  Therefore banning smoking at work 
increases disproportionately the non-monetary costs of smoking for men compared to 
women. On the other hand, allowing smoking at home has a greater impact on women 
as, compared to men, they spend 30% more of their time at home. While at home, the 
type of activities performed also varies by gender. Women work at home 5 times as 
much as men do. In contrast, men use about 4% more of their time relaxing compared 
to women. This pattern prevails across the four groups defined according to their 
economic activity.  
 
                                                 
6  Pedrero (2004) discusses in detail the fact that the main economic activity of Mexican women is to 
perform domestic work at home.    
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Table A2.4 Percentage of Weekly 
Time Spent at Different Locations by Gender and Economic Activity. 
 
Percentage of 
men 
All  Public worker  
Private 
worker  Student  
House 
worker 
100  10.4  81.3  2.90  5.4 
 % 
time R  
% 
time R  
% 
time R  
% 
time R  
% 
time R 
Gov’t work   4.85 5 45.1 1 0.00 11 0.76 10  2.90 5
Notes: Workplace Public/Private for Students and Home Workers is the time spent searching for 
jobs. I calculated the number of hours people spend searching for jobs in public versus private places 
using total time on the job search and the percentage of current workers in public and private 
workplaces as weights. 86% (89%) of female (male) workers work in private places and 14% (11%) 
in private workplaces. The highest rank (rank columns) corresponds to the place in which the least 
time is spent. 
Source: Own calculations based on ENUT, 2002. 
Private work  40.2 1 0.00 11 47.7 1 5.94 4  22.7 2
School 1.53 8 2.33 6 0.58 9 27.6 2  0.36 11
Housework 6.89 3 6.83 3 6.81 3 6.48 3  8.39 3
Transportation 5.70 4 5.63 4 5.90 4 5.09 5  3.14 4
Restaurant 0.85 10 0.98 9 0.77 8 1.03 9  1.68 8
Retail stores 1.63 7 2.07 7 1.58 6 1.14 8  1.75 7
Recreational  3.03 6 3.73 5 2.99 5 2.97 6  2.28 6
Cultural  1.05 9 1.03 8 0.96 7 2.60 7  1.56 9
Health center  0.13 11 0.09 10 0.12 10 0.05 11  0.43 10
Home-relax 34.1 2 32.2 2 32.6 2 46.3 1  54.8 1
 100   6.58  40.4  2.98   50.0  
Percentage of 
Women 
All  Public worker  
Private 
worker  Student  
House 
worker 
100  6.58  40.4  2.98  50.0 
 % 
time R  
% 
time R  
% 
time R  
% 
time R  
% 
time R 
Gov’t work  2.24 7 29.2 1 0.00 11 0.96 10  0.58 8
Private work 13.0 3 0.00 11 27.4 2 5.92 4  3.57 5
School 1.37 8 1.78 7 0.98 7 22.3 2  0.39 10
Housework 42.0 1 28.4 2 34.7 1 21.4 3  51.0 1
Transportation 2.48 6 4.49 4 3.29 4 3.63 5  1.50 6
Restaurant 0.66 10 0.93 9 0.73 9 0.88 9  0.56 9
Retail Stores 3.23 4 2.91 6 2.85 5 2.00 7  3.66 4
Recreational  3.07 5 3.01 5 2.45 6 1.50 6  3.67 3
Cultural  0.75 9 1.18 8 0.85 8 1.10 8  0.58 7
Health center  0.27 11 0.28 10 0.19 10 0.01 11  0.35 11
Home-relax 30.9 2 27.8 3 26.5 3 40.3 1  34.2 2
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Table A2.4 also informs about the time use of people in different occupations. 
For example, females working in private workplaces spend more time working at 
home than at private workplaces. Females working in public workplaces spend about 
the same time at work than at home. Therefore, females who have private or public 
jobs spend at least the same proportion of time working at home than working at their 
respective private or government workplaces. One possible explanation for this 
phenomenon is part-time jobs.  In contrast, men who work in public or private 
workplaces spend about 45% of their time working outside home and only 6% of their 
time working at home. 
Students only spend about 25% of their time at school. In addition, women 
spend 25% of their time getting work done at home and about 40% relaxing at home 
(listening to music, using the computer etc.). Conversely, men who are students spend 
relatively more time relaxing (46%) than doing housework activities at home.  
The time spent at transportation facilities is about 5% of total time. Private, 
public workers and students spend more time using transportations services than home 
workers, regardless of their gender. The time spent at retail stores is about 1% points 
higher for women than for men. For both men and women, the time spent at 
restaurants and hospitals is negligible implying that the effect of restrictions on 
smoking at these locations should be relatively minor. The student population in the 
age range 20-50 years spends literally no time at hospitals were the stringiest 
regulations are in effect.  
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 CHAPTER 3 
 
OPORTUNIDADES TO REDUCE SMOKING IN MEXICO? 
  
1. Introduction  
This chapter investigates the causal effect of Oportunidades, a federal program 
in Mexico, on the smoking behaviors of its participants. The aim of this program is not 
to affect smoking directly, but to reduce poverty through investments in health, 
nutrition and education. Yet, based on a long line of health economics research there 
are several reasons to predict that the Oportunidades intervention will affect smoking 
among poor Mexicans. First, it provided households with subsidies that were very 
large compared to their baseline incomes.  Based on estimated income elasticities that 
show that smoking is a normal good in Mexico (Jiménez-Ruiz et al., 2008), these 
subsidies are expected to increase smoking participation by about 9 percent. Second, 
Oportunidades provided participant women and adolescents in high school with health 
information sessions, called pláticas.  Beneficiaries have reported that these sessions 
helped them understand the importance of healthy lifestyle behaviors, hygiene and 
prevention (Adato et al., 2000). Extrapolating from studies of the effects of health 
information campaigns on smoking (Nuño-Gutiérrez et al., 2008), it is reasonable to 
predict that the program might reduce smoking participation by about 25 percent. 
Third, Oportunidades increased the schooling of adolescent participants, and a long 
line of health economics research suggests that increased schooling should improve 
health and reduce unhealthy behaviors like smoking. Based on Behrman et al., (2005) 
the schooling attainment of children after four years of participation in Oportunidades 
should have increased by 0.35 years. From previous research, this is expected to 
reduce the prevalence of smoking among Mexican adolescents by 14 percent.  
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 The contributions of this chapter are the following. First, estimating the causal 
treatment effect of participation in Oportunidades on adolescent and adult smoking, 
documents the existence of unintended effects of the program. Furthermore, since 
smoking is an input in the production of health (Grossman, 1972) and health might 
reduce poverty via its effects on economic growth (Mayer, 2001; Fields, 2001), 
estimating the effect of the program on smoking elucidates the possibility of 
eliminating long-lasting poverty. Second, Gutierrez et al. (2005) and Duarte Gómez et 
al. (2005) have used propensity score matching (PSM) techniques based on 
retrospective data to estimate average treatment effects on smoking habits of program 
participants. In contrast, the approach in this essay consists on exploiting an 
exogenous jump in program participation at the poverty threshold for eligibility by 
means of a fuzzy Regression Discontinuity (RD) design (Imbens and Lemieux, 
2007).7 
 The RD is a quasi-experimental design that allows estimating a local average 
treatment effect (LATE) on the treated at the poverty threshold. This effect predicts 
what would happen with the smoking behaviors of non-participants if they were made 
eligible and decided to participate. As such, the LATE is particularly relevant when 
program expansions to cover better-off households via a small change in the cut-off 
for eligibility (van der Klaauw, 2008). Comparing the LATE with the average 
program effects previously analyzed, I investigate whether heterogeneous impacts of 
the program exist.8  Third, this essay is the first to estimate the causal effects of 
                                                 
7  The distinction between a sharp and fuzzy RD design is due to Trochim (1984). In both designs the 
probability of participation changes discontinuously at the threshold. In the sharp design this 
probability changes from zero to one while in the fuzzy design the magnitude of the probability 
change is smaller.  
 
8  Heterogeneous effects of Oportunidades on household consumption have been recently documented 
by Djebbari and Smith (2008).  
 
73 
 
 Oportunidades by gender. Furthermore, because of the differential treatments between 
men and women in the Oportunidades program, and in the absence of peer effects, 
estimating the program's impact on adult male smoking enables isolating the income 
effect.  
This paper’s identification strategy relies on the fact that only the households 
scoring below a poverty threshold (here normalized to zero) were eligible to 
participate in the program. As it is clear from Figure 3.1, the eligibility rules induced a 
considerable discontinuity in program participation rates (denoted with open circles) at  
the eligibility cutoff among nearly identical individuals. Hence, comparing smoking 
behaviors of those who barely made it to be eligible to those who failed to be eligible 
potentially eliminates any confounding program selection and omitted variable biases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Average program participation and smoking participation rates are 
plotted as a function of five categories of the poverty score on each side of the 
eligibility cutoff. Participation rates are based on true data, but smoking rates 
are hypothetical.  
Figure 3.1 Raw Averages of Program Participation and Smoking for Adults as  
a Function of the Poverty Scores that Determined Eligibility. 
 (The individuals in this sample live in comunities where Oportunidades  started operating in 1998) 
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In consequence, it allows estimating the causal effect of Oportunidades on smoking at 
the threshold for eligibility. In principle, the negative effect of health information 
sessions and schooling might be offset by the positive income effect. Suppose it does 
not. Then, the program would have a positive effect on smoking and the discontinuity 
in program participation rates at the cutoff score would be echoed by a discontinuity in 
average smoking rates of the type shown in Figure 3.1 with x’s. Smoking rates of 
individuals below the threshold would be much lower than smoking rates of 
individuals above the threshold. The discussion that follows demonstrates that the 
hypothetical average smoking rates are not representative of the true ones. This is 
shown in two ways. I first present graphical plots similar to Figure 3.1. Then I report 
the results of flexible parametric models that approximate the relationship between 
both program participation and eligibility and smoking and eligibility with an intercept 
shift at the threshold for eligibility.  The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. 
Section II provides background on the Oportunidades program and discusses the 
pathways through which participating in this program is expected to change smoking 
behaviors. Section III scrutinizes the research design and the econometric methods 
used with the available data. Section IV presents the empirical findings for adults and 
adolescents. Section V addresses the validity of the design. Section VI isolates the 
likely effect of income on smoking among adults, and Section VII brings together the 
principal results.  
 
2. Background on Oportunidades  
2.1 Eligibility rules and identification strategy 
Oportunidades, formerly known as PROGRESA, is the backbone of the social 
policy in Mexico. It currently covers approximately 25 million people, which 
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 represents 25 percent of the Mexicans in that country and 90 percent of the population 
living in extreme poverty (GEUM, 2008). Oportunidades’ benefits include sizeable 
cash transfers conditional on households conforming to a set of coresponsabilities. The 
purpose of the later is to improve the human capital of the poor through investments in 
health, schooling and nutrition.9  
At its original stage, this program was targeted to households in extreme 
poverty of rural marginalized localities with access to a school and a health clinic.10 
Due to budgetary restrictions, the program was randomly phased into communities 
over two years. In some communities it started in 1998 (treatment-98), and in the 
remaining communities, coverage started one year later (treatment-99). Within all the 
marginalized communities, the first step in the selection of beneficiary households 
involved a multi-dimensional approximation to the poverty condition (Skoufias et al., 
1999). Using a discriminant analysis, several individual and households characteristics 
coming from a census survey conducted in 1997 (ENCASEH-97) were combined to 
generate a poverty score for each household.11 Eligible households were those with 
                                                 
9  The program provides nutritional supplements to infants, under-nourished children and pregnant and 
breastfeeding women (Skoufias and McClafferty, 2001). The impact of this benefit in the outcome of 
interest is only important if the food supplement releases resources that households can use to buy 
more cigarettes. This is the same effect that I expect to find as a result of the cash transfers, which I 
fully address in the paper. 
 
10  Localities were marginalized if their marginality index was very high or high. Other options of this 
index were very low, low and medium The marginality index was developed using the method of 
principal components, based on seven variables:  1) Share of illiterate adults (> 14 years) in the 
locality, 2) Share of dwellings without water, 3) Share of dwellings without drainage systems, 4) 
Share of dwellings without electricity, 5) Average number of occupants for room 6) Share of 
dwellings with dirt floor, and 7) Share of population working in the primary sector (Skoufias and 
McClafferty, 2001).   
 
11  The value of the poverty index depends on the following variables: a crowding index (number of 
people in the household/number of rooms), whether the head of household is female, whether the 
household has access to medical service, the total number of children in the household less than 
eleven years old, years of education of the household head, age of the household head, whether the 
household has a bath and whether the bath has running water, whether the floor of the house has a dirt 
floor, whether the household has a gas heating system, a refrigerator, a washing machine, whether 
assets include a vehicle, whether the home is in a rural area and region of residence dummies for the 
19 census regions (Parker et al., 2006). 
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 poverty scores below a region-specific cutoff level. The rights and responsibilities of 
the eligible households were informed in a community assembly. In particular, 
Oportunidades required household withdrawal from pre-existing social programs. The 
assembly was also aimed to gather feedback from the community about families that 
needed to be eligible but were not and vice versa. Disapproval of eligibility status by 
other members of the community was an exception more than a rule (González de la 
Rocha and Escobar, 2001). 
In July of 1999, some of the households in rural areas that were initially 
ineligible became eligible through a densification process. Such a revision was 
undertaken to increase the number of households with certain characteristics that were 
felt to be under-represented when the eligibility status was first determined. In 
principle, making comparisons of individuals below and above the two thresholds 
would enable testing for nonlinear impacts of the program at different poverty levels. 
Unfortunately, performing this test was hindered by the impossibility to get (or infer 
from the data) the region-specific thresholds that resulted from the densification 
process.12 The quasi-experimental evidence presented in this essay is based on the 
threshold for eligibility in 1997. 
The densification process shrank the discontinuity in program participation at 
the original threshold in treatment-98 communities, and eliminated the discontinuity in 
treatment-99 communities. This can readily be seen in Appendix Figure A3.1 Panel A 
shows pre-densification average participation rates in treatment-98 communities as a 
function of five equal-size categories of the poverty score on each side of the 
eligibility cutoff.  Panel B plots post-densification average participation rates in 
treatment-98 communities. A comparison of these figures suggests that the 
                                                 
12  In fact, little is known about the criteria actually followed to boost the eligible population. For a 
discussion see Buddelmeyer and Skoufias, 2003 and Rubalcava and Teruel, 2003. 
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 densification process leaved unchanged the participation rates of the originally 
eligible. It is interesting to note that some of the individuals in non-eligible households 
were already participating before the densification took place. This was due to both 
the community assembly and ad-hoc changes in eligibility status in communities that 
were affected by natural disasters in the late nineties (Rubalcava and Teruel, 2003). 
Indeed, the densification process in 1999 only slightly increased the participation rates 
of the originally ineligible. Panel C in Figure A3.1 of the Appendix post-densification 
average participation rates in treatment-99 communities. In these communities there is 
not sharp discontinuity in participation rates for individuals in the neighborhood of the 
original threshold. This raises concerns regarding the validity of the RD identification 
in these communities. In consequence, the data used in this essay is limited to 
treatment-98 rural communities.  
2.2 Analysis of Potential Impacts of Oportunidades on Smoking 
Oportunidades provides families with two subsidies: a food subsidy and a 
schooling subsidy. They are both handed directly to the mother of the household. The 
monthly amount of the food subsidy is of 150 pesos (about $15 dollars in 2002), 
which represents about 20 percent of the baseline household income. Households are 
encouraged to spend this money to improve nutrition, but they use it as they like. The 
food subsidy is disbursed conditional on (a) regular health clinic attendance by all 
family members, and (b) monthly attendance to health information sessions by the 
mother and adolescents in grades 10-12. Women have attended these sessions since 
the program started, and adolescents only during the school year since 2001 (De la 
Torre, 2005). The sessions cover 35 topics. Many aim to promote self-care and one of 
them covers addiction prevention (SDS, 2003). 
Families with children are eligible to receive the schooling subsidy subject to 
children school attendance in one of the subsidy-eligible grade levels for at least 85 
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 percent of days in a given month. Table 3.1 shows the schooling subsidy amounts and 
how they increase with grade level to offset the higher opportunity costs of working 
for older children. Scholarships are higher for girls as school attendance has 
traditionally been lower for them. Schooling benefits are permanently discontinued if 
a child fails a grade more than once. 
 
Table 3.1 Schooling Subsidy Amounts by Grade and Gender Handed to the 
Mother of Households in Oportunidades with Children Attending School  
(pesos per month in the second semester of 2002*). 
 
Educational Level 
and Grade 
 Gender of Child who Attends School and 
Participates in Oportunidades:   
 Boy Girl 
Elementary School:  
Grade 3  100 100 
Grade 4  115 115 
Grade 5  150 150 
Grade 6  200 200 
Middle School:  
Grade 7  290 310 
Grade 8  310 340 
Grade 9  325 375 
High School:  
Grade 10  490 565 
Grade 11  525 600 
Grade 12   555   635 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: *In 2002, 10 pesos were approximately equivalent to 1 US dollar. 
 
Schooling subsidies are given to poor eligible families with children in subsidy-eligible grade levels. 
To receive these subsidy children must attend school at least 85 percent of the days in a given 
month.  In addition to schooling subsidies, participant households receive a food subsidy of about 
$15 dollars (in 2002). The food subsidy is given conditional on: (a) regular health clinic attendance 
by family members; and (b) monthly attendance to health information sessions by the mother and 
adolescents in high school.   
 
Source: Oportunidades Program Webpage: 
http://www.Oportunidades.gob.mx/informacion_general/main_ma.html  
The mechanisms through which the incentives of the program are expected to 
affect smoking can be derived from an economic model of addiction. As discussed in 
the introduction, sophisticated economic models of rational addiction (Becker and 
Murphy, 1988) and time inconsistent preferences (Gruber and Köszegi, 2001) have 
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 been recently developed and tested. Nonetheless, a simpler model suffices to predict 
changes in smoking resulting from program participation. The myopic model of 
addiction by Mullahy (1985) suggests that, in a given time period ݐ, the demand for 
cigarettes ܥ, is a function of the stock of habits ࣢, the price of cigarettes ௖ܲ , the price 
of all other goods ைܲ஺ீ, the individual’s income ܫ, schooling ܵ and information ߡ:   
ܥሺݐሻ ൌ ሾ࣢ሺݐሻ, ௖ܲሺݐሻ, ைܲ஺ீሺݐሻ, ܫሺݐሻ, Sሺݐሻ, ߡሺݐሻሿ  ሺ1ሻ 
 
 
Schooling and information could also be collapsed in a vector of covariates 
affecting both the production of nicotine services and the perceptions of health 
promotion. In any event, the effects of Oportunidades are expected to affect smoking 
participation through an income effect, an information effect and a schooling effect. 
The rest of this subsection discusses the sign and magnitude of the expected changes 
based on available health economics empirical evidence.  
The schooling and food subsidies of Oportunidades are expected to affect 
smoking participation through an income effect. An average of three years of 
participation in Oportunidades increased the average per capita income of those living 
in extreme poverty by nearly 28 percent (Rubalcava and Teruel, 2003). The income of 
the participants in my sample should have increased by 37 percent after four years of 
participation in the program. It has been shown that the increase in income due to 
transfers from Oportunidades resulted in higher food expenditure (Hoddinott, 
Skoufias and Washburn, 2000). Part of the money was spent on processed foods, such 
as sodas and cookies. Doctors and health promoters feared that the money could also 
be used to buy and consume cigarettes (Adato et al., 2000). Nonetheless, an increase 
in income does not necessarily imply that smoking should increase because relaxing 
the budget constraint enables more access to health information or to buying smoking 
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 quitting devices. The sign and magnitude of the effect on smoking depends on whether 
smoking is normal or inferior. This remains an empirical question. In developed 
nations, early demand studies concluded that it was normal, but recent ones find it to 
be inferior (Chaloupka and Warner, 1999). In Mexico, Jiménez-Ruiz et al. (2008) 
estimate an “income elasticity” of household smoking participation of 0.25. To the 
extent that this figure is representative of the income elasticity in rural areas, 
Oportunidades subsidies would result in 9 percent increase in smoking participation, 
which represents about 1.5 percentage points.   
Another channel through which Oportunidades might induce participants to 
choose healthier behaviors is health information. Assuming ex-ante incomplete 
information, economic theory predicts that providing information regarding the 
consequences of tobacco consumption and the addictive nature of tobacco would solve 
an information failure. Consequently, people would accurately estimate the costs of 
smoking and ultimately smoke less (i.e. the sign of ߡሺݐሻ in equation (1) above would 
be negative). Public health experts in Mexico support this view. They agree that 
"providing information to the population regarding the health damages caused by 
tobacco smoking [is] an effective tool to reduce this behavior" (López Antuñano, 
2005).  
Recent evidence of the effects of a school anti-smoking campaign in Mexico 
involving parents, teachers and peers, points to a reduction in the rate of experimental 
smokers of about 50 percent and no effect on smoking among regular smokers (Nuño-
Gutiérrez et al., 2008). Data from the National Addiction Survey (2002) indicates that 
about 50 percent of smokers are light smokers (INEGI, 2004). This evidence suggests 
that the provision of information would modify the health perceptions of 
Oportunidades participants, increase the costs of smoking, and reduce smoking 
participation by about 25 percent. 
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 The impact of the health information sessions is not expected to be confounded 
with other mass-media policies. This is because tobacco advertising in radio and 
television was banned in 2004, the same year in which health-warning labels increased 
from 25 to 50 percent of the back face of the cigarette packs (Sebrie, 2006), but 
smoking in this paper is measured in 2003. The small health-warning labels that were 
introduced nationally in 2000 are not likely to have been effective (Hammond et al. 
2007); leaving enough room from the health information sessions to have an impact.  
Oportunidades might have also affected cigarette consumption among 
adolescents through a schooling effect. “Years of formal schooling completed have 
been identified as the most important correlate of good health [and less unhealthy 
behaviors]” (Grossman, 2004; 32). Farrell and Fuchs (1982) claim that the observed 
correlation between health and education is mainly due to unobservable characteristics 
affecting both, investments in health and schooling (e.g. time preferences). An 
alternative explanation for the correlation is a causal effect from schooling to health or 
vice versa.  Recent empirical evidence suggests a causal effect going from schooling 
to less unhealthy behaviors. Using the approach of instrumental variables, Currie and 
Moretti (2003), Kenkel et al. (2006), and de Walque (2007) find a negative effect of 
schooling on current smoking in the US. These studies, however, provide less 
guidance about the specific causal pathways involved.13  
De Walque (2007) claims that an additional year of schooling beyond college 
decreases the probability of smoking by 6 percent. Behrman et al. (2005) simulate that 
                                                 
13  Schooling affects health in three main ways. First, because education is an investment that raises the 
future level of income and consumption, educated individuals have more incentives to invest in their 
health (Becker 1993). Second, schooling improves the ‘allocative efficiency’ of individuals. That is, 
through more schooling people get access to health knowledge which makes them choose healthier 
behaviors. Third, schooling increases people’s ‘productive efficiency’. This is because they produce 
more health from the same amount of inputs (Grossman, 1972).  Kenkel (1991) indicates that the 
productive efficiency pathway of schooling might induce healthier behaviors. 
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 participating in Oportunidades over an 8-year time period would increase the average 
educational attainment of children by 0.7 years. Because children in the current 
sample have participated in the program an average of 4 years, their educational 
attainment is about 0.35 years more than that of non participant children. 
Extrapolating from this evidence, it is possible to conclude that Oportunidades would 
decrease smoking participation by 2 percentage points, which represents a 14 percent 
reduction in smoking participation rates in rural Mexico. Although informative, this 
ad-hoc estimation should be taken with serious caution for the following reasons. 
First, it assumes that the effect of schooling on smoking is linear, but the combined 
evidence in Kenkel et al. (2006) and de Walque (2007) suggests that the marginal 
returns to schooling are positive but decreasing.14 If so, because Oportunidades main 
impact is on middle school attendance, its effect on smoking would be higher. Second, 
it generalizes the instrumental variables estimations to the entire population in the US, 
and then to the Mexican population.  
Table 3.2 summarizes the expected effects of the program. To the extent that 
there are no spillover effects of information, the overall effect of the program on men 
smoking should be at around 9 percent. Since the negative information and schooling 
effects can potentially be offset by the income effect, the theoretical effect among 
women and adolescents would be ambiguous. Based on the back-of-the envelope 
calculations, and in the absence of peer effects, participation in Oportunidades would 
expect to decrease the smoking prevalence among women by as much as 16 percent 
and among adolescents by as much as 30 percent. 
 
 
                                                 
14  While Kenkel et al., 2006 find that high school completion decreases the probability of smoking by 
25 percent; de Walque (2007) finds that finishing college decreases the probability of smoking by 16 
percent. 
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 Table 3.2 Mechanisms Behind, and Sign of, the Potential Effect of Participation 
 in Oportunidades on Smoking based on Differential Treatments among  
Adult Men, Adult Women and Adolescents. 
 
Benefits of  
the Program 
 
Mechanism behind 
a Potential Impact 
of the Program on 
Smoking 
 Expected sign of the Effect of Each 
Mechanism and of the  
Overall Effect for: 
  Adult 
Men  
Adult 
Women  Adolescents 
Food and 
schooling 
subsidies   
 
Income effect 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
Health sessions 
providing 
information on 
addiction 
prevention  
 Allocative 
efficiency:  
Information makes 
people choose 
healthier behaviors. 
 
 
 
- 
 
- 
Schooling 
Allocative 
efficiency: 
Information at 
school makes people 
choose healthier 
behaviors more 
efficiency  
Productive 
efficiency: schooling 
enables people 
choose healthier 
behaviors with the 
same amount of 
inputs.   
 
 
 
 
 
- 
Overall expected effect 
(in the absence of peer effects): +  ?  ? 
 
Before I discuss the data and methods of this paper, one issue regarding 
program effects on smoking participation in relation to the dynamic aspects of 
smoking deserves further consideration. As DeCicca et al. (2008) highlight, because of 
addiction, current participation reflects past decisions regarding initiation and 
cessation. Accumulated evidence from both developed and developing countries 
suggests that these decisions occur in different points of the life cycle. According to 
the 2002 Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS) data set, on average people start 
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 smoking at 18.4 years of age and quit smoking at 35.9 years. This evidence suggests 
that most of the program impacts on smoking participation would come about changes 
in smoking initiation among adolescents, and smoking cessation, among adults.  
 
3. Data and Econometric Methods 
3.1 Data  
The data used in this chapter come from the ENCASEH 1997 and ENCEL 
2003 rural surveys. The ENCASEH provides baseline characteristics and household 
poverty scores. It was composed of two groups of communities: treatment-98 and 
treatment-99. I restrict attention to the individuals in treatment-98 communities 
because the densification process invalidated the RD design in treatment-99 localities 
(Appendix Figure A3.1, panel C). Treatment-98 are communities where the program 
started operating since 1998. The ENCEL 2003 is a follow-up survey containing self-
reported information about smoking and other health behaviors. The empirical 
analysis is conducted on separate subsamples of adults and adolescents. 
The LATE computed in this chapter is informative about smoking behaviors of 
individuals participating in the program for an average of four years relative to those 
of non-participants. This is because program participants started receiving the benefits 
of the program between March of 1998 and December of 2000, and their smoking 
behaviors are measured in 2003. Smoking participants are those who answered ‘yes’ 
to the question: Do you currently smoke? Table 3.3 presents summary statistics of the 
estimation sample. 
3.2 Econometric Framework 
Let ܥ௜  be cigarette smoking in 2003, and ௜ܶ  be an indicator for participation in 
Oportunidades. By definition, an individual is never simultaneously observed in both 
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 Table 3.3 Descriptive Statistics by Participation Status in Oportunidades 
for the Sample of Adults and Adolescents. 
 
Adults In  
Oportunidades?: 
 Adolescents In  
Oportunidades?: 
No  Yes  No  Yes 
Panel A:Dependent Variables Measured in 2003 
Smoking rate 0.050  0.055  0.091  0.071 
(0.007)  (0.005)  (0.011)  (0.007) 
Participation in Oportunidades 0.000  1.000  0.000  1.000 
(0)  (0)  (0)  (0) 
Panel B. Demographic Variables Measured in 2003 
Female 0.728  0.733  0.552  0.527 
(0.013)  (0.009)  (0.020)  (0.013) 
Age 42.043  40.084  17.239  16.929 
(0.429)  (0.239)  (0.071)  (0.044) 
Married 0.849  0.916  n.a.  n.a. 
(0.011)  (0.006)  (-)  (-) 
Single n.a.  n.a.  0.845  0.892 
(-)  (-)  (0.014)  (0.008) 
Indigenous 0.344  0.481  0.276  0.383 
(0.014)  (0.011)  (0.018)  (0.013) 
Panel C. Covariates Associated with Smoking Measured in 2003 
No. years since started smoking 7.240  5.807  0.903  0.630 
(0.447)  (0.261)  (0.070)  (0.039) 
Tobacco control laws 0.259  0.155  0.266  0.139 
(0.013)  (0.008)  (0.018)  (0.009) 
Cigarette price  12.281  12.267  12.257  12.213 
(0.025)  (0.018)  (0.034)  (0.024) 
Panel D. Other Covariates Measured in 1997 
Despensa& 0.135  0.138  n.a.  n.a. 
(0.011)  (0.007)  (-)  (-) 
Niños de Solidaridad& n.a.  n.a.  0.166  0.215 
(-)  (-)  (0.016)  (0.011) 
Land Property 0.688  0.610  0.713  0.662 
(0.015)  (0.011)  (0.020)  (0.013) 
Cigarette price  11.734  11.689  11.725  11.634 
(0.040)  (0.029)  (0.058)  (0.038) 
Observations 1108  2262  627  1443 
 
 
Notes: *One US dollar was about 10.5 pesos in 2003 and 8 pesos in 1997. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. 
&Niños de Solidaridad gave grants for children in marginalized communities to finish elementary 
school. Despensas provided a monthly package of basic food products to very poor families  
Source: Own calculations based on ENCASEH 1997 and ENCEL 2003. 
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 the treatment and the absence of treatment states. Therefore, ௜ܶ ൌ 1 if an individual ݅ 
belongs to a household that started receiving the benefits of the program in 2000 or 
before and continues receiving the benefits in 2003, and ௜ܶ ൌ 0 if an individual 
belongs to a household that never received the benefits of the program. Let ܥ௜ሺ1ሻ be 
the outcome given treatment, and ܥ௜ሺ0ሻ  the outcome in the absence of treatment. 
Then the actual outcome we observe is: ܥ௜ ൌ ௜ܶܥ௜ሺ1ሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ௜ܶሻܥ௜ሺ0ሻ. A common 
regression model representation expresses the outcome as a function of program 
participation and an unobserved error term representing all causes of cigarette 
consumption other than participation  ߝ௜ ׷  
ܥ௜ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߠ ௜ܶ ൅ ߝ௜       ሺ2ሻ   
 
 
For simplicity, the previous expression excludes a vector of observable 
characteristics determining smoking other than treatment, but its inclusion is 
straightforward. The foremost parameter of interest in this paper, the causal effect of 
program participation on smoking, is given by ߠ. To the extent that program 
participation is exogenous, least squares estimation of equation (2) would produce an 
unbiased estimate of ߠ.  
As discussed in section 2.1, Oportunidades gives households incentives in the 
form of cash transfers and coresponsabilities, and assigns them to a certain eligibility 
status based on their poverty scores. Program participation is voluntary. Based on 
expected benefits and costs of the program, households make the decisions to join the 
program or not. As such, some households might find it more beneficial to join the 
program than others; they may ‘self-select into the program’ (Heckman, 2008). In the 
Oportunidades context, the self-selection problem might be aggravated by the fact that 
the agents making the choice to join the program may be different from the agents 
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 receiving treatment. Note, for instance, that participant adolescents are younger and 
are more likely to be indigenous than non-participant youths (Table 3.3). If these 
differences persist in characteristics not observed by the econometrician, program 
participation endogeneity concerns would be at stage. Fortunately, the RD design used 
in this essay overcomes this problem and enables the estimation of an unbiased causal 
effect of ߠ: a local average treatment effect.  
The identifying assumption in a RD design relies on the fact that program 
participation is a function of eligibility ܧ (i.e. ܶ ൌ ݂݊ሺܧሻሻ. We also know that the first 
stage of the selection of eligible households was based on a known poverty score. In 
particular, households scoring below a predetermined cutoff poverty score (here 
normalized to zero) were eligible to participate in the program. That is, letting ܧ௜ be 
program eligibility, and ௜ܲ be the poverty index in 1997:  ܧ௜ ൌ 1  ݂݅  ௜ܲ ൏ 0 and 
 ܧ௜ ൌ 0. The list of eligible beneficiaries was finalized after getting feedback from the 
community, and was later changed when the densification process took place. The 
variables that leaded to these changes are unobserved by the econometrician implying 
that eligibility depends on the poverty score in a stochastic manner, but in such a way 
that the propensity of treatment is known to have a discontinuity at the threshold for 
eligibility. Given this feature, Oportunidades can be best characterized by means of a 
fuzzy Regression Discontinuity design. In contrast, a sharp RD design would require 
treatment to be a deterministic function of the poverty score (Trochim, 1984).   
Estimating ߠ in a sharp RD design, requires continuity at the cutoff 
ܧሾߝ௜| ௜ܲ ൌ ݌ሿ. Local continuity requires that individuals just above and below the cut-
off have similar average potential outcomes when receiving treatment and when not. 
This identifying condition implies that individuals in the neighborhood of the cutoff 
should share the same predetermined characteristics (i.e. there is local randomization). 
Judging from the eligibility rules, this assumption seems plausible, but cannot be taken 
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 for granted. As in other research designs, it is impossible to test this assumption for 
unobserved characteristics. However, in section 5 of this essay, four different tests 
provide evidence suggesting that observable characteristics of individuals close to the 
cutoff were nearly identical. Hence, following Hahn et al. (2001), the average 
treatment effect of Oportunidades if the sharp discontinuity in the probability of 
treatment was one would be given by the difference in smoking behaviors for 
individuals just below and just above the eligibility cutoff: 
ߠ௦௛௔௥௣ ൌ lim௣՛଴ ܧሾܥ௜| ௜ܲ ൌ ݌ሿ െ lim௣՝଴ ܧሾܥ௜| ௜ܲ ൌ ݌ሿ     (3ሻ 
 
 
Since the probability of participation in Oportunidades at the threshold for 
eligibility does not jump from zero to one (see Figure 3.1), ߠ௦௛௔௥௣ in equation (3ሻ 
would not generally lead to correct inferences regarding an average treatment effect 
(van der Klaauw, 2008b). Nonetheless, assuming local conditional independence (i.e. 
individuals do not select into treatment on the basis of anticipated gains from 
treatment), a fuzzy RD design identifies an average treatment effect of participation 
precisely when the change in the probability of participation is less than one. This 
effect is estimated as follows:  
ߠ ൌ
୪୧୫೛՛బ ாሾ஼೔|௉೔ୀ௣ሿି୪୧୫೛՝బ ாሾ஼೔|௉೔ୀ௣ሿ
୪୧୫೛՛బ ாሾ்೔|௉೔ୀ௣ሿି୪୧୫೛՝బ ாሾ்೔|௉೔ୀ௣ሿ
     (4ሻ 
 
 
In the presence of self-selection on the basis of expected gains from the 
treatment, Hahn et al. (2001) show that under a weaker local monotonicity 
assumption, the ratio (4) will instead identify a local average treatment effect (LATE) 
at the cutoff point.  The local monotonicity assumption requires the individual level of 
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 treatment to be a monotonically increasing (or decreasing) function of the poverty 
score. This assumption is fundamentally untestable. However, it is expected that the 
probability of treatment would decrease as the poverty index increases (people become 
richer). If so, the denominator of equation ሺ4ሻ captures the (less than one) 
discontinuity in program participation at the threshold. As such, it magnifies the 
estimate in the discontinuity of smoking status given by ሺ3ሻ by the inverse of the 
fraction of compliers (Matsudaira, 2008). Compliers are individuals who were induced 
to participate in the program because their poverty score happened to be slightly below 
the cutoff score .The LATE differs from the average treatment effect estimated by 
Duarte Gómez et al. (2005) and Gutiérrez et al. (2005). The later effect is an 
estimation of the average effect of the program on compliers and people who 
participate in the program no matter where the threshold for eligibility is located.  
3.3 Estimation 
For the estimation of the LATE (as in equation is (4) above), suppose that 
cigarette smoking ܥ௜ measured in 2003, and program participation ௜ܶ (as defined in the 
previous section), can be expressed as a function of the 1997 poverty score ௜ܲ as 
follows: 
 
ܥ௜ ൌ ߙଵ ൅ ܦ௜ߨ ൅ ݉ଵሺ ௜ܲሻ ൅ ߝଵ ܧൣݒଵ , ܧ൧  ௜  ݂݅  ௜ܲ ൏ 0  ሺ5ሻ
௜ܶ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ܦ௜ߨ଴ ൅ ݉଴ሺ ௜ܲሻ ൅ ݒ଴௜   where ܧൣݒ଴ห ,ܲ  ܧ൧ ൌ 0 and ܧ௜ ൌ 1 ݂݅  ௜ܲ ൏ 0   ሺ6ሻ 
ଵ ௜   where หܲ ൌ 0 and ܧ ൌ 1    
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Under the assumptions that (a) ݉ଵሺ. ሻ and ݉଴ሺ. ሻ are continuous at ܲ ൌ 0, and 
(b) the parametrization of the ݉ሺ. ሻ function is accurate;  ߨଵ in (5) represents the size 
of the discontinuity in smoking and  ߨ଴ in ሺ6ሻ represents the size of the discontinuity 
in program participation. Note that ߨଵ and ߨ଴ are the numerator and denominator of 
 equation (4), respectively. Therefore, the causal effect of program participation on 
smoking is given by their ratio:  ߠ ൌ ߨଵ/ߨ   ଴.
There are several ways to estimate ߠ. One approach is to use non-parametric 
and semiparametric estimations such as one-sided kernel, local polynomial regression 
and estimators based on partially linear model estimation with and without covariates 
(see, for example Haht et al., 2001; Porter, 2003; and Frölich, 2007). The approach in 
this paper is to use a flexible parametric model following DiNardo and Lee (2004) and 
Matsudaira (2008). Indeed, it is possible to estimate ߨଵ, ߨ଴, and hence ߠ, by means of 
a flexible parametric model. ݉ଵሺ. ሻ and ݉଴ሺ. ሻ in equations ሺ5ሻ and ሺ6ሻ, represent a n 
degree polynomial in ܲ, fully interacted with the indicator for eligibility ܧ௜ ൌ
1 ݂݅  ௜ܲ ൏ 0 allowing the shape of the conditional expectation vary on either side of the 
cutoff. This parametrization is expressed as: 
 
ܥ௜ ൌ ߙଵ ൅ ܧ௜ߨ ൅ ܧ௜ ∑ ߮ௗ ሺ ௜ܲሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ܧ௜ሻ∑ ߮ଵ௣
௡
ௗ ሺ ௜ܲሻ ൅ ߝଵ  ሺ7ሻ
௜ܶ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ܧ௜ߨ଴ ൅ ܧ௜ ∑ ߮଴ௗ௡ௗୀଵ ሺ ௜ܲሻௗ ൅ ሺ1 െ ܧ௜ሻ∑ ߮଴௣ᇱ
௡
ௗୀଵ ሺ ௜ܲሻௗ ൅ ߝ଴௜    ሺ8ሻ 
ଵ ଵௗ
௡
ୀଵ
ௗ ᇱ
ୀଵ
ௗ
௜    
 
The estimation of ߨଵ and ߨ଴ depends on the particular functional form of the 
model relating ܥ௜ and ௜ܶ  to the eligibility score. For that reason, I will perform various 
specification checks varying the order of the polynomial on either or both sides of the 
cutoff. However, the preferred estimations will come from a specification where the 
order of the polynomial is chosen using the Schwarz (1978) criterion. This criterion, 
also known as the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), is commonly used to 
compare competing regression models. It penalizes a larger model for using additional 
degrees of freedom while rewarding improvements in goodness of fit (Baum, 2006). 
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 Because this model is exactly identified I estimate it via two-stage least 
squares (TSLS). As Wooldridge recognizes (2002, 636) the LATE is identical to the 
instrumental variables estimator of ߠ in equation ሺ2ሻ when eligibility ܧ௜ is used as an 
instrument for participation  ௜ܶ. Eligibility is a valid instrument for participation to the 
extent that it does not have an independent causal impact on smoking besides its effect 
through participation in Oportunidades. One can hardly argue against this assumption. 
Hence, the first stage of the TSLS estimates program participation as a function of 
eligibility and the interaction terms. This is analogous to estimating equation (8) 
above, implying that ߨ଴ is the coefficient on the dummy for eligibility in the first 
stage. The instrument (eligibility) must be powerful in predicting a statistically 
significant discontinuity in participation at the threshold for eligibility. If not, ߨො଴ 
would be zero, and so we would have no variation to work with. Knowing that 
eligibility induces a discontinuity in program participation, the second stage of the 
TSLS uses predicted program participation along with the interaction terms to predict 
smoking. As such, ߠ is the coefficient on the dummy for participation in the second 
stage. The relationship between ߨ଴, ߨଵ, and ߠ implies that ߨଵ ൌ  ߠ כ ߨ଴. The standard 
errors of ߨଵ are estimated from a reduced form specification of ௜ܻ on the dummy for 
eligibility and the polynomial interaction terms (as in equation (7)). Robust standard 
errors are reported throughout. In that way, I account for the fact that members of the 
same family share the same poverty score, and allow for heteroscedasticity due to 
misspecification of the ݉ሺ. ሻ  function.  
All the regressions in this chapter exclude a vector of covariates. This is 
because ߠ is unchanged to the inclusion of smoking covariates when the identifying 
assumptions are met. In section 5 I prove that this is indeed the case. In addition, I also 
contrast the results of the regressions that exclude covariates with those including 
standard socio-demographic variables, state-level cigarette prices derived from 
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 barcode scanning in large food stores reported monthly by the Central Bank of Mexico 
and a dummy for state-level tobacco control laws.  
 
4. Results  
In this section I present estimates of the effect of program eligibility on 
participation and smoking, and of the impact of participation in Oportunidades on the 
smoking behaviors of adults and adolescents.  
4.1 Effect of eligibility on participation in Oportunidades  
Represented with small diamonds, Figure 3.2 shows average program participation 
rates of adults (Panel A) and adolescents (Panel B) for five equally spaced poverty 
score categories on each side of the cutoff. A sizeable jump in program participation 
of adults at the eligibility cutoff of at least 40 percent is apparent in both figures. Table 
3.4 presents estimations of the size of this jump. These are the coefficients on the 
dummy for eligibility coming from flexible parametric models where participation is 
modeled as a function of a full set of polynomial terms along with the eligibility 
indicator (see eq. (8)). The Schwarz preferred specification includes first-order 
polynomial terms on both sides of the cutoff. The predicted values of this model are 
superimposed to the average participation rates in Figure 3.2. In spite that the poverty 
score in the figure is truncated at +/- 150 points, the regressions are estimated on the 
entire range of data. This is because, under the assumption that the first-order 
polynomial is the true function of the underlying data, the LATE is “efficiently 
estimated using data that are both close to and far from [either side of] the 
discontinuity threshold” (DiNardo and Lee, 2004; 1400). 
The Schwarz preferred estimation indicates that being eligible to participate in the 
program is associated with a 53 percentage point increase in the probability of 
participation for both adults and adolescents with standard errors of .028 and .034, 
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 Panel A. Discontinuity Estimates for Adults 
 
 
Discontinuity Estimates:
 x  Smoking Rates: -.003 (.011)
     Participation Rates: .536 (.028)    
Estimated Effect: -.005 (.021)
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Panel B. Discontinuity Estimates for Adolescents 
 
 
Discontinuity Estimates:
 x  Smoking Rates: -.014 (.019)
     Participation Rates: .536 (.034)
Estimated Effect: -.026 (.036)
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Notes: Average program participation and smoking participation rates are plotted as a 
function of five categories of the poverty score on each side of the eligibility cutoff. The lines 
are conditional expectations of specifications as in equations (7) and (8) in the text. They are 
estimated using the whole range of data with poverty scores of +/- 500. The first order 
polynomial approximation presented here is the Schwarz (1978) preferred specification.
Figure 3.2 Impact of Eligibility on Program Participation and Smoking and 
Effect of Program Participation on Smoking. 
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Table 3.4 Identification of Program Effects: Discontinuity Estimates of 
Participation in Oportunidades  at the Poverty Score Eligibility Cutoff  
for Adults and Adolescents. 
 
Polynomial order on both 
sides of the eligibility 
cutoff 
Discontinuity Estimates of Participation 
 at Cutoff for: 
  Adults Adolescents 
1   0.536&   0.536& 
    (0.028)   (0.034) 
2 right, 1 left*   0.458‡   0.454‡ 
    (0.037)   (0.044) 
2   0.449   0.457 
    (0.037)   (0.045) 
3   0.408   0.407 
    (0.047)   (0.058) 
4   0.403   0.386 
    (0.056)   (0.069) 
5   0.414   0.380 
    (0.066)   (0.083) 
6   0.399   0.360 
    (0.076)   (0.097) 
7   0.376   0.351 
  (0.085)   (0.113) 
Observations 3370 2070 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: *This regression is estimated using a quadratic parametrization to the right of the cutoff for 
eligibility and a linear to the left. 
& are the preferred estimates based on Schwarz (1978). 
‡ are the second best estimates based on Schwarz (1978). 
Each cell comes from the first stage regression of the two-stage least squares (TSLS) estimation. In 
particular, each entry represents π0 in equation 8 in the text. This is the dummy for eligibility 
coefficient of a flexible parametric regression of program participation on eligibility that also 
includes interactions of the dummy for eligibility and polynomial terms of the poverty score that 
defined eligibility. The order of the polynomial terms is specified in the first column of the table. 
Except for the estimates in the second row of the table, I use the same polynomial order to the right 
and to the left of the cutoff.   
None of the regressions include covariates. Clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
respectively (first row, Table 3.4). The second-best specification, which includes 
linear polynomial terms to the left of the cutoff and quadratic to the right, suggests a 
45 percentage point difference in participation rates around the threshold. Even 
thought the size of the discontinuity decreases as higher-order polynomials are 
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 included, the magnitude remains sizeable and significant.  This evidence suggests that 
scoring below a predetermined cutoff had a sturdy impact on the probability of 
participation in Oportunidades. On the econometric side, the persistent and 
statistically significant discontinuity demonstrates the existence of a strong first stage 
relationship between eligibility (the instrument) and program participation. Hence, 
identifying causal effects using the RD design is not only justified, but powerful. 
4.2 Effect of participation on smoking behaviors 
Represented with x’s, average adult smoking rates are plotted in Figure 3.2, 
Panel A. The similarity of the smoking rates on either side of the cutoff is visually 
apparent. Moreover, the predictions of the parametric estimates (also plotted in Figure 
3.2 with dashed lines) point to a null effect of eligibility on smoking behaviors. In fact, 
the -0.003 coefficient together with the small confidence interval around the point 
estimate implied by the standard errors (s.e.: .011) provide strong evidence of a null 
effect of eligibility on smoking behaviors (Table 3.5). The point estimate of the effect 
of adult participation in Oportunidades on smoking is zero (-.005) and precise. In fact, 
the confidence interval suggests an effect going from -4 to 3 percentage points. The 
implications of this non-result are interesting, and will be discussed further in section 
5 below.  
Panel B of Figure 3.2 plots average program participation and smoking rates 
and their parametric predictions for adolescents. The parametric estimations of the 
effects are presented in Table 3.5. The effect of eligibility on smoking participation is 
1.4 percent, which is small and not statistically significant. The effect of program 
participation on smoking suggests that participating in the program increased 
adolescent smoking rates by 2.6 percentage points. This effect is not statistically 
significant but also less precisely estimated. Because the confidence interval is more 
on the positive side, smoking of current non-participants would increase slightly if the 
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 poverty threshold was moved to cover better-off households and the current non-
eligibible became eligible and participate.  
 
Table 3.5 Effect of Eligibility on Program Participation and Smoking and  
Effect of Participation in Oportunidades on Smoking for Adults and Adolescents. 
(Estimations based on the preferred flexible parametric specification**) 
 
 
 Effect of: 
Observations 
 Eligibility on 
participation 
Π0* 
  
Eligibility 
on 
smoking 
Π1& 
  
Participation 
on smoking 
θ= Π1/ Π0‡ 
  
Adults  0.536   -0.003   -0.005   3370 
   (0.028)   (0.011)   (0.021)     
Adolescents  0.536   0.014   0.026   2070 
   (0.034)   (0.019)   (0.036)     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: ** The preferred estimates are based on the Schwarz (1978) criterion. They are estimated 
using first order polynomials interacted with a dummy for eligibility to Oportunidades on both sides 
of the eligibility cutoff.  
*  The effect of eligibility on participation corresponds to ߨ଴ in equation (8) in the text. This is the 
coefficient of the dummy for eligibility coming from the F st Stage of the TSLS regression of program 
participation.  
ir
& The effect of eligibility on smoking corresponds to ߨଵ in equation (7) in the text. That is the 
coefficien mmy for eligibility coming from a reduced form equation of smoking.  t on the du
‡  The effect of participation in Oportunidades on smoking is the local average treatment effect 
(LATE): ߠ ൌ ߨଵ/ߨ଴ in equation (4 ) in the text. This is the participation coefficient of the second 
stage of the TSLS.  
None of the regressions include covariates. Clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
4.3 Specification checks  
The previous subsection discussed RD results based on first order polynomial 
regressions. The conclusion that emerged is that, around the threshold for eligibility, 
adult and adolescent participants smoke at the same rates as non-participants. This is 
valid so long as the first order polynomial specification of the m(.) function is the true 
function of the underlying data. If the true functions do not belong to the class of first-
order polynomials, the discontinuity estimates will in general be biased, and may lead 
to erroneous inferences of statistical significance (Lee, 2008).  
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 Table 3.6 reports sensitivity estimates based on alternative model 
specifications.  
 
Table 3.6 Program Participation on Smoking for Adults and Adolescents:  
Sensitivity Estimates.  
(Estimations based on the second and third best parametric specifications**) 
 
 
 Polynomial order:  
Observations 
 First order to the 
left of the cutoff 
and second to the 
right  
  
Second order on 
both sides of the 
cutoff 
  
Adults  0.004   0.076   3370 
   (0.028)   (0.050)     
Adolescents  -0.008   0.094   2070 
   (0.033)   (0.060)     
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: ** Based on Schwarz (1978), the  second best specification includes a first order polynomial 
term to the left and to the right of the cutoff and a second order polynomial term only to the right of 
the cutoff (see column 2). The third best specification includes second order polynomial terms on 
both sides (see column 3).  
All entries are local average treatment effects (LATE) of participation in Oportunidades an average 
of four years on smoking. These estimations come from the Second Stage of the TSLS regression and 
represent θ ൌ ߨଵ/ߨ଴ in equation (4) in the text.   
None of the regressions include covariates. Clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
Based on the Schwarz criterion, the second-best specification includes a 
second order polynomial only to the right of the threshold. As before, the coefficients 
are not-significant. However, the sign of the coefficients is reversed. The confidence 
interval implied by the standard errors is similar to that of the preferred model (+/-5 
percent). For completeness, I also report results from a model in which second order 
polynomial terms are included on both sides of the cutoff. The coefficients of this 
model remain not significant. Moreover, given that this model is far from being a good 
fit of the underlying data, it is not surprising that the standard errors increase. All in 
all, the specification checks presented here do not contradict the main finding of this 
chapter: participation in Oportunidades did not affect current smoking rates of adults 
or adolescents.  
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 5. Internal Validity of the RD estimates 
This section’s aim is to provide evidence in favor of a randomization around 
the Oportunidades eligibility cutoff, and hence, of the validity of the estimates. The 
RD impact estimates reported in the previous section are credible so long as the mean 
outcomes of individuals marginally above the threshold identify the true 
counterfactual of those marginally below the threshold. For that to be case, the 
individuals who barely made it to be eligible to participate in the program should be 
similar in observable and unobservable characteristics determining smoking behaviors 
to those who almost made it to be eligible. This is analogous to conducting a 
randomized experiment at the threshold (Hahn et al., 2001). It is precisely this 
randomization process what will be tested in this section.   
As Lee (2008) emphasizes, randomization around the threshold is linked to 
how much control individuals have on the assignment variable (i.e. the poverty score). 
Manipulation can be complete or partial (McCrary, 2008). Complete manipulation 
occurs when the poverty score is entirely under the control of the agent. Partial 
manipulation occurs when the agent has some control of the assignment variable. Yet, 
the probability of receiving treatment lies somewhere between 0 and 1 due to an 
idiosyncratic element.  
Partial manipulation of the poverty score might have occurred. Back in 1997, 
when the first Oportunidades survey was carried out, the interviewed families knew 
that an anti-poverty program was going to be implemented. It is possible that 
households (or interviewers) reported (registered) some of the variables with error 
aiming that this would impact the final eligibility assignment. However, complete 
manipulation was very unlikely because the variables determining the poverty score 
were not public information until after the program was evaluated for the first time in 
1999.  
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 Meaningful parameters using the RD design can be obtained even in the 
presence of partial manipulation as long as one can prove that the randomization 
around the threshold worked (Lee, 2008).The critical assumption is that each ‘type’ of 
person has an equal chance of scoring just below or just above the threshold. For that 
to be the case, conditioning on the ‘type’ of the individual, the density function of the 
poverty score should be continuous. Since the conditional density is not observable, 
testing for a discontinuity at the cutoff in the observable density function of the 
poverty score is informative about the randomization process. This is because 
continuity of the conditional density implies continuity of the poverty score density. 
I test the null hypothesis of zero discontinuity in the density function of the 
poverty score at the threshold using the Wald test proposed by McCrary (2008), which 
I estimate through local linear density techniques.15 Figure 3.3, plots the conditional 
expectation of this test along with confidence intervals for adults (top) and adolescents 
(bottom).16  Both the graphical analysis and the point estimates (first row, Table 3.7) 
establish that the small discontinuity in the log of the baseline poverty score density 
for adults is not statistically significant. Nonetheless, the discontinuity in the log of the 
baseline poverty score density of adolescents is statistically significant. The 
discontinuity of the density of poverty scores for adolescents casts doubt on the 
identifying assumption, but it does not prove lack of randomization.17 I  
 
 
                                                 
15  I would like to thank Justin McCrary for providing the Stata code to perform the McCrary (2008) test. 
 
16 Normal Q–Q plots for the t-test of the (true) null hypothesis of continuity, where t-tests stem from 
1000 replications are available from the author upon request. They suggest that the normal 
distribution approximation is accurate as neither skewness nor fat tails are apparent. For details on 
this see McCrary (2008).  
 
17 In the same token, failing to reject the null hypothesis of zero discontinuity at the threshold is not 
conclusive of randomization around the threshold. See McCrary (2008) for a great example on this. 
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Notes: This figures provide discontinuity estimates from the test proposed by 
McCrary (2008, 703).  
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Figure 3.3 Density and Confidence Intervals of the Poverty Scores that 
Determined Program Eligibility for Adults and Adolescents:  
A test of the Validity of the RD Design.  
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Table 3.7 Assessment of the Validity of the RD Design in the Sample  
of Adults and Adolescents: Discontinuity Estimates. 
 
Estimates for: 
    Adults     Adolescents 
Panel A. Log Discontinuity            
Poverty Score that determined program eligibility   -0.043     -0.277 
    (0.087)     (0.102) 
Panel B. Discontinuity Estimates of Preset characteristics 
B.1 Correlated with smoking           
Female   0.006     -0.040 
    (0.026)     (0.038) 
Age   -2.108     0.013 
    (0.829)     (0.120) 
Literate   0.015     -0.018 
    (0.027)     (0.017) 
Married   0.036     n.a. 
    (0.019)     (-) 
Single   n.a.     0.001 
    (-)     (0.007) 
Indigenous   -0.026     -0.062 
    (0.034)     (0.044) 
Cigarette prices   -0.046     0.099 
    (0.092)     (0.140) 
B.2 Correlated with baseline poverty            
Despensa   -0.043     n.a. 
    (0.025)     (-) 
Niños de Solidaridad   n.a.     -0.025 
    (-)     (0.039) 
Land property   -0.011     -0.006 
    (0.034)     (0.042) 
 
 
 
Notes: The entries in Panels A, B and C represent the coefficient on the eligibility dummy of a 
regression similar to equation 6 in the text. It includes first order polynomial interaction terms of the 
poverty scores and the dummy for eligibility on both sides of the cutoff. Clustered standard errors of 
that coefficient are in parentheses. 
Panel A reports discontinuity estimates from the test proposed by McCrary (2008, 703).  
The discontinuities in Panel B are for preset characteristics measured in 1997 from the ENCASEH-
97. For this set of regressions estimates with up to second order polynomial terms are very similar 
and are available from the author upon request. Cigarette prices are state-level prices in 1997 
published by the Central Bank of Mexico. See the notes in Table 3 for the definition of Niños de 
Solidaridad and Despensas.  
 Table 3.7 (Continuation)  
 
Estimates for: 
    Adults     Adolescents 
Panel C. Discontinuity Estimates based on all available baseline covariates and 
excluding participation  
Effect of eligibility on Participation  0.005     0.000 
   (0.012)     (0.019) 
Panel D. Discontinuity estimates including covariates     
Effect of Program Participation on Smoking  -0.005     0.005 
   (0.020)     (0.032) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The entries in Panels A, B and C represent the coefficient on the eligibility dummy of a 
regression similar to equation 6 in the text. It includes first order polynomial interaction terms of the 
poverty scores and the dummy for eligibility on both sides of the cutoff. Clustered standard errors of 
that coefficient are in parentheses. 
Panel C includes age, gender, marital status, years of education, and cigarette prices measured in 
1997. There were no tobacco aws in place at that time.   control l
Panel D reports the effect of participation in Oportunidades on smoking. This is the local average 
treatment effect (LATE): θ ൌ ߨଵ/ߨ଴ in equation (4) in the text, which corresponds to the 
participation coefficient of the second stage of the TSLS. The covariates included in this regression 
are age, gender, marital status, years of education, cigarette prices and state clean indoor air 
policies as of 2003. 
illustrate this point through an example. Suppose that individuals did not exercise any 
control over their poverty score, but interviewers did. In an attempt to make eligible to 
the program as many people as possible, poverty ‘points’ could have been given to 
those who barely failed the eligibility cutoff. This behavior would have caused the 
discontinuity of the density of poverty scores that we observe. In spite of that, the 
identifying assumptions would not be violated so long as points were given randomly 
to the non-eligible. In contrast, giving points based on characteristics unobserved by 
the econometrician would damage the research design. The remaining of this section 
discusses alternative tests that attempt to provide evidence against the hypothesis that 
the ineligible were made eligible based on unobservables.  
Testing whether the baseline characteristics of individuals in the neighborhood 
of the cutoff are similar is an alternative way to provide evidence in favor of pre-
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 program randomization at the threshold.18 As Lee (2008) recognizes, the sample 
average in a narrow neighborhood of the eligibility cutoff would in general be a biased 
estimate of the true conditional expectation function at the 0 threshold when that 
function has a non-zero slope. To address this problem, polynomial approximations 
(as in equation (7)) are used to generate simple estimates of the discontinuity of 
baseline characteristics at the threshold for eligibility. Failure to reject the null 
hypothesis of no discontinuity ensures that the conditional expectation of any baseline 
characteristic in the poverty score is continuous, which implies that the unobservable 
conditional density of the poverty score, of main interest to us, is continuous (Lee, 
2008). Ideally, I would test for discontinuities of smoking behaviors before program 
intervention, but these data are not available in the baseline survey. Hence, I test the 
hypothesis of no discontinuities on a set of covariates that are correlated with smoking 
status, and other characteristics that are associated with poverty, but did not compose 
the poverty scores.  
Each cell in Panel B of Table 3.7 represents the discontinuity estimates at the 
threshold for eligibility of the baseline variables defined in the first column of the 
table. For instance, the 0.006 coefficient at the intersection of the “female” row and 
the “adult” column suggests that the female rate before the program started was 
similar for observations “just above” and “just below” the threshold. The rest of the 
discontinuities at the cutoff are small and not statistically significant providing 
evidence in favor of the "randomization" at the threshold for both the adult and 
adolescent samples. The only exception to this rule is the age coefficient for adults. 
However, under the null hypothesis that the covariates around the threshold are 
balanced and independent, we would expect 5 percent of the discontinuity estimates to 
                                                 
18 This is equivalent to the standard test of randomization in an experimental design, using a test of the 
equality of the mean of every variable in covariates across treatment and control groups. 
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 be statistically different from zero. Moreover, as I discuss below, controlling for age in 
the estimation of program effects on smoking behaviors does not change the main 
results of this chapter. 
The next diagnostic tests predicts smoking status as a function of poverty 
scores, a dummy for eligibility and all the available baseline covariates related to 
smoking, but excludes program participation. These estimations contain all the 
information that could possibly predict smoking behaviors (aside from participation). 
Therefore, if individuals just above and just below the cutoff are nearly identical, 
baseline characteristics should not predict a discontinuity in smoking behaviors. These 
predictions are reported in Panel C of Table 3.7. The size of the discontinuities is tiny 
and not statistically different from zero in both samples, thus favoring the hypothesis 
of similarity of individuals around the threshold. 
The last test involves estimating program effects with covariates included. In 
the presence of local random assignment, the point estimates of the impact of the 
program should be insensitive to the inclusion of any combination of baseline 
covariates (Imbens and Lemiux, 2007; Lee, 2008). In practice, if the covariates are 
correlated with the potential outcomes, tossing them in the regression may eliminate 
the biases that result from the inclusion of observations far away from the threshold, 
which would ultimately improve the precision of the estimates. The bottom part of 
Table 3.7 presents the estimates of the effect of Oportunidades on smoking 
participation, θ using a flexible parametric model that includes covariates. It is 
reassuring to see that the adult estimates are exactly the same as the ones where the 
covariates were excluded (“participation on smoking” column, Table 3.5). 
Furthermore, the standard errors in the model that includes covariates are slightly 
smaller, as expected. In the adolescent sample, not only the standard errors in the 
regression that includes covariates drop to zero, but also the point estimate.  
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 This section showed that adults and adolescents around the neighborhood of 
the cutoff are nearly identical in terms of observable characteristics. The various tests 
supporting this argument also suggest that the discontinuity in the density of 
adolescent poverty scores was the result of a random sorting. The available evidence 
furnishes the non-testable hypothesis of equal unobservable characteristics. It 
furthermore suggests that individuals were locally randomized, and that the zero 
impact estimates on smoking behaviors reported in this paper are internally valid.  
Despite that the results are consistent, the lack of significant effect found 
between participants and non-participants could potentially be contaminated by the 
presence of measurement error in self-reported smoking status. Cigarette smoking 
tends to be underreported in places where there is smoking-related social stigma 
(Rossiter, 2009). Underreporting due to social stigma is a possibility in the 
Oportunidades context. Smokers might have also had incentives to underreport if they 
believed that their smoking status was associated with a decreased probability of being 
eligible to participate in the program in the future. This would be the case, for 
example, if Oportunidades officials expected that the health information sessions 
would lead to a decrease in smoking. In contrast, cigarette consumption could have 
been overreported if smoking was associated with a “status” value. A comparison of 
the self-reported with true smoking status coming from biochemical markers would be 
necessary to address measurement bias, but information on true smoking status is not 
available. Therefore, the estimates above rest on the assumption that the self-reported 
data is accurate.  
 
6. Discussion 
The evidence provided in this chapter indicates that program participation in 
Oportunidades caused no effect on the smoking participation decisions of adults, and 
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 hence on health outcomes. This conclusion is supported by both the point estimates 
and the narrow confidence intervals implied by the standard errors. From the local 
average treatment effect (LATE) on the treated of this paper it is possible to predict 
what would have happened with the smoking rates of ‘compliers’ in the absence of 
treatment. Putting it differently, the LATE tells us what would have happened to the 
smoking rates of non-participants had the threshold for eligibility being moved to the 
right in order to cover better-off households. This effect is relevant in programs like 
Oportunidades where the evidence of positive impacts increases the probability of 
program expansions. 19 
Matching individuals in treatment and control communities based on “pre-
program characteristics” coming from retrospective information, Duarte Gómez et al. 
(2005) find a zero average treatment effect on the treated on smoking. This effect is 
the same as the LATE estimated in this essay. Consequently, the no effect of 
Oportunidades on smoking generalizes to the participant population.  
Previous research regarding the average treatment effect on the smoking 
behaviors of participant youth is less conclusive. Gutiérrez et al. (2005) find no 
difference in the smoking rates of short-term (up to 3 years) participants and those of 
non-participants. Duarte Gómez et al. (2005) find that the smoking rates of short-term 
program participants were 26 percent lower than those of long-term (up to 5.5 years) 
participants. Combining this evidence suggests that long-term participation in 
Oportunidades increased the smoking rates of the average adolescent participant. 
However, Gutiérrez et al. (2005) find the average long-term effect on adolescent 
current smoking to be not statistically different from zero. The long-term local average 
                                                 
19 See De la Torre (2005) for the latest summary of these effects. 
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 treatment effects documented in this paper are also not statistically different from zero. 
Nonetheless, the point estimate is positive and less precisely estimated.  
What processes were involved in causing this non-result? As program benefits 
where simultaneously given, disentangling each of the effects is possible to the extent 
that similar people received heterogeneous program benefits. For instance, suppose 
that eligible households were randomly assigned to two groups. Now suppose that 
both groups received cash transfers but only one was required to go to the information 
sessions. Applying the logic of difference-in-difference quasi-experimental estimators, 
program effect differences between these two groups could be causally attributed to 
the information sessions.  
Differential treatments between women and men in Oportunidades can be used 
to isolate the income effect on smoking participation among adults. Households in 
Oportunidades were given cash transfers, but only women were required to attend 
health information sessions (Table 3.2). Therefore, program effects can be interpreted 
as income effects among men, and income-information effects among women. 
Moreover, taking the difference between the program impact effects of men and 
women participating sheds light on the magnitude of the information effect. This 
exercise is valid if (a) there are no reasons to believe that poor men and women in 
rural Mexico adjust their smoking behaviors differently to income and information 
shocks, and (b) there are no spillover effects of information. For the same reasons, 
differences in adolescent and women program effects can be interpreted as a schooling 
effect. However, women might be a poor counterfactual for adolescents given that 
these populations are at different points of their life cycle and economic incentives are 
expected to affect their smoking behaviors differently.  
Table 3.8 reports the effects of Oportunidades on current smoking for men and 
women. The Schwarz preferred program impacts include only first order polynomials 
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 (first column). The point estimates of the effect of Oportunidades on male smoking, 
which can be interpreted as an income effect, are not statistically different from zero. 
Nonetheless, the standard errors imply an effect between +/- 10 percentage points, 
approximately. Program effects among women are more precisely estimated, but are 
also non significant. These conclusions are nearly insensitive to changes in model 
specification (second column) or the inclusion of covariates (third column). 
Furthermore, I fail to reject the hypothesis of no discontinuity in the density of the 
poverty score for men and women (Appendix Figure A3.2), which suggest that the 
results by gender are internally valid.  
 
Table 3.8 Isolating the Income Effect of the Program:  
Effect of Participation in Oportunidades on Smoking by Gender.  
 (Estimations based on the preferred and second best flexible parametric specifications**) 
 
 
 Polynomial order: 
Observations 
 
First order 
on both 
sides of the 
cutoff  
  
First order to 
the left of the 
cutoff and 
second to the 
right  
  
First order 
on both 
sides of the 
cutoff 
  
Men  -0.011   0.014   -0.027 906  
   (.063)   (.082)   (0.063)   
Women  -0.002   -0.001   -0.002 2406  
   (0.011)   (0.013)   (0.011)   
Regression includes  
Covariates? 
 No   No   Yes   - 
 
  
Notes: ** Based on Schwarz (1978), the first best specification includes first order polynomial terms 
on both sides of the cutoff for eligibility (see columns 2 and 4). The second best specification includes 
first order a first order polynomial term to the left and to the right of the cutoff and a second order 
polynomial term only ght of the cutoff (see column 3).  to the ri
All entries are local average treatment effects of participation in Oportunidades an average of four 
years on smoking: θ ൌ ߨଵ/ߨ଴ in equation (4) in the text. They correspond to the   participation 
coefficient of the second stage of the TSLS. 
Only the regressions in the fourth column include covariates. Clustered standard errors are reported 
in parentheses.  
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 The difference between program effects of men and women imply a zero 
health information effect. If so, information dissemination policies might not be the 
way to reduce cigarette smoking in Mexico. This result is interesting, but should be 
taken with caution for at least two reasons. First, because it assumes that men are 
indeed a good counterfactual for women. Second, because the lack of precision of the 
income effect of Oportunidades on smoking among men translates in information 
effects lying anywhere between +/- 12 percentage points. 
 
7. Conclusions  
The goal of the Oportunidades program is to eradicate poverty in Mexico 
through investments in human capital in the form of schooling, nutrition and health. 
Previous research on the health impacts of this program found that short-term 
participation increased the utilization of public health clinics for preventive care 
(Gertler, 2000). Along with medical utilization, economic theory predicts that health 
outcomes are also determined by health behaviors such as smoking, exercising and 
eating healthy to avoid obesity (see Grossman, 1972). 
This essay used program eligibility as an instrument for participation in 
Oportunidades to estimate the effect of this intervention on adult and adolescent 
smoking via a fuzzy Regression Discontinuity design. The benefits of the program 
include sizeable cash transfers, health information sessions and schooling. Based on 
economic theory predictions and previous empirical findings there were reasons to 
predict that Oportunidades would affect smoking among poor Mexicans through each 
of these benefits. The findings of this chapter suggest, however, a zero local average 
treatment effect on adults that participated in the program an average of four years. 
This effect compares to the average treatment effects found in previous literature, 
suggesting that the impact of the program is homogeneous across the poor. Income, 
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 schooling and information jointly did not change smoking among adolescents. 
Because these estimates were less precisely estimated, the worst case scenario points 
to a slight increase of smoking among long-term adolescent participants.  
Because of the differential treatments between men and women in the 
Oportunidades program, the income effect was isolated by estimating the program's 
impact on adult male smoking. The point estimate of the effect of Oportunidades on 
smoking among men was not statistically different from zero. Disappointingly, it was 
not precisely estimated. Therefore, it is not conclusive of a null income effect on 
smoking. The analysis by gender, however, indicated that health and income 
combined did not have an effect on the smoking behaviors of participant women. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
Notes: This figures provide discontinuity estimates from the test 
proposed by McCrary (2008, 703).  
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Figure A3.2 Density and Confidence Intervals of the Poverty Scores that 
Determined Eligibility by Gender: A test of the Validity of the RD Design. 
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 CHAPTER 4 
 
THE IMPACT OF SCHOOLING ON SMOKING  
 
 
1. Introduction 
Education is widely considered to be critical for development. Aside from its 
effect on labor outcomes in Mexico, the returns to schooling might also include better 
health through less unhealthy behaviors (Grossman, 1972; 2004).20 For Mexicans in 
their twenties, smoking is more prevalent among men than women, but schooling is 
associated with less smoking among men and more smoking among women (see Table 
4.1). For both men and women the gradient occurs at relatively low levels of 
education. In this chapter I measure and disentangle the correlation between schooling 
and smoking, separately for men and women. 
 
Table 4.1 Percentage of People who are Current Smokers and Healthy 
 by Schooling Level and Gender. 
 
Schooling  
Level 
  Current Smoker:   Healthy: 
  Men Women   Men  Women 
Elementary   25.5 2.2   56.3 54.2 
Middle school   23.5 4.8   64.8 60.3 
High school   19.9 7.3   73.7 66.8 
College   15.7 8.6   86.2 75.9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Current smokers are people who reported to ever have had the habit of smoking cigarettes 
and smoked at least one cigarette a day when they were interviewed. 
Healthy people are those who reported to be in 'Excellent' or 'Very good health the day they were 
interviewed. 
Source: Own calculations based on MxFLS-2, individuals aged 20 to 29 years. 
In the economics literature, explanations for the correlation between school 
attainment and health behaviors are not only limited to a causal effect of schooling on 
less unhealthy behaviors. Two other not necessarily mutually exclusive hypotheses 
                                                 
20 See Mayer-Foulkes (2006) for a review of the literature on the returns to schooling in Mexico.  
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 have emerged. The first poses the existence of a reverse causal effect, from health 
behaviors to schooling. The second suggests that the correlation between education 
and investments in health is caused by unobserved heterogeneity. That is, difficult-to-
observe ‘third variables’ that affect both schooling and health behaviors, such as 
family background and time preferences (Fuchs, 1982; Farrell and Fuchs, 1982).  
Most of the recent work has exclusively focused on obtaining consistent 
estimates of the effect of schooling on smoking and other health behaviors. One 
exception is Cutler and Lleras-Muney (2010) who analyze an array of factors 
explaining the relationship between schooling and health behaviors in the U.S., but do 
not investigate if the correlation is causal. Two other exceptions are Kenkel et al. 
(2006) and Fletcher and Frisvold, (2009), who have tested both the ‘third-variable’ 
hypothesis and a causal effect of schooling on different health behaviors using a single 
source of data. Both papers find that family background and ability attenuate, but do 
not eliminate, the schooling-health behaviors correlation in the U.S, thus favoring the 
hypothesis of a causal effect.  
Table 4.2 summarizes the literature that has taken steps to deal with the 
potential endogeneity of schooling when estimating the effect of schooling on health 
behaviors.21 U.S.-based papers, which constitute the majority of the studies, do not 
unanimously find significant effects of schooling on health behaviors. Negative and 
significant effects have been found on smoking during pregnancy (Currie and Moretti, 
2003) and on male smoking (de Walque, 2006; Grimard and Parent, 2007; Kenkel, et 
al. 2006). Interestingly, using a very similar instrument but different datasets de 
Walque (2006) finds a significant effect on smoking cessation, but Grimard and Parent 
(2007) do not. Moving to other health behaviors, Fletcher and Frisvold (2009) find 
                                                 
21 A concise survey of the literature examining causal effects of schooling on other dimensions of health 
can be found in Albouy and Lequien (2009). 
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Table 4.2 Summary of the Recent Literature that has Addressed the Potential 
Endogeneity of Schooling when Estimating the Returns to Schooling on Health 
Behaviors. 
  
  
 
Authors Year Goal* School 
margin& 
Health 
measure 
Country Sample 
Size 
Year Data Identification 
Strategy 
Causal 
effect? 
de Walque  2003 CE Years Smoking Indonesia 3,000 1993 IFLS "School supply" 
based on community 
surveys. 
Yes/ 
No 
Spasojevic 2003 CE N.A Health 
Index,  
BMI 
Sweden N.A 1981-91 N.A Change in 
compulsory 
education laws. 
Yes/ 
No 
121 
Currie and 
 Moretti 
2003 CE College Smoking 
during 
pregnan. 
USA 166,183 1970-99 Vital  
Statistics 
 Natality  
Colleges in the 
woman's county in 
her seventeenth 
year. 
Yes 
de Walque 2004 CE College Smoking  USA 370,000  1978–2000 NHIS, Vietnam era draft 
lottery. 
Yes 
Arendt 2005 CE Years BMI, 
 Smoking 
Denmark 3,300 1990, 95 SRH 
WECS 
1958 decrease test 
barriers & increase 
school proximity. 
1975 sch. leaving 
age 7 to 9. 
No 
Kenkel,  
Lillard, 
and 
Mathios 
2006 CE/ 
TF 
High 
School/ 
GED 
BMI, 
 Smoking 
USA 6,500 1998  NLSY79 5 education policy 
variables, state level 
(expenditures, etc.) 
Yes/ 
No 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: *CE is the causal effect of the schooling margin listed in the table on the health behavior of interest in each article. RC refers to the effect of the health behavior 
on schooling.TF stands for third factor hypothesis, which suggests that schooling and health behaviors are caused by unobserved heterogeneity. 
& Years indicates to Years of Schooling. 
Source: Please refer to the References. 
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Table 4.2 (Continued) 
 
Authors Year Goal* School 
margin& 
Health 
measure 
Countr
y 
Sample 
Size 
Year Data Identification 
Strategy 
Causal 
effect? 
de Walque 2006 CE College Smoking  
(Cessation) 
USA 80,000 1983–95 NHIS Vietnam era draft 
lottery. 
Yes 
Grimard 
and  
Parent  
2007 CE Years Smoking USA 227,000 1995, 96,  
98, 99 
CPS  
Suppl.  
Vietnam war draft 
avoidance. 
Yes/ 
No 
Parka and  
Kang 
2008 CE Years Smoking, 
drinking, 
exercise, 
health 
checkups 
South 
Korea 
1,611 2001 KLIPS-4 School 
construction data in 
the mid-70s and 
birth order. 
Yes/ 
No 
Fletcher 
and  
Frisvold 
2008 CE/ 
TF/ 
RC 
College Preventive 
 care 
USA 5,578 1957,64,75, 
92-93 
2003-04 
WLS Sibbling fixed 
effects. 
Yes 
Grabner 2008 CE Years Obesity USA 11,874/ 
11,214 
1971 to 75  
1976 to 80 
NHANES
1 & 2 
 
State Laws on Min. 
Schooling to apply 
for Work Permit 
(1914-1978). 
Yes 
MacInnis  2008 CE College Obesity USA N.A N.A N.A Pre-lottery 
Vietnam. 
Yes 
 
  Notes: *CE is the causal effect of the schooling margin listed in the table on the health behavior of interest in each article. RC refers to the effect of the health behavior on schooling.TF stands for third factor hypothesis, which suggests that schooling and health behaviors are caused by unobserved heterogeneity. 
& Years indicates to Years of Schooling. 
Source: Please refer to the References. 
 
 positive and significant causal effects on various measures of preventive care. In 
contrast with previous research by Kenkel, et al. (2006); Grabner (2008) and MacInnis 
(2008) present evidence of a causal impact of schooling on obesity. 
Outside the U.S., the controversy of the link between schooling and health 
behaviors remains as well. Parka and Kang (2008) find little evidence of an effect of 
schooling on smoking or drinking in South Korea, but do find that education induces 
individuals to exercise or get regular checkups. De Walque (2003) finds a causal effect 
of education on smoking in Indonesia, but this result is not robust to the inclusion of 
geographic fixed effects. Spasojevic (2003) finds positive effects on the probability of 
healthy body mass index (BMI), but this result only holds when the author uses one-
tailed tests. Finally, Arendt (2005) is unable to conclude whether there is a causal 
effect on self reported health and BMI in Denmark given the lack of precision of his 
instrumental variables (IV) estimates.  
The state-of-the-art of the literature examining the correlation between 
schooling and health behaviors can be summarized as follows. First, research has 
mainly focused on developed countries. Second, while the ‘third variable’ hypothesis 
has been widely discussed in the theoretical literature, convincing empirical tests of 
this hypothesis have been hampered by data limitations. Third, the evidence on the 
schooling effects of schooling on health behaviors is mixed. This conclusion can in 
fact be extended to other measures of health; in their review of the literature Albouy 
and Lequien (2009) conclude that the “existence of a causal impact of education on 
health is not clearly established” (p.156). Fourth, most of the studies that claim to find 
causal effects do not tease out the mechanisms through which schooling affects health 
behaviors. Possible channels include income, health-related information and the 
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 efficiency to process that information to make health-related decisions, peer effects, 
occupation, and assortative mating.22  
In what follows, using data from the second wave of the Mexican Family Life 
Survey, I contribute to this literature examining the relationship between schooling 
and smoking in a developing country. In the first part of the analysis I investigate if, 
and to what extent, usually unobserved factors are responsible for the correlation 
between schooling and smoking. In particular, I explore if the schooling-smoking 
relationships among men and women in Mexico are sensitive to the inclusion of 
variables that are designed to elicit individual’s time preferences, expectations, innate 
ability, and family background in a Linear Probability Model (LPM) regression 
framework. I thus use a richer set of ‘third variables’ compared to what has been used 
before (Kenkel et al., 2006 and Fletcher and Frisvold, 2009). Also, and in contrast 
with many previous studies, conducting the analysis on men and women, gives very 
interesting new insights. In the second part of the analysis, I use an Instrumental 
Variables (IV) framework to test whether health-related returns to schooling exist. In 
line with previous research, I focus on identifying total effects of schooling on 
smoking rather than identifying pathways. 
To uncover causal effects of schooling on smoking, I capitalize on an uneven 
and huge middle school construction program that took place in Mexico in the early 
nineties, just after a federal initiative proposed the amendment of the Mexican 
Constitution to mandate compulsory secondary schooling. Between 1992 and 1999, 
the number of public middle schools multiplied by 1.72 and the number of classrooms 
by 1.77. Most of these schools were built in rural areas (Parker et al., 2008). By 
reducing the costs of school attendance for the marginal person, a higher availability 
of classrooms in the individual’s state and area of birth is expected to increase middle 
                                                 
22 See Cutler and Lleras-Muney (2006, 2010) for a comprehensive discussion on this. 
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 school attendance, but there are no reasons to believe that it would directly affect 
people’s smoking decisions.  
To instrument for middle-school attainment, I use exogenous variation in 
public-school classroom availability per thousand school-aged children in the state of 
birth when the individual was 12 years, (i.e. when he/she first became eligible to 
dropout from middle school). Generated this way, the instrument takes into 
consideration that people’s opportunities to go to school are influenced by the number 
of schools, their size and the cohort size, which determines the potential demand. By 
using state of birth, instead of state of residence at age 12, the instrument also 
eliminates potential biases caused by classroom endogeneity (e.g. self-selection to 
areas with higher classroom availability). To account for the fact that unobserved 
state-level characteristics might affect smoking decisions, the preferred specifications 
include state fixed-effects. Therefore, identification comes from within-state variation 
in the number of classrooms available across cohorts. Given that the school expansion 
was intended to affect rural areas, alternative specifications use as an instrument the 
interaction between classroom availability and a dummy for rural-born.  
To preview the results, I find that the positive correlation between schooling 
and smoking is caused by unobserved heterogeneity among women, but not among 
men. The school construction program, measured by the availability of classrooms, is 
proved to exert a large exogenous and positive effect on middle school attainment, 
particularly on rural-born men. The second-stage results of the effect of schooling on 
smoking are less precisely estimated than the LPM. Nonetheless, the results suggest 
that schooling may include less smoking among Mexican men. 
The rest of this chapter is laid out as follows. Section 2 describes the data. 
Section 3 presents the empirical strategy to test the ‘third variable’ hypothesis, briefly 
discusses education policies in Mexico during the 1990s and describes how they lend 
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 themselves to an instrumental variables approach. Section 4 reports the estimation 
results and Section 5 discusses these results. The last section concludes and suggests 
directions for future research.  
 
2. Data  
I analyze the schooling smoking relationship using microeconomic data from 
the second wave of the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS-2). This is a 
multipurpose survey representative at the national, regional and rural-urban levels 
(Rubalcava and Teruel, 2006).  The baseline, fielded in 2002, covered approximately 
35,000 individuals distributed over 141 localities in Mexico. The MxFLS-2 was able 
to follow-up 90 percent of all respondents from 2002, including those who move 
within Mexico and those who move to the United States. Most of the followed-up 
people were interviewed in 2005 and 2006, but given the difficulties in tracking 
people out, the fieldwork of the second wave was concluded in 2007.  
The oldest cohort of individuals in my sample was 12 years by September 1st 
of 1990. According to Mexico’s school entry-age requirements during the nineties, 
these individuals should have started middle school that year. 23 The youngest cohort 
in my sample was 20 years old the day of the follow-up survey. Two reasons 
motivated this age restriction. First, by age 20 most of the people in Mexico have 
already reached their definitive education level. The individuals in my sample who are 
still studying are finishing college, so they have been fully exposed to the junior high 
school construction that took place in the nineties. Second, by age 20 people should 
also have made their smoking decisions. Own calculations based on the National 
                                                 
23 Regulations regarding the minimum school entry age were changed in June of 2006. Since then, 
individuals are expected to start middle school education in the school year in which they turn twelve 
years old by December 31st (Ministry of Education, 2006).  
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 Health and Nutrition Survey 2006 indicate that the average age at which Mexican men 
start smoking is 16.9 years. The same figure is 18.5 for women.  
Based on the above restrictions, 2298 men and 2808 women were eligible to be 
included in my sample. They should have started middle school between 1990 and 
1999. 117 men and 134 women were removed from the sample due to missing 
information in schooling, smoking, state-of-birth and area-of-birth.  Missing values in 
time-invariant variables were imputed based on what was reported in 2002. Time 
varying variables with missing values were also imputed using the information 
available in 2002 in combination with changes reported by the individual between 
2002 and the day of the follow-up interview. I imputed the remaining (small set of) 
missing values using multiple imputation techniques (see Roylston, 2005). In all 
specifications, each imputed observation was flagged with an imputation dummy. The 
final sample of analysis consists of 2181 men and 2662 women. Summary statistics 
for women and men are reported in Table 4.3.  
One of the most important advantages of the MxFLS is that all respondents 
were directly asked their history of schooling and smoking consumption. Current 
smoking participation was coded based on the responses to the following questions: 
“Do you/did you ever had the habit of smoking cigarettes?” and “How many cigarettes 
do you smoke a day?” People who answered ‘yes’ to the first question and a positive 
number to the second question were coded as current smokers. Hence, the omitted 
category includes never and former smokers. Given the young age of the sample used, 
former smokers only represent 1.05 percent of the female sample and 1.93 percent of 
the male sample. By 2005, 76.02 percent of men and 75.5 percent of women in my 
sample reported to have finished at least one year of middle school. I focus on this 
margin because, as indicated in Table 4.1, the schooling-smoking gradient arises at 
relatively low levels of education. Furthermore, Grossman (2004) suggests that the  
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Table 4.3 Descriptive Statistics of Individuals and State Policy Variables by 
Gender. 
 
 Men Women 
 Mean  SD  Mean  SD 
Panel A. Individual-level variables        
Current smoker 0.191  0.393  0.057  0.232 
Some middle school 0.760  0.427  0.759  0.428 
Age 23.500  2.509  23.476  2.485 
Currently attends school 0.149  0.356  0.131  0.338 
Indigenous 0.094  0.292  0.098  0.297 
Rural-born 0.522  0.500  0.532  0.499 
Future oriented 0.264  0.441  0.264  0.441 
Good future expectations 0.558  0.261  0.533  0.267 
Risk averse 0.320  0.467  0.264  0.441 
Cognitive ability -0.024  1.002  0.013  1.002 
Family resources at age 12 0.605  0.489  0.614  0.487 
Parent with some middle school 0.352  0.478  0.341  0.474 
Mother has some middle school 0.230  0.421  0.216  0.411 
Panel B. State policy variables        
Classroom availability (per 1000 ch) 15.974  2.634  15.95  2.777 
Families in Oportunidades in 2005 0.194  0.123  0.20  0.127 
Families in Oportunidades, age 12 0.008  0.027  0.01  0.029 
Families in Oportunidades, age 15 0.045  0.069  0.05  0.074 
Cigarette price in 2005  14.442  1.039  14.42  1.036 
Cigarette price, age 15  11.192  2.041  11.17  2.125 
Tobacco control law in 2005 0.220  0.411  0.23  0.423 
Observations 2181  2662 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Individual level data comes from the second wave of the Mexican Family Life Survey 
(MxFLS-2). People aged 20 to 29 years old who started middle school between 1990 and 1999. 
State-level policies come from different sources: Tobacco Control Laws: State-level regulation (as 
explained in Chapter 1). Cigarette Prices: Central Bank of Mexico. Families in Oportunidades: 
Ministry of Social Development.  
returns to schooling may be larger for low levels of schooling. Fortunately, middle 
school is also the level expected to be influenced by the features of the school 
expansion that I use to instrument for schooling (more on this below).
 The MxFLS is ideally suited for this research because it sought to measure 
individuals' expectations, inter-temporal, and risk-related preferences based on 
questions that involve hypothetical choices in the financial domain. The internal 
validity of these questions has been validated through an associated project —the 
Mexican Family Life Survey –Preferences Pilot— which collected information from 
both experiments that involved real financial incentives and survey measures of 
preferences on a subsample of MxFLS respondents (Hamoudi and Thomas, 2006). 
Still, responses to such questions cannot be taken at face value, because it is not clear 
that the preferences elicited over money apply to the health domain of interest here. 
However, they may reasonably be taken as informative about these preference 
parameters. 
To gauge their value of the future, individuals were asked whether they agreed 
with the following statement: “What time frame is the most important to you when 
deciding how much money to spend and to save?” I code those who answered “at least 
some months” as being future-oriented.24  Individuals who value more the future (i.e. 
have low discount rates), plan more for the future. Consequently, they are expected to 
invest more in both schooling and health promotion.   
Individuals were also asked: “How probable is it that there will be enough 
money in three years to cover all your household needs?” People with higher 
subjective probabilities on this question were coded as having ‘good future 
expectations’.25 To ensure realization of future utility, people with better expectations 
                                                 
24 Other questions were also designed to elicit inter-temporal preferences. Subjects were, for example, 
presented with a choice between receiving a payment immediately, or waiting a specified period of 
time and then receiving a larger payment. Each decision involved different waiting times and implied 
discount rates. The results presented below are not sensitive to the choice of proxy. 
 
25 Other similar questions included: How probable is it that there is enough money this year to cover all 
of your household needs? How likely is that you will be working in 10 years? How likely is that you 
will be working in 10 years? Using these alternative questions to grasp people’s expectations about 
the future does not affect the results presented in section IV.    
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 might invest more in their education and health. Alternatively, for individuals with 
good future expectations and strong tastes for unhealthy behaviors, it might be optimal 
to engage in the behaviors they like and use future resources to ensure a healthier life 
(i.e. pay for medical expenses or smoking cessation products). 
The final domain of preferences includes attitudes towards risk. The instrument 
presents respondents with different income-earning mechanisms (“lotteries”) all of 
which carry different amounts of risk, so that by choosing a preferred lottery the 
respondent reveals her degree of tolerance to risk. Following Conroy (2008), risk 
aversion is constructed as a dummy variable indicating if the respondent chose the 
risk-free gamble. To guard against the possibility of early mortality, risk averse people 
will try to live healthier lives. If education is associated with more stable future 
consumption streams, they will also invest more in it.  
Cognitive ability is based on Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices Test, 
which involves the matching of patterns. This test is designed to assess a person’s 
capacity for intellectual activity, irrespective of his acquired knowledge (Raven et al., 
1993).  For this study individual Raven test scores were normalized to obtain a 
continuous distribution of cognitive ability, with mean 0 and variance 1 that is not 
truncated at either tail. This procedure was done separately for men and women by 
cohort. Raven tests from the MxFLS have been used before to explore the role of 
mother’s cognitive ability in procuring her children’s health (Rubalcava and Teruel, 
2004), and to show that cognitive ability dynamics interact with both individual and 
local indicators of macroeconomic wellbeing (Mayer-Foulkes, 2009).  
Family background variables include a proxy for family resources and parental 
schooling. The first is a dummy indicating whether or not the household where the 
individual lived when he/she was 12 had a toilet (versus having a latrine, black hole or 
no sanitary services). Parental schooling is coded as a dummy variable taking the 
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 value of one if either parent completed at least one year of middle school. An indicator 
for whether the mother is the one who has at least some middle school is also 
included. 
For the reasons explained below, each individual in the MxFLS was matched 
to the number of schools available in his/her state-of-birth when he/she was 12 years 
old. This is when individuals in Mexico are expected to start middle-school.  I also 
matched individuals with the characteristics of their current state of residence, and 
their state of residence when they were 12 and 15 years old. Current state-level 
characteristics include cigarette prices, a dummy indicating whether the state had 
enacted tobacco control policies and the number of families in Oportunidades in 
relation to the total number of families in the state. This is a proxy for the intensity of 
the Oportunidades program. Characteristics at age 15 also include the intensity of this 
program and cigarette prices. At age 12, only the percentage of families in 
Opportunities is included. 
State-level data come from different sources. The school construction data is 
from the Ministry of Education (Sistema Nacional de Estadística Educativa, in 
Spanish). State-level tobacco control laws “for the protection of non-smokers” were 
gathered from Orden Jurídico Nacional - a repository of laws available online -. 
Details on how the laws were coded are explained in Chapter 2 of this dissertation. 
Information on cigarette retail pack prices is derived from barcode scanning in large 
food stores reported monthly by the Central Bank of Mexico for 46 urban cities and 
published in the Official Diary. Nominal prices were converted to real prices using the 
official “Cigarette City Price Index” available online at the Central Bank’s webpage.26 
                                                 
26 
http://www.banxico.org.mx/polmoneinflacion/estadisticas/indicesPrecios/indicesPreciosConsumidor.
html 
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 State cigarette prices were constructed as simple averages of city prices. Information 
on the percentage of families who benefit from the Oportunidades program is public 
information made available online by the Ministry of Social Development.27 
 
3. Econometric Framework and Identification of the Causal Effect of 
Schooling on Smoking 
3.1 Econometric Framework 
To facilitate discussion of the econometric issues involved, consider a simple 
equation describing tobacco consumption ௜ܶ  for individual i (in 2005):  
௜ܶ ൌ ܾ௢ ൅ ௜ܾܺଵ ൅ ௜ܾܵଶ ൅ ݑ௜   ሺ1ሻ 
 
 
where ܾ௢ is an intercept, ௜ܺ is a vector of observed attributes, ௜ܵ is a schooling 
measure and ݑ௜ is a residual. If schooling is strictly exogenous, then OLS estimation 
of ܾଶ in equation ሺ1ሻ can be interpreted as a consistent estimate of the effect of 
schooling on cigarette consumption.  The ‘third factor’ and the ‘reverse causality’ 
hypotheses suggest, however, that schooling is endogenous. To see this, let equation 
ሺ2ሻ represent the schooling decision:  
 
      ௜ܵ ൌ ܽ௢ ൅ ௜ܺܽଵ ൅ ௜ܶܽଶ ൅ ߝ௜   ሺ2ሻ 
 
where ܽ௢ is an intercept and ߝ௜ is a residual. Following Cawley (2004), 
suppose in addition that each of the residuals in equations (1) and (2) can be 
decomposed as having a genetic component ܩ௜
௝ ሺ݆ ൌ ܶ, ܵሻ, a non-genetic component 
ܰܩ௜
௝ ሺ݆ ൌ ܶ, ܵሻ, and error terms ߱௜ and  ݒ௜ that are i.i.d over individuals: 
 
                                                 
27 http://www.oportunidades.gob.mx/ 
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 ߝ௜ ௜
ௌ ܩ௜
ௌ
௜  ሺ3ሻ
ݑ௜ ൌ ܩ௜
் ൅ ܰܩ௜
் ൅ ߱௜     ሺ4ሻ 
ൌ ܩ ൅ ܰ ൅ ߱       
 
A violation of the assumption that ܾଶ is uncorrelated with ݑ௜ and hence, that 
OLS estimates of ܾଶ will yield biased estimates of the true effect of schooling on 
smoking might occur in three circumstances: 1) ܽଶ ് 0; 2) the genetic factors ܩ௜ௌ 
affecting schooling decisions are correlated with genetic factors that exert an effect on 
smoking consumption ܩ௜் (e.g. innate ability); or, 3) the non-genetic factors 
influencing schooling ܰܩ௜ௌ are related to non-genetic factors affecting smoking ܰܩ௜் 
(e.g. time preferences). That ܽଶ ് 0 is what the reverse causality hypothesis predicts. 
The other two situations are considered by the ‘third factor’ hypothesis.  
The richness of the dataset I use in this chapter enables me to control for 
genetic and non-genetic variables that are widely thought to influence both schooling 
and smoking. These variables include future orientation, expectations about the future, 
a measure of risk aversion, cognitive ability, and family background variables 
measured prior to middle school attendance. The third variable hypothesis will be 
tested comparing the schooling coefficients of a baseline LPM with those that add 
gradually each of the ‘third factors’. The baseline regression will include a basic set of 
controls, namely, age, age squared, a dummy coded as one if the respondent is self-
reported as indigenous, a dummy reflecting current school attendance, a dummy for 
rural-born and a set of state-of-birth fixed-effects.28 This strategy will allow me to 
assess the extent of the biases and estimate more precise coefficients.  
In spite of the rich set of controls that are usually unobservable, the schooling 
coefficients are not to be interpreted as causal effects. This is because there might still 
                                                 
28 The heteroscedasticity of the error term in this linear model is corrected using White's robust 
estimator. 
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 be other time-invariant characteristics driving both health behaviors and schooling. 
Also, there might be other unobserved characteristics influencing both schooling and 
smoking that vary over time. Finally, the correlation may be driven by reverse 
causality. These three concerns are addressed in the second part of the analysis. To 
present a convincing analysis of the causal link of schooling on smoking, I will use 
exogenous variation in classroom availability that results from a considerable school 
expansion that came about in Mexico during the nineties. The context of this supply-
side intervention and how it lends itself to an instrumental variables approach are 
discussed in turn.  
3.2 Middle school policy background 
Mexico’s objective of providing full coverage to all elementary school-age 
children was nearly fulfilled in the early nineties. At the same time, the secundaria, a 
schooling cycle created in 1923 that corresponds to the U.S. junior high school (grades 
7-9), only served as an optional continuation of primary studies for youth aged 12 to 
15 years (Levinson, 1999). In fact, it was not until 1989 when the Mexican 
Government set as a goal “the provision of junior high school educational services 
through the use of traditional and newer non-conventional options” (Poder Ejecutivo 
Federal, 1989;  p.41). This objective was set in the context of an unprecedented 
educational modernization program that involved a number of administrative and 
curricular reforms. In 1992 administrative resources were decentralized from the 
Federal to State Governments. Also in that year, a federal initiative proposed the 
amendment of the Mexican Constitution to mandate compulsory secondary schooling, 
which was passed by Congress in 1993.   
A sizable secondary school construction seems to have followed the 1992 
initiative requiring completion of lower secondary school education. Figure 4.1 shows 
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 the annual growth rate of public middle schools and classrooms in Mexico between 
the school cycles of 1991-1992 and 2007-2008.  
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Figure 4.1 Annual Growth Rate of Public School Infrastructure in Mexico. 
(Schools and Classrooms) 
 
It can readily be seen that a tremendous rise in the number of both middle 
school facilities and classrooms started in 1992 and did not settle down until around 
2003. In 1992, there were 17,584 public schools and 121,031 classrooms in Mexico. 
By 1999, the year where the youngest cohort in my sample should have started junior 
high school, these figures had risen to 24,450 and 157,906 respectively. This increase 
represents 0.82 schools and 4.4 classrooms per 1000 children aged 12 to 15 in 1992.29  
As it is clear from Figure 4.2, the expansion of classroom availability was very 
heterogeneous across states. For example, while the increase in the number of 
                                                 
29 Based on data from the population council (CONAPO in Spanish) there were 8,301,905 children aged 
12 to 15 in 1992. 
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 classrooms per thousand school-age children between 1992 and 1999 was of 0.4 in 
Mexico City, this figure was 11.91 in Quintana Roo.   
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Source: Own calculations based on data from the Ministry of Education (Sistema Nacional 
de Estadística Educativa). 
Figure 4.2 Change of middle school classroom availability between  
1992 and 1999. 
(per thousand children aged 12 to 15 years in 1992) 
 
Most of the school expansion took place in rural areas, where at least 17% of 
the students with elementary school completed had no access to secondary schools 
before the intervention (Poder Ejecutivo Federal, 1989). Many of the schools built 
were tele-secondary schools, which are part of a satellite system that shows videos 
during class time and are followed by time spent doing exercises (Parker et al., 2008). 
By decreasing the price of schooling, the school construction intervention was 
expected to relax the initial supply-sided binding constraint and increase junior high 
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 schooling levels (Kanbur, 2008). Average schooling attainment for people aged 15 and 
over in Mexico increased from 6.5 grades in 1990 to 8.1 in 2005. Was this caused, at 
least partially, by the increase of public schools? Based on descriptive evidence, 
Mayer-Foulkes (2008) suggests that this was indeed the case. Between 1989 and 2000, 
a higher proportion of men and women completed lower secondary school instead of 
having no schooling or incomplete or complete elementary schooling (see Figure 4.3). 
Mayer-Foulkes (2008) emphasizes that the changes in the distribution of schooling 
occurred “almost exclusively in response to the increased availability of public 
schooling” (p.16).  
 
 
 
 
Source: Mayer-Foulkes (2006). 
Figure 4.3 Profile of Changes in the Distribution of Adult School Attainment 
1989-2000. 
 
3.3 Identification and Empirical Strategy  
Following the literature that uses educational policies as instruments for 
schooling attainment (see, for example, de Walque, 2003; Lleras-Muney, 2005; Parka 
and Kang, 2008; Albouy and Lequien, 2009), in this chapter I use plausibly exogenous 
variation coming from public classroom availability in the state where the individual 
was born at the time he/she was making his/her decisions to start middle-school. 
Classroom availability is measured as the number of classrooms that existed in the 
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 individual’s state of birth when the person was 12, divided by the estimated number of 
12-15 year olds in the state in that year (in thousands). The denominator takes into 
account that, for a fixed amount of classrooms, cohort size might have an impact on 
the actual availability of schooling for a particular individual. In contrast to previous 
studies which have used the availability of schools as instruments for schooling (e.g. 
Duflo, 2001; de Walque, 2003; Currie and Moretti, 2003; Chou et al., 2007; Parka and 
Kang, 2008), the numerator of my instrument considers that school availability not 
only depends on their numbers, but also on their size (Card and Lemieux, 2001). By 
using the individual’s state-of-birth, as opposed to state of education, I ensure that my 
estimates are not contaminated by self-selection. That is, the estimated coefficients are 
not influenced by the fact that some individuals in my sample could have moved 
across geographic units to attend middle school in areas where school construction 
was higher (or lower). This is because all the individuals were born before the school 
construction took place.  
The general framework for my instrumental variables regression, which I 
estimate via two-stage least squares (2SLS), can be written as follows: 
௜ܵ௕௬ ൌ ܽ௢ ൅ ௜ܺ
′ܽଵ′ ൅ ܥ௜ ܽ ൅ ߜ௕ ൅ ߝ௜ ሺ5ሻ
௜ܶ௕௬
ଶ଴଴ହ ൌ ܾ௢ ൅ ௜ܺ
′ܾଵ′ ൅ ௜ܵ௕௬ ෠ܾଶ ൅ ߛ௕ ൅ ݑ௜௕௬   ሺ6ሻ 
ଶ଴଴ହ
௕௬ ଶ ௕௬    
 
Equation (5) describes the first stage of the 2SLS estimation. Individual levels 
of schooling are regressed on an intercept a୭, a vector X୧′  capturing all observed 
attributes other than classroom availability, the per-thousand children classrooms 
available for individual i, who was born in state b and turned twelve years old in year 
y, C୧ୠ୷, and a set of state-of-birth dummies ߜ௕. ߝ௜௕௬ is the error term. 
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 The key identifying assumption is that the number of clasrrooms available in 
the state of birth at age 12 is not correlated with unobserved factors of the smoking 
participation decisions in 2005. That is, ܥ௜௕௬ in equation ሺ5ሻ can be excluded from 
equation ሺ6ሻ, the second stage. To the extent that classroom availability generates 
exogenous variation that affects smoking only through its effect on schooling, the 
predicted levels of education from the first stage will produce unbiased estimates of 
the effect of schooling on smoking in the second stage. The inclusion of fixed-effects 
in equations ሺ5ሻ and ሺ6ሻ, ߜ௕ and  ߛ௕ respectively, wipes out state-level time invariant 
unobserved characteristics. Identification thus derives from within-state variation 
across cohorts who attended middle school at different times. As such, the validity of 
the IV estimation rests on the assumption that the cross cohort difference in individual 
smoking behaviors follows a smooth-enough trend and that any departure can be 
attributed to the extra schooling induced by the school construction in their state of 
birth.  
The maximum level of disaggregation of the data on the number of classrooms 
(or schools) available from the Ministry of Education is at the state-level. This seems 
an imperfect measure of within-state variation in the number of classrooms in urban 
areas given that the construction of public schools was intended to affect people in 
rural areas. Put it differently, for somebody born in an urban area, the school 
expansion in rural areas in the state where this individual was born should not have 
affected their schooling decisions, unless this person decided to emigrate to rural 
areas, which seems implausibly. To account for this fact, I use both the level effect 
and the interaction between classroom availability ܥ௜௕௬ and rural-born ܴ௜ as 
instruments for schooling in the first stage:  
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௜ܵ௕௬
ଶ଴଴ହ ൌ ܽ௢ ൅ ௜ܺ
′ܽଵ′ ൅ ܥ௜௕௬ܽଶ ൅ ܥ௜௕௬ כ ܴ௜ܽଷ ൅  ߜ௕ ൅ ߝ௜௕௬      ሺ7ሻ 
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This identification strategy relies on the extra boost to education that school 
construction in rural areas should have on children of rural backgrounds. 
3.4 Instrument validity  
The validity of the instrument rests on the assumption that the number of 
classrooms available when the individual was 12 years old is not correlated with 
smoking participation decisions observed in 2005. Understanding what motivated the 
allocation of classrooms is key to assessing the validity of the instrument. Table 4.4 
sheds some light on the source of classroom availability comparing an array of 
observable characteristics for two groups of states: ‘low’ and ‘high’ intensity. States are 
classified as ‘low intensity’ if the increase in the availability of classrooms between 
1992 and 1999 fell below the national average. The rest of the states form the ‘high 
intensity’ group.  
As expected, the first row of Table 4.4 shows that a higher number of 
classrooms became available in states where the share of rural population was higher. 
In the same table, the comparison of national-level socio-demographic variables 
before the school construction took place reveals that, compared to low intensity 
states, in high intensity states the percentage of indigenous people and of the number 
of children born alive was higher, but educational attainment, individual and 
household income, and the percentage of the economic active population was lower. 
When only rural areas across states are compared, the same patterns arise; although 
the differences are no longer statistically significant. 
The evidence presented in Table 4.4 suggests that the placement of middle 
schools was done in a compensatory way (i.e. in underserved areas). The inclusion of 
state-of-birth fixed-effects should capture pre-school construction time invariant 
differences. However, policy endogeneity may still be problematic if within-state
 Table 4.4 Comparison of State-Level Variables Measured in 1990 by Intensity of 
Classroom Construction. 
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Unit of 
Measurement 
Increase in Availability 
of Classrooms 92-99 t-statistic 
 Low High 
Rural % 0.224 0.374 -2.93 *** 
  (0.036) (0.035)  
National level:     
Indigenous households % 0.041 0.162 -2.36  
  (0.012) (0.044)  
Educational attainment grade 6.918 5.914 3.29 *** 
  (0.221) (0.207)  
Children born alive number 2.724 2.971 -3.03 *** 
  (0.062) (0.053)  
Household income pesos 1113.643 876.389 2.20 ** 
  (58.098) (83.400)  
Individual income pesos 232.286 176.611 2.18 ** 
  (13.827) (19.721)  
Economic active pop. % 44.115 42.123 1.72  
  (0.500) (0.942)  
Rural areas:     
Indigenous households % 0.087 0.236 -1.97  
  (0.025) (0.064)  
Educational attainment grade 4.605 4.121 1.76  
  (0.201) (0.185)  
Children born alive number 3.369 3.473 -1.28  
  (0.074) (0.044)  
Household income pesos 600.357 519.611 1.15  
  (38.711) (54.276)  
Individual income pesos 120.000 100.722 1.18  
  (8.416) (12.746)  
Economic active pop. % 40.540 39.624 0.69  
  (0.698) (1.043)  
Observations  14 18  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: ‘Low’ intensity are states where the increase in the availability of classrooms between 1992 
and 1999 fell below the national average. The rest of the states form the ‘high intensity’ group.  
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * 10% Significance level. ** 5% Significance level. 
*** 1% Significance level. 
Source: Own calculations based on data from the National Institute of Statistics (INEGI). 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 4.4 (Continued) 
 
 
Unit of 
Measurement 
Increase in Availability 
of Classrooms 92-99 t-statistic 
 Low High 
Urban Areas:     
Indigenous households % 0.021 0.115 -2.28 ** 
  (0.005) (0.036)  
Educational attainment grade 7.578 6.913 3.37 *** 
  (0.140) (0.136)  
Children born alive % 45.073 43.638 1.43  
  (0.443) (0.810)  
Household income number 2.543 2.696 -2.50 ** 
  (0.043) (0.042)  
Individual income pesos 1247.143 1059.722 1.91  
  (50.450) (77.110)  
Economic active pop. pesos 263.500 219.167 1.92  
  (11.179) (18.403)  
Observations  14 18  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: ‘Low’ intensity are states where the increase in the availability of classrooms between 1992 
and 1999 fell below the national average. The rest of the states form the ‘high intensity’ group.  
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * 10% Significance level. ** 5% Significance level. 
*** 1% Significance level. 
Source: Own calculations based on data from the National Institute of Statistics (INEGI). 
unobservable characteristics drive both classroom availability at age 12 and smoking 
status in 2005. This possibility would arise if, for example, high intensity states are 
also the states that eventually passed more stringent tobacco control laws or exhibited 
higher cigarette prices. Table 4.5 shows that cigarette prices and the enactment of 
tobacco control laws are orthogonal to the intensity of the program. Nonetheless, I 
include state-level cigarette prices and policies because they are standard controls in a 
cigarette demand estimation equation. In fact, I also include cigarette prices at age 15. 
These prices are more representative of the prices the individual faced when he/she 
initiated smoking, and, due to the addictive nature of cigarettes, those prices might 
also influence current smoking decisions. 
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 Table 4.5 State Policy Variables by Intensity of Classroom Construction. 
 
 
Year Unit of Measurement 
Increase in 
Availability of 
Classrooms 92-99 t-statistic 
 Low High 
Tobacco producer state . dummy 0.071 0.111 -0.37 
   (0.071) (0.076)  
Cigarette price  2000 pesos 10.504 10.207 0.72 
   (0.266) (0.298)  
Cigarette price  2006 pesos 15.041 14.871 0.43 
   (0.261) (0.279)  
Tobacco control law 2000 dummy 0.000 0.167 -1.62 
   (0.000) (0.090)  
Tobacco control law 2006 dummy 0.286 0.500 -1.21 
   (0.125) (0.121)  
CIAPI-men 2006 Index(0-1) 0.037 0.090 -1.54 
   (0.017) (0.027)  
CIAPI - women 2006 Index (0-1) 0.018 0.037 -1.38 
   (0.008) (0.010)  
Families in Oportunidades 1997 % 0.010 0.020 -0.98 
   (0.006) (0.008)  
Families in Oportunidades 1998 % 0.056 0.100 -1.99 ** 
   (0.014) (0.016)  
Families in Oportunidades 1999 % 0.070 0.151 -2.76 *** 
   (0.017) (0.022)  
Families in Oportunidades 2000 % 0.070 0.159 -2.85 *** 
   (0.017) (0.024)  
Families in Oportunidades 2001 % 0.087 0.192 -2.77 *** 
   (0.019) (0.030)  
Families in Oportunidades 2002 % 0.124 0.257 -2.97 *** 
   (0.024) (0.035)  
Families in Oportunidades 2003 % 0.121 0.252 -2.93 *** 
   (0.024) (0.035)  
Families in Oportunidades 2004 % 0.142 0.286 -3.11 *** 
   (0.026) (0.035)  
Families in Oportunidades 2005 % 0.140 0.277 -3.06 *** 
   (0.026) (0.034)  
Observations   14 18  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: 'Low intensity' states are the ones where the increase in the availability of classrooms between 
1992 and 1999 fell below the national average. The rest of the states form the ‘high intensity’ group.  
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * 10% Significance level. ** 5% Significance level. *** 
1% Significance level. 
Source: Own calculations based on different sources of data. Tobacco Control Laws: State-level 
regulation (as explained in Chapter 1). Cigarette Prices: Central Bank of Mexico. Families in 
Oportunidades: Ministry of Social Development. 
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 A final concern is that states where the number of classrooms increased the 
most between 1990 and 1999 were also states where the presence of other programs 
that potentially affected individual’s smoking decisions in 2005 was increasing (or 
decreasing). The lower part of Table 4.5 shows that in high intensity states not only a 
higher percentage of total families were beneficiaries of the Oportunidades program, 
but this difference widened over time. This is not surprising as the Oportunidades 
program was targeted to rural marginalized communities in 1997 and it was expanded 
to urban localities in 2002. In chapter three I was unable to reject the hypothesis of no 
effects on smoking of the Oportunidades. Since there is no evidence of a causal effect 
of Oportunidades on smoking, the increasing presence of this program in states where 
the number of classrooms was also increasing should not cause concerns.  
The Oportunidades program did have an effect on school attainment (see 
Behrman et al., 2005). Even though the objective of this paper is not to estimate the 
causal effect of state policies on schooling, but to use these policies to investigate the 
effect of schooling on smoking; the intensity of the Oportunidades program in the 
individual’s state of residence at age 12 is included in most specifications. By doing 
that, biases in the estimation of the effect of the school construction on schooling 
would be reduced. For completeness, I also include a variable capturing the intensity 
of the program at age 15, when individuals start taking their smoking initiation 
decisions, and in 2005, when the outcome of interest is observed. Because state-of-
birth fixed-effects are included in all specifications, the identification of the 
Oportunidades program, the state-level prices and tobacco control policy variables 
comes from people’s movements across states over time. Additionally, as the prices 
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and intensity of the Oportunidades program varied over time, the exposure of non-
movers to each of these variables at age 12 and 15 varied across cohorts.30 
Based on the previous discussion, there are no reasons to believe that 
classroom availability is not a valid instrument for schooling. To further support this 
conclusion I formally test the validity of the instrument following Curie and Moretti 
(2005). That is, I ask whether the impact on schooling of public middle school 
classrooms differs from the impact of private classrooms. If the instrument captures 
reductions in the price of schooling, the availability of public classrooms should have 
a larger impact than the availability of private classrooms. As individuals in rural areas 
are generally of disadvantaged backgrounds, most of them attend public schools. 
Hence, the availability of private classrooms in rural areas should have a marginal 
effect.   
 
4. Results  
4.1 Results of Linear Probability Models of Smoking Participation 
Before I present the results that test the omitted “third variables” hypothesis, Table 4.6 
provides the estimates from Linear Probability Models (LPM) that correspond to the 
specification that includes only the most basic set of control variables. Columns (1) to 
(3) present results for men and columns (4) to (6) report results for women. In 
columns (1) and (4) I only control for state-of-birth indicators, age and age squared. 
These schooling coefficients thus represent the total association between schooling 
and smoking for men and women, respectively. In line with Table 4.1, men with some 
middle school are five percent less likely to smoke, but women are two percent more 
likely to smoke. In columns (2) and (5) demographic variables are added. When 
 
30 Most of the tobacco control laws were enacted between 2000 and 2005, after the majority of the 
individuals in my sample had turned 15 years. For that reason, I only include a measure of tobacco 
control laws in 2005.  
 Table 4.6 Linear Probability Estimations of Smoking Participation: Benchmark Models. 
 
 Men  Women 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6) 
Some middle school -0.0360 ** -0.0503 ** -0.0515 **  0.0388 *** 0.0230 *** 0.0209 *** 
 (0.017) (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.010) (0.008) (0.008)
Currently attends school -0.0128  -0.0142  0.0159 ** 0.0214 *** 
 (0.020)  (0.018)  (0.007) (0.007)
Indigenous -0.0351  -0.0466 **  -0.0015 -0.0021
 (0.026)  (0.023)  (0.012) (0.010)
Rural-born -0.0727 *** -0.0778 ***  -0.0532 *** -0.0504 *** 
 (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.008) (0.007)
State-level time varying 
controls# 
no no  yes  no no yes
R-squared 0.024 0.032  0.045  0.037 0.049 0.069
Observations 2181 2181  2181  2662 2662 2662
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Notes: All specifications include the following controls: age, age squared, and state fixed effects.  
# State-Level time Varying Controls are the following: 1) the percentage of families in Oportunidades in the state where the individual lived in 2005, and 
when he/she was 12 and 15 years of age; 2) a dummy variable for whether the state where the person resided the year of the follow-up survey had enacted 
tobacco control laws; and 3) cigarette real prices in the state where the individual resided in 2005 and when he/she was 15 years old.    
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * 10% Significance level. ** 5% Significance level. *** 1% Significance level. 
 
 
 
 controlling for indicators for rural-born, indigenous status and for being currently 
studying, the schooling coefficient the negative association between schooling and 
smoking increases among men, and the positive association decreases among women. 
Being indigenous or rural-born is negatively associated with smoking for both men 
and women. Interestingly, while both some middle school and being currently 
studying are positively associated with smoking among women, they are negatively 
related to smoking among men. Columns (3) and (6) add tobacco control laws, 
cigarette prices and the intensity of Oportunidades. The inclusion of these variables 
further increases the schooling coefficient for men and decreases that for women. The 
magnitude of this change is small and the schooling coefficients remain statistically 
significant. The F-test statistic at the bottom of the table shows that the set of policy 
and price variables is significant. 
4.2 Results of the Test of the ‘Third Variable’ hypothesis 
As discussed before, the negative correlation between schooling and smoking 
among men and the positive association among women may be due to omitted 
variables. Using information from a single source, the Mexican Family Life Survey, 
this part of the empirical analysis assesses the importance of usually unobserved 
measures as determinants of smoking decisions and evaluates its effect on the 
schooling coefficient. The variables are grouped in three sets: utility function 
parameters, cognitive ability and family background variables. To see the effects of 
each set alone, I gradually add variables to a baseline LPM specification that includes 
the same controls as columns (3) and (6) in Table 4.6. The results for men are reported 
in Table 4.7 and those for women in Table 4.8. 
I start the discussion with the results for men. The inclusion of utility parameters in 
Table 7 columns (2) to (4) result in a slightly increase in the middle school coefficient. 
Even though none of the utility function parameters are statistically significant, the 
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 Table 4.7 Linear Probability Estimations of Smoking Participation: Test of the 'Third Variables' Hypothesis for Men. 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  
Some middle 
school (sms) 
-0.0515 ** -0.0532 ** -0.0533 ** -0.0533 ** -0.0418 ** -0.0512 *** -0.0607 *** -0.0525 ** 
149 
Notes: All specifications include: age, age squared, a dummy for school attendance, a dummy for being indigenous, a dummy for rural born, state fixed 
effects, state-level time varying controls and dummies that flag for MV. See table 6 for a definition of state-level time varying controls.  
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * 10% Significance level. ** 5% Significance level. *** 1% Significance level. 
(0.020)  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.020)  (0.019) (0.021)  (0.022)  
Future oriented   -0.0020  -0.0161  -0.0167     -0.0177  
  (0.013)  (0.036)  (0.036)     (0.036)  
Good future 
expectations 
  0.0192  0.0124  0.0125     0.0192  
  (0.034)  (0.040)  (0.040)     (0.040)  
Future oriented 
*good future 
   0.0246  0.0256     0.0288  
   (0.054)  (0.054)     (0.053)  
Risk averse     0.0062     0.0077  
    (0.014)     (0.014)  
Cognitive  
Ability 
     -0.0193 ***  -0.0234 *** 
     (0.006)   (0.006)  
Age 12 family 
resources age 
12 
       -0.0020 -0.0094  -0.0082  
       (0.014) (0.015)  (0.016)  
Parent with sms         0.0650 *** 0.0705 *** 
       (0.014)  (0.014)  
Mother has sms         0.0295  0.0328  
       (0.023)  (0.023)  
R-squared 0.045  0.045  0.045  0.045  0.047  0.045 0.049  0.052  
F, controls     0.21  10.09  7.31  4.56  
p-value of F     0.93  0.00  0.00  0.00  
Observations 2181  2181  2181  2181  2181  2181 2181  2181  
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Notes: All specifications include: age, age squared, a dummy for school attendance, a dummy for being indigenous, a dummy for rural born, state fixed 
effects, state-level time varying controls and dummies that flag for MV. See table 6 for a definition of state-level time varying controls.  
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * 10% Significance level. ** 5% Significance level. *** 1% Significance level. 
Table 4.8 Linear Probability Estimations of Smoking Participation: Test of the 'Third Variables' Hypothesis for Women. 
 
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4)  (5) (6)  (7)  (8) 
Some middle 
school (sms) 
0.0209 *** 0.0187 ** 0.0186 ** 0.0184 ** 0.0134 ** 0.0188 ** 0.0129 * 0.0055
(0.008)  (0.007) (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.006) (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.006)
Future oriented   -0.0148 ** 0.0161  0.0160     0.0136
  (0.006) (0.014)  (0.014)     (0.015)
Good future 
expectations 
  0.0389 ** 0.0548 ** 0.0548 **    0.0478 ** 
  (0.016) (0.023)  (0.023)     (0.024)
Future oriented* 
good future 
  -0.0561 * -0.0561 *    -0.0542 * 
  (0.029)  (0.029)     (0.031)
Risk averse    0.0091     0.0081
   (0.008)     (0.009)
Cognitive  
Ability 
    0.0111 ***   0.0091 ***  
    (0.004)   (0.003)
Age 12 family 
resources age 12 
     0.0118  0.0066  0.0051
     (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.011)
Parent with sms        0.0331 *** 0.0301 *** 
      (0.008)  (0.007)
Mother has sms        -0.0178  -0.0196
      (0.012)  (0.014)
R-squared 0.069  0.071 0.072  0.072  0.071 0.069  0.075  0.079
F , controls    4.30  8.35  11.39  6.31
p-value of F    0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Observations 2662  2662 2662  2662  2662 2662  2662  2662
 
 
 
 
 test at the bottom of the table shows that these variables are jointly significant. I next 
raise the question of whether, controlling for the basic set of variables, the schooling-
smoking relationship is mediated by cognitive ability as measured by the standardized 
Raven test. Column (5) of Table 4.7 shows that cognitive ability is negatively 
associated with smoking participation among men in their twenties. The apparent 
smoking-related returns to schooling are 18.8% smaller that those implied by column 
1. The next set of regressions control for family background variables. Family 
resources at age 12 are negatively but not statistically associated with smoking. 
However, parental schooling increases the probability of smoking. The magnitude of 
this ‘effect’ is even higher than the effect of own schooling. As with own schooling, 
the relationship between parental schooling and smoking decisions of the offspring 
includes the direct effects of schooling, but also the indirect effects. The later include 
peer effects, occupation and assortative mating, among others. To the extent that 
family resources, measured as the household disposing of toilet, are not a good proxy 
for income, the schooling parental coefficient also reflects income effects. The last 
column of Table 4.7 list the coefficients of a regression where all the ‘third factors’ are 
included. In doing that, both the cognitive ability and parental schooling ‘effects’ 
increase, but the magnitude and statistical significance of the middle school coefficient 
remains fairly robust (compare the last column of Table 4.7 with column 1).  
The results for women are very different from the results for men. Column 1 of 
Table 4.8 lists the coefficient of the baseline regression. The inclusion of some of the 
utility function parameters reveals that 10 percent of the schooling-smoking 
relationship is mediated by future orientation and future expectations (column (2)). As 
one would expect, future oriented women are less likely to smoke. However, better 
future expectations are positively associated with smoking. In fact, as shown in 
column (3), future orientation decreases smoking only when the individual has good 
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 expectations about the future. The risk aversion coefficient is small and statistically 
insignificant (see column (4)). The inclusion of cognitive ability alone decreases the 
schooling coefficient by 35 percent. In contrast with the results for men, cognitive 
ability is positively and strongly associated with smoking among women. The family 
background variables are added in columns (6) and (7). The proxy for family 
resources is not statistically significant. However, the total ‘effect’ of parental 
schooling increases smoking participation. The magnitude of this effect is smaller than 
that for men. The inclusion of family background variables decreases the schooling-
smoking correlation among women by almost 40 percent, and the coefficient becomes 
only border-line significant.  The last column of Table  4.8 includes all the usually 
unobserved regressors. While the contribution of these factors is similar as when each 
of them was included separately, controlling for all ‘third factors’ drives the schooling 
effect on smoking among women to zero, and the coefficient is no longer statistically 
significant.  
All in all, the hypothesis that the correlation between schooling and smoking is 
caused by unobserved heterogeneity is borne out for Mexican females, but not for 
males. In particular, once usually unobserved variables are controlled for, the positive 
correlation between schooling and smoking among women vanishes. In contrast, the 
finding that males with more schooling are five percent less likely to smoke is robust 
to the inclusion of variables capturing the value of the future, individual’s 
expectations, cognitive ability and family background. As discussed in the previous 
section, despite the stability of the schooling variable across specifications one should 
be reluctant to interpret the smoking gap between more and less educated men as a 
reliable estimate of the health returns to schooling through less smoking. In the next 
two sub-sections, I present the results that attempt to estimate causal effects of 
schooling on male smoking.  
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4.3 Instrumental Variable Estimations 
The formal analysis of the effect of schooling on smoking starts with the 
discussion of the first stage results. Each cell in Table 4.9 reports the first-stage 
coefficient and standard error on classroom availability from separate regressions that 
are similar to equation (5) above. They are reduced-form estimates of schooling (see 
Glewwe and Kremer, 2005). In addition to coefficients and standard errors, I also 
report the F statistic for the test of the joint statistical significance of the excluded 
instruments and the partial R-squared of the excluded instruments from the first-stage 
regression of each IV specification. Columns (1) to (4) present the results of the effect 
of private schools and columns (5) to (8) report the results of the effect of public 
schools. 
When classroom availability is used as an instrument (Panel A, Table 4.9) and 
only demographic variables are included (column (1)), one private classroom per 1000 
children aged 12 to 15 increases the probability of having some middle school by 5 
percent. However, as controls are added gradually, the effect diminishes and becomes 
statistically insignificant (see columns (2) to (4)).  The F-statistic for the test of the 
hypothesis that the coefficient on the instrument in this regression of schooling is zero 
decreases significantly as controls are added. This suggests that the instrument is not 
powerful enough.  Moving to the effects of public school expansion, column (5) 
indicates that an increase of one public classroom per 1000 children aged 12 to 15 
results in a 1.1 percent increase in the probability of studying at least one year of 
middle school. Because individuals may have different tastes for both schooling and 
smoking, column (6) includes variables that capture preferences, expectations, family 
background  and cognitive ability. When these factors are included, the classroom 
availability coefficient drops down. This suggest that unobserved characteristics are 
associated with the benefits of the public school construction. In columns (7) and (8)
 Table 4.9 First Stage Estimation of the Effect of Classroom Availability on Schooling for Men. 
 
 Private Schools  Public Schools 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  
Panel A: Level Effect of Classroom Availability (CA) 
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CA  0.050 *** 0.038 *** -0.015  0.002  0.011 *** 0.010 *** 0.017  0.011  
 (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.066)  (0.068)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.013)  (0.016)  
R-squared 0.097  0.188  0.212  0.214  0.106  0.198  0.221  0.223  
F statistic, 1st stage 12.84  7.40  0.02  0.01  8.12  7.35  1.64  0.50  
Panel B: Level  and Interaction Effect of Classroom Availability (CA) 
CA  0.038 ** 0.033 ** -0.0319  -0.0127  0.004  0.002  -0.001  -0.004  
 (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.067)  (0.070)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.014)  (0.017)  
CA*rural born 0.028  0.014  0.0315  0.027  0.015 ** 0.017 *** 0.026 *** 0.025 *** 
 (0.031)  (0.030)  (0.036)  (0.036)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  
R-squared 0.097  0.188  0.212  0.214  0.108  0.201  0.227  0.228  
F statistic, 1st stage 6.51  3.92  0.44  0.31  5.59  6.15  7.79  6.72  
Demographics yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  
Third factors no  yes  yes  yes  no  yes  yes  yes  
State fixed-effects no  no  yes  yes  no  no  yes  yes  
Time varying state 
controls  
no  no  no  yes  no  no  no  yes  
Observations 2181  2181  2181  2181  2181  2181  2181  2181  
 
 
 
 
Notes: Dependent Variable is ‘some middle school’. Demographics are: age, age squared, dummies for school attendance, being indigenous, and rural 
born. a Third factors are:  dummies for a) risk averse, b) future oriented and c future expectation, and interaction of future expectations and future 
orientation, Raven’s cognitive ability test, a dummy for family resources (having a toilet at age 12), parental middle school, a dummy for whether the 
mother is the parent with middle school and dummies that flag for MV. See table 6 for a definition of state-level time varying controls. 
Classroom availability is the number of classrooms available in the state-of-birth of the individual when he/she was 12 years old. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * 10% Significance level. ** 5% Significance level. *** 1% Significance level. 
 
 state-fixed effects are included. Column (7) excludes and column (8) includes state-
level variables. The effect of classroom availability increases with the inclusion of 
state fixed-effects, but the coefficient is no longer statistically significant. As in the 
case with private schools, the F statistic of the preferred specification (last column) is 
not powerful enough. Comparing the preferred specifications of public and private 
classroom availability (columns (4) and (8)), as expected, the effect of public 
classrooms is larger than that of private ones. Nonetheless, none of the coefficients are 
statistically significant.  
As previously discussed, the school expansion was targeted to underserved 
rural areas. The lack of effect of classroom availability on schooling for all the 
population might be due to an absent effect on individuals in urban areas. Panel B in 
Table 4.9 presents first stage reduced-form results of regressions where schooling is 
instrumented by both classroom availability and the interaction between classroom 
availability in the state of birth and a dummy for rural-born.  As before, columns (1) to 
(4) list the effects of private classrooms and columns (5) to (8) report the effects of 
public classroom access. The level effect of classroom availability in private schools is 
only significant when state fixed-effects are not controlled for (see columns (1) and 
(2), Panel B). Having more private classrooms in rural areas is not associated with a 
statistically significant increase in schooling at the junior high school margin. In 
contrast, the reduced form estimates of the effect of public classrooms confirm that 
being born in a state with better access to schools increases middle school attainment 
for individuals who were born in rural areas (see columns (5) to (8) in Panel B). As 
state fixed-effects and additional state-level controls are included, the level effect of 
classroom availability remains insignificant, but the magnitude and significance level 
of the interaction term increase.  
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 Finding a positive effect of public classroom availability in rural areas, as 
opposed to private classroom access, lends some credibility to the hypothesis that the 
opening of middle schools induced some youths who would have otherwise stopped 
studying after graduating from elementary school to continue their junior high 
education. Furthermore overidentification tests indicate that one cannot reject the 
validity of the exclusion restrictions for the classroom availability level and its 
interaction with a dummy for rural-born. 
Comparing the partial R-squares in panels A and B, columns (8), the preferred 
specification, shows that adding one more instrument increases the explanatory power 
of the excluded instrument very much, explaining why the F statistics improves so 
much between the two specifications. As recognized by Bound et al. (1995) the F-
statistic on the excluded instruments in the first stage contains valuable information 
about the magnitude of the finite sample bias created by weak instruments. Staiger and 
Stock (1997) show that, in a simple model, 1/F provides an approximate of the finite-
sample relative bias of IV to OLS. Testing the joint significance of the two additional 
instruments yields an F of 6.72, which corresponds to a relative bias of 15%. This F is 
only slightly smaller than the widely cited threshold of F>10, which is associated with 
a 10% bias. Based on the test by Bound et al. (1995), where the extent of the bias for 
given F varies with the number of endogenous regressors and the number of 
instruments,  the F-statistic of 6.72 with two excluded instruments also yields a bias of 
IV estimates relative to OLS of less than 20%. Therefore, while the instruments are 
not overwhelmingly powerful, the finite-sample biases of the estimates of the second-
stage coefficients are not tremendous.  
As I wish to ascertain the impact of schooling on smoking, I limit myself to the 
discussion of the second-stage results that are interpretable based on the F-statistic for 
the joint significance of the instrument in the first stage. The results that are valid and 
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 (border-line) powerful include the level effect of the public classroom availability and 
its interaction with a rural-born dummy. As a benchmark for comparison with the IV 
results, column (1) in Table 4.10 reports the schooling coefficient of a LPM that 
includes time preferences, state-fixed effects and state-level control variables. As 
before, columns (2) and (5) in Table 4.10 add controls gradually to the specifications. 
In all the IV specifications the direction of the effect is reversed, but none of the 
coefficients are statistically different from zero. The standard errors of the IV 
approach are relatively large, and one cannot reject the hypothesis that differences 
between LPM and IV estimates are due to sampling error.  
 
Table 4.10 Second-Stage: Instrumental Variables Estimates of the Effect of  
Public Schooling on Smoking Participation for Men. 
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
       
Some middle school 0.1382  0.1107  0.1292  0.0539
(0.248)  (0.244)  (0.252)  (0.267)
    
Demographics yes  yes  yes  yes
Third factors no  yes  yes  yes
State fixed-effects no  no  yes  yes
Time varying state controls  no  no  no  yes
F Statistic on First Stage 5.59 6.15 7.79  6.72
Observations 2181 2181 2181  2181
 Notes: Dependent Variable is ‘some middle school’. Demographics are: age, age squared, dummies 
for school attendance, being indigenous, and rural born. a Third factors are:  dummies for a) risk 
averse, b) future oriented and c future expectation, and interaction of future expectations and future 
orientation, Raven’s cognitive ability test, a dummy for family resources (having a toilet at age 12), 
parental middle school, a dummy for whether the mother is the parent with middle school and 
dummies that flag for MV. See table 6 for a definition of state-level time varying controls. 
Some Middle School is the predicted value of Schooling in the First Stage. It was obtained from a 
regression where Schooling was regressed on the level effect of classroom availability, an 
interaction term of classroom availability and a dummy for rural-born.and all the control variables 
included in these regressions. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * 10% Significance level. ** 5% Significance 
level. *** 1% Significance level. 
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 5. Discussion  
The evidence provided in this chapter uncovered important features of 
cigarette smoking in Mexico. A result of striking consistency is that males and females 
smoke for very different reasons. While unobserved heterogeneity explains the 
positive association between schooling and smoking among women, the negative 
correlation among men is not influenced by the addition of these difficult-to-observe 
control variables. 
Smoking seems to occur among sophisticated women of relatively better 
backgrounds. That is, female smoking participation increases with the price of 
cigarettes, better future expectations, cognitive ability and better family background. 
Many of the statistically significant determinants of smoking among women have 
effects opposite of what one would expect. This ‘lack of consistency’ is actually 
consistent with the fact that smoking prevalence among has been increasing over time. 
Even in the last decade when taxes were raised, health-warning labels and anti-
smoking mass media campaigns were launched, and youth access restrictions to 
cigarettes and clean indoor-air laws were strengthened (Ibáñez-Hernández, 2005), 
female smoking kept on increasing. While it is difficult to be conclusive on this point, 
smoking may be part of feminine modernity.  
The rest of the discussion focuses on men. To the extent that the measures used 
in this paper are good proxies of individual’s preferences in the health domain, the 
evidence I found is not consistent with the hypothesis that time preferences are 
important determinants of smoking.31  However, in line with previous research by 
Kenkel et al. (2006), cognitive ability was not only associated with less smoking, but 
the inclusion of this variable also affected the schooling coefficient. Therefore, 
                                                 
31 Results available from the author upon request reveal, however, that the utility parameters are 
important determinants of schooling.  
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 excluding cognitive ability in models of smoking yields biased estimates of the effect 
of schooling on smoking.  
The potential influence of family background variables on schooling and 
health behaviors has been widely recognized (see, for example, Case et al., 2005; 
Fletcher and Frisvold, 2009). Nonetheless, due to data limitations, most of the studies 
of smoking participation, initiation or cessation have failed to control for this type of 
variables. In this study, parental schooling was found to be statistically and strongly 
associated with smoking among men and women. The magnitude of the effect was 
twice as large among men. In contrast, research in the U.S. has found a small and 
generally not statistically significant effect of parental schooling on smoking 
participation (Kenkel, et al., 2006) or on preventive care behaviors (Fletcher and 
Frisvold, 2009). An effect of parental schooling on obesity does exist in the U.S. but it 
is negative (Kenkel et al., 2006). 
Following the study by Berger and Leigh (1989) a number of studies 
attempting to estimate the causal effect of schooling on health and health behaviors 
used parental schooling as an instrument for schooling. In a country like Mexico 
where the intergenerational transmission of human capital is strong (Mayer-Foulkes, 
2008) parental schooling would probably be a very powerful instrument for schooling 
in a model of smoking. Nevertheless, the results in this chapter show that this strategy 
would not be valid. Family background variables, particularly parental schooling, have 
direct impacts on both male and female smoking, implying that specifications that 
exclude these variables would be faulty. This might be also true in the analysis of 
other health behaviors.  
Regarding causal effects, the first stage of the instrumental variables strategy 
indicated that the availability of one classroom per thousand school-aged individuals 
in rural areas was associated with a 2.6 percent increase in the probability of studying 
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 junior high school. This is the effect on relatively disadvantaged men who were 
constrained by lack of middle school availability and who would have not gone to 
middle school if it had not been for the fact that a (sufficiently large) middle-school 
opened in their state of birth. It is also the effect on men who took the opportunity to 
study as soon as it arrived. Compared to other men who had the same opportunity, 
they might have higher tastes for schooling relative to work. 
In spite of the statistically significant effect of the school expansion on 
schooling and of the relatively powerful instrument, the second-stage IV estimates of 
the returns to schooling on smoking are no statistically different from zero. The IV 
parameters are less precisely estimated than the LPM ones. Based on Imbens and 
Angrist (1994) and under the assumption of heterogeneity on the returns to schooling 
this ‘lack of impact’ is the so-called local average treatment effect (LATE). It only 
applies to the individual whose education has been affected by junior high school 
openings (described above) and it may differ from the average effect for the 
population.  
So, while this unusual intervention was effective in increasing schooling levels 
it is not clear whether it generated health-related returns to this education. At least two 
reasons might be behind this finding. The school construction was intended to increase 
the quantity of schooling, but the quality of schooling might have been deficient. 
Alternatively, the quality of education might have been acceptable, but the fact that 
individuals were ‘obliged’ to stay in school longer than those who voluntarily chose to 
go to school might have had detrimental effects on the acquired knowledge and skills. 
Deficient health and malnourishment should not have affected these results. These 
factors do affect student achievement (Maluccio et al., 2009), but they do it through 
their effects on cognitive development, which was controlled for in the regressions.  
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 The lack of precision of the IV estimates and the robustness of the schooling 
coefficients to the inclusion of unobserved variables suggests that more education may 
exert a negative effect on male smoking, but my instrument simply does not create 
enough variation to pick it up. Moreover, Mincerian estimates on labor income in 
Mexico show that there are increasing returns to education at levels not achieved by 
most of the population (Meyer-Foulkes, 2006).  Hence, years of schooling at higher 
educational levels might also have a causal impact on smoking and other health 
behaviors in Mexico.  
 
6.  Conclusions 
For the most part, the research examining the relationship between schooling 
and health behaviors has focused on developed countries. In this chapter, I extended 
this literature using a rich dataset of individuals in Mexico. In trying to disentangle the 
correlation between schooling and smoking two hypotheses of the link between 
schooling and smoking participation were tested; the ‘third factor’ hypothesis and the 
hypothesis of a causal effect of schooling on smoking. The analysis was conducted 
separately for men and women providing very interesting new insights to the literature 
examining schooling and health behaviors in developing countries. I focused on 
middle school attendance (grades 7 to 9) as the margin on which schooling was 
expected to affect smoking. Descriptive evidence suggested that this was the right 
margin to look at schooling effects. It is also the school level of most of the people in 
Mexico.  
The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that unobserved heterogeneity 
explains the positive association between schooling and smoking among women. 
Women from better-off backgrounds are more likely to engage in smoking. The 
negative correlation among men was found to be very robust to the inclusion of 
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 usually unobserved controls such as preferences for the future, cognitive ability and 
family background. For both men and women, schooling of the parents is positively 
associated with smoking. 
The public school construction in Mexico during the nineties is associated with 
increases in junior high schooling among men. The estimation of the impact of this 
increased schooling on smoking among the individuals who were affected by the 
school expansion was less precisely estimated. Finding equally valid but more 
powerful instruments in future research would shed some light on whether part of the 
negative correlation between male schooling and smoking is causal. The results in this 
paper indicate that family background variables might be powerful, but not valid. 
Future research may benefit from exploring the effect of other schooling margins on 
smoking outcomes that capture the dynamics of smoking (i.e. smoking initiation or 
cessation). Finally, uncovering the mechanism(s) through which educational 
attainment affects smoking remains an important research question, and one that 
future research should address. 
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 CHAPTER 5 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Using individual-level data, which is a step toward the correct way to analyze 
smoking behaviors; this dissertation empirically assessed the extent to which different 
public policies, through changes in incentives, influenced the smoking decisions of 
youth and young adults.   
The first chapter described the model to be used as the framework of analysis, 
and provided background on the demand and supply of cigarettes, against the 
backdrop of anti-smoking policies in Mexico.  
One goal of the first substantive essay, which corresponds to Chapter 2, was to 
develop an index of clean indoor air policies based on economic theory predictions. 
This index, which I named Clean Indoor Air Policy Index (CIAPI), gives less credit to 
regulations where a small share of the population is potentially affected or where 
people spend nearly no time. This is because smoking restrictions in these locations, 
even if enforced, are not expected to increase the costs of smoking, and thereby 
decrease smoking consumption. The CIAPI also penalizes differences between the 
actual and the desired level of enforcement. This index is not without limitations, but 
it does provide a ‘summary score’ that, compared to previous indices, is based on 
more credible assumptions.  
The second chapter also asked whether stringent limits to smoking are 
associated with the decision to smoke and, conditional upon smoking, with the 
intensity of consumption. More stringent laws, measured by the CIAPI, were not 
found to be correlated with smoking participation for either men or women. 
Nonetheless, stringent smoking restrictions were shown to be negatively associated 
with the number of cigarettes smoked by men. Despite that I found no evidence 
indicating that more stringent laws were caused rather than cause smoking, I prefer to 
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 not interpret these results as causal. This is because, with the data available, I was 
unable to rule out the possibility that the correlation is driven by unobserved state-
level heterogeneity.  
The first chapter also provided a general sense of the determinants of smoking 
using, for the first time in Mexico, individual-level data. The stock of cigarettes was 
found to be a good predictor of the number of cigarettes smoked. Nonetheless, none of 
the other individual and state-level variables were found to determine the intensity of 
smoking. In contrast, smoking participation was predicted by a number of individual-
level variables, which varied by gender. Interestingly, the decision to smoke was 
negatively associated with Oportunidades, a federal anti-poverty program in Mexico, 
and with schooling among men. In the case of women, however, the Oportunidades 
program was not found to be correlated with smoking participation. Additionally, the 
schooling-smoking gradient was found to be positive. These two contrasting findings 
were explored further in the other two essays of the dissertation.  
The third chapter, and second substantive essay of the dissertation, investigated 
the causal effect of Oportunidades on the smoking behaviors of its participants. The 
benefits of this program include sizable cash transfers, health information sessions and 
schooling. Affecting smoking is not a goal of this program. However, health 
economics research suggests that the Oportunidades intervention could substantially 
change smoking among poor Mexicans. Exploiting an exogenous jump in program 
participation by means of a fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Design, the estimated 
local average treatment effect on smoking among adults that participated in the 
program an average of four years was zero. In contrast, Oportunidades might have 
increased slightly the smoking rates of participant adolescents. Finally, differential 
treatments by sex enabled isolating the income effect of Oportunidades by estimating 
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the program's impact on adult male smoking. The evidence suggested a null income 
effect on adult smoking.  
Chapter four measured and disentangled the correlation between schooling and 
smoking in Mexico. Using rich data from the second wave of the Mexican Family Life 
Survey (MxFLS-2), I found that the positive correlation between schooling and 
smoking among women is driven by unobserved heterogeneity. Smoking is more 
prevalent among more sophisticated women coming from better-off backgrounds. In 
contrast, neither of the usually unobserved ‘third factors’ was shown to affect the 
negative association between schooling and smoking among men. The apparent 
health-related returns to schooling among men were tested using and Instrumental 
Variables (IV) framework. Within each state, I exploited variations across cohorts in 
new junior high school classroom openings between 1990 and 1999 to construct an 
instrument for schooling. The evidence in that chapter suggested that junior high 
school expansion was associated with higher schooling achievement, particularly in 
rural areas. The results also indicated that returns to schooling might include less 
smoking among Mexican men.  
This dissertation constitutes the first thorough analysis of cigarette 
consumption in Mexico from an economic perspective. Using a static framework for 
the analysis, most of this research focused on understanding the decision to smoke. 
Suggestions for future research were discussed in each chapter. General extensions to 
this research include the exploration of the determinants of conditional intensity; and 
the examination of the dynamics of cigarette consumption (i.e. smoking initiation and 
cessation). 
 
